Walter Veit

Animal welfare has a long history of disregard. While in recent decades the study of animal welfare has become a scientific discipline of its own, the difficulty of measuring animal welfare can still be vastly underestimated. There are three primary theories, or perspectives, on animal welfare - biological functioning, natural living and affective state. These come with their own diverse methods of measurement, each providing a limited perspective on an aspect of welfare. This paper describes a perspectival pluralist account of animal welfare, in which all three theoretical perspectives and their multiple measures are necessary to understand this complex phenomenon and provide a full picture of animal welfare. This in turn will offer us a better understanding of perspectivism and pluralism itself.

Assessing the welfare of non-human sentient animals is a multifaceted scientific endeavour. A human psychology approach that holds promise for application to animals is affect balance, based on the idea that how one feels most of the time is determined by the balance between the separate dimensions of positive and negative affect. Affect balance has been shown to have profound relationships with mental and physical health and well-being in humans. The aim of this conceptual article is to evaluate whether the affect balance methodology might offer a useful integrative measure of the affective/hedonic component of animal welfare and to outline key considerations for its potential application. Due to the variation in human affect balance methods, any attempt to translate them to other species requires first extracting their main underlying principles. We extracted four underlying principles, the first three relating to estimating the frequencies of positive and negative affect over time, and the fourth relating to the integration of positive and negative affect into an affect balance score or category. We then discuss how the theory behind the affect balance methodology can be translated to other species, and the theoretical and practical considerations in the development and validation of potential assessment methods. Altogether, we think that this approach holds great potential for animal welfare science and we encourage empirical studies into this topic.

One of the primary concerns in animal research is ensuring the welfare of laboratory animals. Modern views on animal welfare emphasize the role of animal sentience, i.e. the capacity to experience subjective states such as pleasure or suffering, as a central component of welfare. The increasing official recognition of animal sentience has had large effects on laboratory animal research. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., University of Cambridge, 2012) marked an official scientific recognition of the presence of sentience in mammals, birds, and cephalopods. Animal sentience has furthermore been recognized in legislation in the European Union, UK, New Zealand and parts of Australia, with discussions underway in other parts of the world to follow suit. In this paper, we analyze this shift towards recognition of sentience in the regulation and practice in the treatment of laboratory animals and its effects on animal welfare and use.

In this essay, we discuss Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka’s The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul from an interdisciplinary perspective. Constituting perhaps the longest treatise on the evolution of consciousness, Ginsburg and Jablonka unite their expertise in neuroscience and biology to develop a beautifully Darwinian account of the dawning of subjective experience. Though it would be impossible to cover all its content in a short book review, here we provide a critical evaluation of their two key ideas—the role of Unlimited Associative Learning in the evolution of, and detection of, consciousness and a metaphysical claim about consciousness as a mode of being—in a manner that will hopefully overcome some of the initial resistance of potential readers to tackle a book of this length.

With increasing attention given to wild animal welfare and ethics, it has become common to depict animals in the wild as existing in a state dominated by suffering. This assumption is now taken on board by many and frames much of the current discussion; but needs a more critical assessment, both theoretically and empirically. In this paper, we challenge the primary lines of evidence employed in support of wild animal suffering, to provide an alternative picture in which wild animals may often have lives that are far more positive than is commonly assumed. Nevertheless, while it is useful to have an alternative model to challenge unexamined assumptions, our real emphasis in this paper is the need for the development of effective methods for applying animal welfare science in the wild, including new means of data collection, the ability to determine the extent and scope of welfare challenges and opportunities, and their effects on welfare. Until such methods are developed, discussions of wild animal welfare cannot go beyond trading of intuitions, which as we show here can just as easily go in either direction.

Mixed martial arts (MMA) is frequently criticized as barbaric and inhumane. This stands in stark contrast with the booming popularity of the sport. Before now, what little philosophical work has been written on MMA depicts it as something inherently wrong (as with Dixon) or as something merely permissible (as with articles by Weimer and Kershnar and Kelly, respectively). Contrary to these foregoing analyses this chapter argues that MMA is not only permissible, but a morally praiseworthy and virtuous endeavor in virtue of developing moral character and recognizing the intimate connection between body and mind.

Mixed martial arts (MMA) is frequently criticized as barbaric and inhumane. This stands in stark contrast with the booming popularity of the sport. Before now, what little philosophical work has been written on MMA depicts it as something inherently wrong (as with Dixon) or as something merely permissible (as with articles by Weimer and Kershnar and Kelly, respectively). Contrary to these foregoing analyses this chapter argues that MMA is not only permissible, but a morally praiseworthy and virtuous endeavor in virtue of developing moral character and recognizing the intimate connection between body and mind.

A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness aims to advance Donald Griffin’s vision of the “final, crowning chapter of the Darwinian revolution” by firmly integrating animals within the science of consciousness. Although this field has largely neglected the questions of when and why consciousness evolved, this book champions a Darwinian philosophy where the experiences of other animals are put centre-stage in investigations of consciousness. This synopsis offers a summary of the book’s core arguments for the advancement of a truly biological science of consciousness. This approach allows for an empirically rigorous investigation into what it is like to be a bat, a crow, a bee, or an octopus.

In the last two decades, there has been a blossoming literature aiming to counter the neglect of plant capacities. In their recent paper, Miguel Segundo-Ortin and Paco Calvo begin by providing an overview of the literature to then question the mistaken assumptions that led to plants being immediately rejected as candidates for sentience. However, it appears that many responses to their arguments are based on the implicit conviction that because animals have far more sophisticated cognition and agency than plants, and that plants should not have the same moral status as animals, plants should not have any moral status. Put in simpler terms: it is not as bad to eat plants than to eat, say, pigs. While there are still uncertainties around comparative moral and policy implications between animals and plants, given a gradualist account of quasi-sentience and partial moral status, both of which we claim are a matter of degree, we may not have to abolish our convictions by declaring that plants have no sentience or moral status at all. Indeed, we can hold two things at the same time: that animals and plants have moral status, but animals have prima facie more moral status than plants.

It is my pleasure to respond to three thoughtful commentaries on A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness in this issue (Veit 2023a). The commentaries by Pober (2025), as well as Barrett and Fischer (2025), both focus on the relationship between valence, common currencies of value, and consciousness, and so I will largely respond to their arguments together. Afterwards, I will respond to the commentary by Kohda (2025) which raises distinct concerns about my gradualist approach to consciousness and proposes an alternative thesis for understanding the evolution of self-awareness, drawing on his experimental work on mirror self-recognition in fish.

Climate change mitigation has become a paradigm case both for externalities in general and for the game-theoretic model of the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC) in particular. This situation is worrying, as we have reasons to suspect that some models in the social sciences are apt to be performative to the extent that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Framing climate change mitigation as a hardly solvable coordination problem may force us into a worse situation, by changing real-world behaviour to fit our model, rather than the other way around. But while this problem of the performativity of the ToC has been noted in a recent paper in this journal by Matthew Kopec, his proposed strategies for dealing with their self-fulfilling nature fall short of providing an adequate solution. Instead of relying on the idea that modelling assumptions are always strictly speaking false, this paper shows that the problem may be better framed as a problem of underdetermination between competing explanations. Our goal here is to provide a framework for choosing between this set of competing models that allows us to avoid a ‘Russian Roulette’-like situation in which we gamble with existential risk.

The last decade has seen an explosion of meta-philosophical work on conceptual engineering. Beyond simple analysis of concepts, conceptual engineering allows for evaluation and improvement of concepts accord- ing to the purposes for which they will be used. This paper sketches a pluralist account of conceptual engineering and provides a distinction between two different and often conflicting kinds of conceptual engineer- ing: naturalist conceptual engineering (NCE) and moral conceptual en- gineering (MCE), distinguished not by their methods, but by their roles, functions, and purposes. Using the examples of health and animal wel- fare, we demonstrate the application of both MCE and NCE and show how the different contexts in which a concept is used can create con- flicting demands but also how concordance between these demands can strengthen a concept.