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18Review of Chrisoula Andreou: Choosing well: the good, the bad, and the trivial (review)Ethics 134 (2): 268-273. 2023.
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20The Present Functions and the Future Persistence of Planning AgencyJournal of Applied Philosophy 41 (1): 30-40. 2024.Following Bratman, I distinguish between the Cummins or component-function of the planning capacity (its role as a component of larger forms of practical organizations) and its Wright or existence-function – the planning capacity's effect that explains its existence. I agree with Bratman that these functions are distinct. The planning capacity's role within larger practical organizations need not explain its origin. But I argue that the distinction is less stark for future-oriented existence-fun…Read more
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2218An Introduction to the Philosophy of AgencyIn The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, Routledge. pp. 1-18. 2022.
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314The Structures of Temporally Extended AgentsIn Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Time in Action: The Temporal Structure of Rational Agency and Practical Thought, Routledge. pp. 108-132. 2022.This paper offers an overview of the ways agents might extend over time and the characteristic structure of extended human agency. Agency can extend in two distinct but combinable modes: the ontological, which gives rise to simple continuous agents; and the conceptual, which gives rise to agents who conceive of and care about distal times, and have minimal planning abilities. Our extended form of agency combines both. But we are still limited by the temporal locality in the operation of our psyc…Read more
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206Constitutivism, MoralIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. 2022.Moral constitutivism purports to explain moral normativity by appeal to the nature of either agency or rational powers. Ambitious constitutivism aspires to ground the categorical authority of morality and to derive the content of the basic moral norms while avoiding the problems of moral realism. As a general strategy, moral constitutivism faces three serious challenges. First, the shmagency challenge. The worry is that the authority of the norms derived from the nature of agency is only conditi…Read more
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294Diachronic AgencyIn The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, Routledge. pp. 336-347. 2022.This chapter discusses the structure of our temporally extended agency. We do not have the power to act directly at a distance, so any of our temporally extended projects must be sustained over its temporal unfolding by momentary actions. We need both the capacity to organize these momentary steps in light of a synoptic overview of the extended activity as a whole and to sustain our motivation to continue to pursue the extended activity. Hence, the distinctive mode in which we act over time is t…Read more
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509Games and the fluidity of layered agencyJournal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (3): 344-355. 2021.What can the philosophy of agency learn from Nguyen’s book on games? The most important lesson concerns, to use Nguyen’s terms, the ‘layered’ structure of our agency and the ‘fluidity’ requ...
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1697The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency (edited book)Routledge. 2022.An outstanding reference source to the key issues, problems, and debates in this exciting subject. Comprising 42 chapters it is essential reading for students and researchers within philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of psychology and ethics.
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215The simple constitutivist movePhilosophical Explorations 22 (2): 146-162. 2019.A common feature of all versions of constitutivism is the “simple constitutivist move” to the effect that engagement in any enterprise requires respecting the constitutive standards of the enterpri...
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165Intending, acting, and doingPhilosophical Explorations 20 (sup2): 13-39. 2017.I argue that intending and acting belong to the same genus: intending is a kind of doing continuous in structure with intentional acting. Future-directed intending is not a truly separate phenomenon from either the intending in action or the acting itself. Ultimately, all intentions are in action, or better still, in extended courses of action. I show how the intuitive distinction between intending and acting is based on modeling the two phenomena on the extreme and limiting cases of an otherwis…Read more
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494What good is a diachronic will?Philosophical Studies 144 (3): 403-430. 2009.There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent's capacity to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive vi…Read more
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600Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative LaborPhilosophers' Imprint 10 1-23. 2010.It is often argued that future-directed decisions are effective at shaping our future conduct because they give rise, at the time of action, to a decisive reason to act as originally decided. In this paper, I argue that standard accounts of decision-based reasons are unsatisfactory. For they focus either on tie-breaking scenarios or cases of self-directed distal manipulation. I argue that future-directed decisions are better understood as tools for the non-manipulative, intrapersonal division of…Read more
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614Pro-Tempore Disjunctive IntentionsIn Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.), Time and the Philosophy of Action, Routledge. pp. 108-123. 2015.I investigate the structure of pro-tempore disjunctive intentions: intentions directed at two or more eventually incompatible goals that are nonetheless kept open for the time being, while the agent is waiting to acquire more information to determine which option is better. These intentions are the basic tool for balancing, in our planning agency, rigidity and flexibility, stability and responsiveness to changing circumstances. They are a pervasive feature of intentional diachronic agency and co…Read more
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882Agency, Scarcity, and MortalityThe Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4): 349-378. 2015.It is often argued, most recently by Samuel Scheffler, that we should reconcile with our mortality as constitutive of our existence: as essential to its temporal structure, to the nature of deliberation, and to our basic motivations and values. Against this reconciliatory strategy, I argue that there is a kind of immortal existence that is coherently conceivable and potentially desirable. First, I argue against the claim that our existence has a temporal structure with a trajectory that necessar…Read more
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442Recensione: Telmo Pievani, Introduzione alla Filosofia della Biologia (review)2R 2 1-11. 2006.Il volume di Pievani costituisce la più estesa ed aggiornata presentazione in lingua italiana del dibattito filosofico sulla biologia evoluzionistica. Il libro non presuppone alcuna conoscenza specialistica né in filosofia né in biologia, e perciò può essere letto con profitto anche dai non specialisti (un occasionale ricorso ad un dizionario di biologia può essere utile per la definizione di alcuni termini tecnici). Per il suo carattere introduttivo, si presta ad essere utilizzato come testo ne…Read more
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2659Constitutivism and the Inescapability of AgencyOxford Studies in Metaethics 4 303-333. 2009.Constitutivism argues that the source of the categorical force of the norms of rationality and morality lies in the constitutive features of agency. A systematic failure to be guided by these norms would amount to a loss or lack of agency. Since we cannot but be agents, we cannot but be unconditionally guided by these norms. The constitutivist strategy has been challenged by David Enoch. He argues that our participation in agency is optional and thus cannot be a source of categorical demands. In…Read more
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Il Principio di Differenza: Incentivi o Uguaglianza?Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 1 47-63. 1995.
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825Willing, Wanting, Waiting by Richard Holton (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3): 443-457. 2012.In his book Willing, Wanting, Waiting Holton defends a comprehensive view of the will. His central claims are: that we have a capacity of choice, independent of judgment about what is best to do, that resistance to temptation requires a special kind of intentions, resolutions, and the exercise of an executive capacity, willpower, there is a distinction between weakness of will and akrasia. I argue that Holton is right about these claims, but I raise a few concerns: I am unclear about the philoso…Read more
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638Diachronic Structural RationalityInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3): 311-336. 2014.In this paper I investigate whether there are genuine and irreducible pressures of diachronic rationality grounded on the structure of the subject rather than on substantive considerations, such as pragmatic ones. I argue that structural pressures of diachronic rationality have a limited scope. The most important pressure only tells against arbitrary interference with the mechanisms for the retention of attitudes over time. I then argue that in the practical case, a substantial account in terms …Read more
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540Three Ways of Spilling Ink TomorrowIn Elvio Baccarini (ed.), Rationality in Belief and Action,, Rijeka. pp. 95-127. 2006.There are three ways to control our future conduct: by causing it, by manipulating our future selves, or by taking future-directed decisions. I show that the standard accounts of future-directed decisions fail to do justice to their distinctive contribution in intentional diachronic agency. The standard accounts can be divided in two categories: First, those that conflate the operation of decisions with that of devices for either physical constraint or manipulative self-management. Second, accou…Read more
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410Inescapability RevisitedManuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 41 (4): 113-158. 2018.According to constitutivism, the objective authority of practical reason is to be grounded in the constitutive features of agency. In this paper, I offer a brief survey of the basic structure of constitutive argument about objectivity and consider how constitutivism might dispel the worry that it can only ground a conditional kind of authority. I then consider David Enoch’s original shmagency challenge and the response in terms of the inescapability of agency. In particular, I revisit the appeal…Read more
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2021.1.1 In a recent series of papers, G.A. Cohen has presented an egalitarian interpretation of the Difference Principle (hereafter, DP).1 According to this principle—first introduced by Rawls in A Theory of Justice2—inequalities in the distribution of primary goods3 are legitimate only to the extent that they maximize the prospects of the least advantaged members of society. Cohen argues that, once it is properly applied, DP does not legitimate any departure from equality. According to him, the d…Read more
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690Conditional IntentionsNoûs 43 (4). 2009.In this paper, I will discuss the various ways in which intentions can be said to be conditional, with particular attention to the internal conditions on the intentions’ content. I will first consider what it takes to carry out a conditional intention. I will then discuss how the distinctive norms of intention apply to conditional intentions and whether conditional intentions are a weaker sort of commitments than the unconditional ones. This discussion will lead to the idea of what I call the ‘d…Read more
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386Ludwig on Conditional IntentionsMethode 4 (6): 61-74. 2015.In this paper, I discuss Ludwig's systematic and illuminating account of conditional intentions, with particular reference to my own view (presented in "Conditional Intentions", Noûs, 2009). In contrast to Ludwig, I argue that we should prefer a formal characterization of conditional intentions rather than a more substantial one in terms of reasons for action (although the conditions that qualify an intention bear on the reasonableness and justifiability of the intention). I then defend a partia…Read more
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439Katsafanas, Paul. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 267. $75.00 (review)Ethics 125 (3): 883-888. 2015.
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508ActionIn John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 137-151. 2009.An introductory survey of the contemporary philosophy of action.
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936Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility, Oxford University Press. 2013.In this paper, I argue against the popular philosophical thesis---aka the ‘own action condition’---that an agent can only intend one’s own actions. I argue that the own action condition does not hold for any executive attitude, intentions included. The proper object of intentions is propositional rather than agential (‘I intend that so-and-so be the case’ rather than ‘I intend to do such-and-such’). I show that, although there are some essential de se components in intending, they do not restric…Read more
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90The will: Interpersonal bargaining versus intrapersonal predictionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5): 654-655. 2005.Ainslie is correct in arguing that the force of commitments partly depends on the predictive role of present action, but this claim can be supported independently of the analogy with interpersonal bargaining. No matter whether we conceive of the parties involved in the bargaining as interests or transient selves, the picture of the will as a competitive interaction among these parties is unconvincing.
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805Diachronic constraints of practical rationalityPhilosophical Issues 22 (1): 144-164. 2012.In this paper, I discuss whether there are genuinely *diachronic* constraints of practical rationality, that is, pressures on combinations of practical attitudes over time, which are not reducible to mere synchronic rational pressures. Michael Bratman has recently argued that there is at least one such diachronic rational constraint that governs the stability of intentions over time. *Pace* Bratman, I argue that there are no genuinely diachronic constraints on intentions that meet the stringent …Read more
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506La Teoria dell'Identita Personale di Parfit e l'UtilitarismoAnnali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 9 161-196. 1993.
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