Chenyang Li

Jiyuan Yu 余纪元, professor of philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo, and Executive Director of the International Society for Chinese Philosophy since 2012, passed away on November 3, 2016, after a two-year battle with cancer. His passing is a major loss to many, especially to the international community of Chinese and comparative philosophy.Born in China, Jiyuan was among the first batches of students entering universities after the Cultural Revolution. One of the youngest of his university peers, he developed a keen interest in Greek philosophy and went overseas to study at the University of Guelph and earned his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1994. After a...

It is a great honor to have colleagues engaging in a meaningful discussion of my book. I appreciate my critics’ thoughtful and constructive criticisms as well as exceedingly generous praises. Due to space limitations, I will confine my response to some key issues raised here. I will begin with Yao Xinzhong’s criticism of my claim and argument on the centrality of harmony in Confucian philosophy. Yao reads my view as being that harmony is the central concept or ideal in Confucian philosophy, which I take to mean that harmony has been the central concept or ideal in Confucian philosophy up to this point. Understood this way, that is not my argument in the book. My claims in the book are more...

Joseph Chan’s Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times is a milestone in the contemporary study of Confucian political philosophy. In this remarkable work, Chan presents his version of Confucian perfectionism, aiming to balance liberalism and Confucianism as a solution to reconstructing a political philosophy in response to contemporary challenges. I am sympathetic to much of what Chan has to say in the book. I agree that, rather than merely being an ethical theory, Confucianism can and should have a place in political philosophy. I also agree that Confucianism can coexist with democracy1 and that human rights can and should be instituted as a fallback apparatus. This essay is not...

By investigating the link between the Confucian ideal of longevity and moral cultivation, I argue that Confucian moral cultivation is founded on the ideal of harmony, and, in this connection, it promotes a holistic, healthy life, of which longevity is an important component. My argument is internal to Confucianism, in the sense that it aims to show these concepts are coherently constructed within the Confucian philosophical framework; I do not go beyond the Confucian framework to prove its validity. Finally, I show that if these Confucian beliefs are true, they have serious implications for public policy-making in contemporary societies.

The materialist thesis that there is a type-type identity between certain mental phenomena and certain physical phenomena has encountered serious criticisms. This paper is to propose a revised form of mind-body identity theory which moves forward from the token identity theory and can stand the major criticism made against the type-type identity theory. In the first part of the paper, through a very brief review of the issue I show what needs to be done; in the second part, I show how my solution avoids the difficulties that have troubled the type-type identity theory.

SCIENTISTS HAVE DISCOVERED that water is H2O. Water is H2O is true. But is it a necessary truth? In other words, is it true in all possible worlds? Some people think it is. For example Hilary Putnam, in his well-known Twin Earth argument, concludes that "water is H2O" is necessarily true; thus a liquid which phenomenally resembles H2O and fits the description of water in almost all aspects, but has the chemical formula XYZ, cannot be water. Saul Kripke has made a similar claim about the necessary identity between water and H2O. Because this type of truth is based on empirical discoveries, Kripke calls truths of this sort "necessary a posteriori." The thesis shared by Putnam and Kripke has two premises: a realist view that natural kinds exist independently of human cognition, and a theory of direct reference of natural kind terms. Opposing the view that natural kind terms pick out objects through descriptions, Putnam and Kripke hold that natural kind terms pick out natural kinds in the world in a direct way. Based on these two premises, they argue that, if two natural kind terms, A and B, designate the same thing in the world, "A = B" expresses a necessary identity.

The traditional ontology is a substance-ontology. It is the ontology that an object is primarily a substance, which has a definite being and properties. A lot of philosophical problems are tied to this ontology. I deconstruct the ontology of substance and propose a being-ontology. It is a way to see the world, instead of as a totality of substances, as a totality of ways of being. It has two theses. First, an object is not viewed as a substance which has properties, but as an entity that has various ways of being, among which one may be viewed as prominent in certain circumstances and another in other circumstances. For example, an object is a statue, it is also a piece of marble, and many more; it is itself no more a statue than a piece of marble, nor more a piece of marble than a statue, but can be viewed as prominently a statue or a piece of marble depending on circumstances. Second, the being of an object is contextually constituted. That is, while an object has a variety of being, each being is constituted in a context. Without a context, no being can be constituted. Thus, my ontology may be viewed at two levels. On the being level, each being is contextually constituted; on the entity level, each entity is a totality of its various ways of being. My ontology is feministic and democratic, in a very broad sense of these terms, in that it deconstructs the 'totalitarian' core of objects and allows a variety of being on their own right. My ontology has consequences for other branches of philosophy. For instance, it explains why in aesthetic critiques the same object may be subject to two or more equally well-grounded assessments. Without the conception of substance, my notion of identity is relative and context-dependent. Using this ontology I offer solutions to a number of metaphysical problems, such as individual identity, personal identity, and mind-body identity, etc

Harmony has become a major challenge for modern governance in the twenty-first century because of the multi-religious, multi-racial and multi-ethnic character of our increasingly globalized societies. Governments all over the world are facing growing pressure to integrate the many diverse elements and subcultures which make up modern pluralistic societies. This book examines the idea of harmony, and its place in politics and governance, both in theory and practice, in Asia, the West and elsewhere. It explores and analyses the meanings, mechanisms, dimensions and methodologies of harmony as a normative political ideal in both Western and Asian philosophical traditions. The book argues that in Western political thought - which sees politics as primarily concerned with resolving social conflicts and protecting individual rights - the concept of harmony has often been neglected. In contrast, since earliest times harmony or ‘he’ has been a profound theme in Confucian thought, and current leaders of many East Asian governments, and the Chinese government, have explicitly declared that the realisation of a harmonious society is their aim. The book also assesses how harmony is pursued, jeopardized or deformed in the real world of politics, based upon empirical analysis of a variety of different cultural, social and political contexts, including: China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Denmark, Latin America and the Scandinavian countries. It shows how harmony as an organizing concept can help to promote new thinking in governance, and overcome problems of modern-day governance like distrust, adversarial conflicts, hyper-individualism, coercive state intervention, and free-market alienation. It also discusses the potential problems posed by the pursuit of harmony, in particular in the grave threat of totalitarianism, and considers how these risks could best be mitigated

There is an inner thoroughness spirit in traditional Chinese learning of classics—the so-called "Guoxue" in Chinese. Only on this foundation of "thoroughness" spirit can academics show its vigorous culture life and spiritual life, which makes traditional Chinese learning of classics pursue the transcendence of heaven and man and can’t be divided into a religion. Our traditional Chinese values and its original significance exist in our traditional academic system and the enlightenment of propriety and music. As for the self—identification, because of the lost of the "thoroughness" spirit and original significance foundation, the traditional Chinese learning of classics concealed their academic specialties that make the reconstruction of modern Chinese culture lack a solid foundation. Currently, various colleges, institutes and centers of traditional Chinese learning have been set up in many universities, but “Guoxue” should not be taken as one special subject far from the other disciplines, and we should make efforts to reconstruct the traditional Chinese learning of classics ("Guoxue") as a primitive significance-adding foundation or “academic home”

Freedom is intrinsic to a good life. An account of the Confucian conception of the good life must include a reasonable conception of freedom. Studies in Chinese ideas of freedom, however, have been focused mostly on Daoism. A quick survey of some fine books on Chinese philosophy shows little result on Confucian freedom.1 In this essay, I argue that attributing a notion of “free will” to Confucian philosophy has serious limitations; it will be more fruitful to draw on contemporary feminist theories of freedom and autonomy, particularly the notion of autonomy competency, in explicating Confucian freedom. Thus, I articulate the Confucian notion of freedom in terms of choosing , and advance a Confucian ..

This article offers a study of the early formation and development of the ideal of harmony in ancient Chinese philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy. It shows that, unlike the Pythagorean notion of harmony, which is primarily based on a linear progressive model with a pre-set order, the ancient Chinese concept of harmony is best understood as a comprehensive process of harmonization. It encompasses spatial as well as temporal dimensions, metaphysical as well as moral and aesthetical dimensions. It is a fundamentally open notion in the sense that it does not aim to conform to any pre-set order. This broader, richer, and more liberal understanding of harmony has had a profound influence on Chinese culture as whole in its long history.

: This is a study of the Confucian ideal of harmony and harmonization (he 和). First, through an investigation of the early development of he in ancient China, the meaning of this concept is explored. Second, a philosophical analysis of he and a discussion of the relation between harmony, sameness, and strife are offered. Also offered are reasons why this notion is so important to Confucian philosophy. Finally, on the basis of value pluralism, a case is made for the Confucian approach of he to the politics of today's world culture

This essay studies equality and inequality in Confucianism. By studying Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, and other classic thinkers, I argue that Confucian equality is manifested in two forms. Numerical equality is founded in the Mencian belief that every person is born with the same moral potential and the Xunzian notion that all people have the same xing and the same potential for moral cultivation. It is also manifested in the form of role-based equality. Proportional equality, however, is the main notion of equality in Confucian philosophy. Proportional equality is realized in moral, economic, and political realms. On the basis of these notions of Confucian equality, I propose two Confucian political principles for contemporary society. The first is the inclusive principle of general election by citizenry, and the second is the exclusive principle of qualification for public offices.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-MingChenyang LiUnderstanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming. By Shu-hsien Liu. Westport and London: Praeger, 1998. Pp. xii + 273.Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming, by Shu-hsien Liu, a leading contemporary Neo-Confucian scholar, aims to present the Confucian tradition [End Page 312] from a contemporary Neo-Confucian perspective and purports to provide some background clues to what has led to the Third Epoch of Confucianism, that is, the emergence of the contemporary Neo-Confucian movement.As its title suggests, the book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with Classical Confucianism, and part 2 is a study of Sung-Ming Confucian philosophy. The Classical period begins with an informative chapter on the historical background to the emergence of Confucian philosophy, which is particularly useful if the book is to be used as a university-level text. The historical chapter is followed by chapters on Confucius (Kong Zi), Mencius (Meng Zi), The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, and the Book of Changes. Part 1 ends with a chapter on the transformation of Confucianism since the Han dynasty. Compared with similar books on Confucian philosophy, the chapter on Confucius appears sketchy, but its treatment of Confucius' central concept, jen (ren), is first-rate, clear, and insightful. The chapter on Mencius is more elaborate. It surveys virtually every key concept of Mencius' philosophy. As with similar works by Chinese scholars, the sheer number of quotations in this chapter may appear excessive to Western readers. Hsün Tzu (Xun Zi), another key classical Confucian philosopher, is only mentioned in passing, although this is not surprising in a book written from a Neo-Confucian perspective; in the Neo Confucian tradition Hsün Tzu is considered unorthodox.The chapter on the Book of Changes is a breath of fresh air in that it has adopted a developmental point of view. The author argues that there are four layers of meaning in the work: it offers a system of mystical symbolism, a system of rational/natural symbolism, a system of cosmological symbolism, and finally a system of ethics/metaphysical symbolism. Professor Liu says of the four systems, "each one succeed[s] the other and yet interpenetrate[s] the other" (p. 74). Overall, Classical Confucianism is analyzed according to three inseparable aspects—spiritual, political, and popular—which define the heritage as well as the burden of this tradition.At first I was a bit surprised to see that the chapter on "The Characteristics and Contemporary Significance of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian Philosophy" is at the beginning, not at the end, of part 2 on Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy. But it turns out that this chapter contains a brief survey of some major Neo-Confucian philosophers of the period and serves well as an introduction to part 2. Recognizing Chu Hsi's (Zhu Xi) contribution to the movement of the Second Epoch, Liu spends two chapters out of six on this great Sung philosopher. The chapter on Wang Yang-ming aims "to destroy the myth once and for all that there is no discrepancy between Lu [Hsiang-shan] and Wang and that there is not a close relationship between Wang and Chu [Hsi]" (p. 198). This goes against a widespread (mis)conception that Wang and Chu represent two distinct lines of Neo-Confucianism.Part 2 ends with a chapter on Huang Tsung-hsi (Huang Zongxi), arguably the most liberal of all Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophers. Liu regards Huang as the culmination of an unfinished Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophical tradition, from which the contemporary Neo-Confucian movement should take up the cause. Altogether, part 2 is not as systematic in introducing Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy as is part 1 on Classical Confucianism. [End Page 313]As a synthesis of various articles previously published by the author over a twenty-five-year period, the book bears both the strengths and the weaknesses of works of this kind: there are in-depth studies focused on specific topics of particular interest in the Neo-Confucian movement, but there is occasionally a lack of smooth transition from one chapter to another or...

In recent years, scholars of Confucian ethics have debated on important issues such as whether Confucian ethics embraces, or should embrace, universal values and impartiality. Some have argued that Confucian ethics integrates both care and justice, and that Confucian ethics is both particularistic and universalistic. In this essay, I will defend a view of the relation between care and justice and the relation between care ethics and justice ethics on the basis of the notion of 'configuration of values,' and show why care ethics and justice ethics cannot be integrated. I will support this view by a reading of some pertinent passages in the Mencius