Chenyang Li

Chenyang Li responds to Yat-hung Leung by pointing out Leung draws on three distinct notions of benevolence, or ren, none of which on its own is a serious contender against harmony as the concept of central importance to Confucian philosophy. Ren cannot be all three of these at once, and no particular conception of ren in fact has all these qualities. Li further clarifies that it is not his aim to establish that harmony is of exclusively highest importance among Confucian concepts and values, but rather merely to restore its place among the various central Confucian values. He elaborates on the essential role harmony plays when one properly values the virtue of benevolence, which itself requires or implies harmony, specifically harmonious coordination, in its practice and realization. Finally, Li argues that we cannot see the Confucian conceptions of benevolence Leung champions as possessing more practical value for contemporary life than the Confucian conception of harmony, and identifies the fundamental grounds and motivation of Leung’s criticisms to lie in allegiance to Song-Ming neo-Confucian orthodoxy, which grounds itself in philosophically empty postulates.

In this essay, we will follow Tang Junyi’s lead in exploring issues related to Chinese diaspora and Chinese philosophy. While we largely endorse Tang’s call for overseas Chinese to establish themselves in their adopted lands, we will argue for a more nuanced view on the identity of Chinese people outside China: they are not marginalized individuals scattered out of “homeland” China, rather they are people legitimately established in their own respective countries. In this connection, we will also advance a view of future Chinese philosophy as a world philosophy that takes roots in China as well as in the world at large. In our view, although Chinese immigrant thinkers in the past century have played a major role in promoting Chinese philosophy outside China, the importance of such a role is likely to decline along with the success of Chinese philosophy becoming a world philosophy.

The study of Chinese philosophy in the English-speaking world has largely focused on ethical and political theories. In comparison, Chinese metaphysics—here understood primarily as theories regarding the nature, components, and operating principles of reality—has been far less researched and recognized. In this essay, we examine various meanings of “metaphysics” as it has been used in denoting a branch of philosophy and make the case that metaphysics is an important part of Chinese philosophy. We argue for the need to study Chinese metaphysics as a serious field of scholarship. We also present some most recent studies of Chinese metaphysics by leading scholars of Chinese philosophy who publish in the English-speaking world. This essay aims to show that not only that Chinese metaphysics is an appropriate and legitimate subject of scholarly research but it can also be a fruitful subfield of in the study in Chinese philosophy.

Responding to a deep and universal need of philosophizing in the context of intensive intercultural interaction among all philosophical traditions in the process of globalization, this timely book offers a unique collection of excellent papers on inter-translatability, art, and ethics; subjects which are most crucial for intercultural conversations today. Instead of opting for a "comparative philosophy" that suggests the superiority of philosophy in comparison with other forms of thought, this book explores "inter-translatability" between East and West, given that any dialogue between heterogeneous cultures and systems of thought has to start with translation, which constitutes the first part of this book. Art and ethics are the two areas that most obviously link philosophies of the past and the present and constitute a fundamental part of Chinese long-living and practical philosophy. The value of art and aesthetic appreciation, no less than ethics, is at the core of Chinese culture and, indeed, promises a great deal for the future world. Thus, they are dealt with here in the second and third parts. This book is also relevant to inter-culturalism in philosophy itself, as the contributors, firstly, come from several different continents and, secondly, though most of them are philosophers, all contributors are well-versed in other disciplines, such as anthropology, literature, religion, aesthetics, history of art, sinology, cognitive sciences, and social sciences.

Abstract: In this essay I will discuss five major challenges faced by Confucianism in recent times. Two of these challenges have been widely acknowledged, namely those of science and democracy. I believe that Confucianism's problem with science has been largely solved, even though more constructive work would further strengthen Confucianism in this regard. The problem of democracy is still being dealt with. I will examine three more major challenges. The third major challenge for Confucianism comes from environmentalism. Confucianism has taken note of its important message and has begun to respond to it. The fourth major challenge is the feminist challenge. Even though contemporary Confucianism accepts sexual equality, philosophically significant progress is yet to be made. The final challenge is the challenge of Confucianism's own survival. After serving three major assults in the 20th century, especially the most recent assult by "the glorious cat," Confucianism needs to find a way to renew itself into future. .

Wang Guowei expressed doubts about Xun Zi’s proposition on “establishing ritual practices in accord with qing,” arguing that it was in direct confict with the philosopher’s famous thesis that “human natural tendency is evil.” The word qing (情) has several connotations in the Xunzi: it may refer to factual truth (实情), sincerity (诚实) or emotions (情感). Readers of the Xunzi tend to view the emotional connotation of qing in a negative light, but in actuality qing as human emotions can also be understood in a commendatory or neutral sense in the Xunzi. I argue that Xun Zi’s proposition on “establishing ritual practices in accord with qing” can only be consistent with his view that “human natural tendency is evil” when qing is used in the neutral sense. In other words, “establishing ritual practices in accord with qing” means to establish, on the basis of actual circumstances, ritual practices and rules that adequately satisfy people’s normal feelings. Xun Zi’s proposition on “establishing ritual practices in accord with qing” can be validated within his own philosophical framework。

Engaging in dialogue with African philosophy, I respond to questions raised by Thaddeus Metz on characteristics of Confucian philosophy in comparison with African philosophy. First, in both Confucian philosophy and African philosophy, harmony/harmonization and self-realization coincide in the process of person-making. Second, Confucians accept that sometimes it is inevitable to sacrifice individual components in order to achieve or maintain harmony at large scales; the point is how to minimize such costs. Third, Confucians give family love a central place in the good life before extend love to the rest of the world. Fourth, the Confucian philosophy of gender equality is based on appropriate division of labor consistent with its yin-yang philosophy, rather than equal split of power in the family. Fifth, in the Confucian view, hierarchy and harmony do not necessarily contradict each other, though hierarchy is not essential to all forms of harmony. The two can co-exist.

Since antiquity, Confucians have sought to work with the state in order to implement their philosophy through state sponsorship. And yet, whenever Confucians have sought state sponsorship, naturally the government has adopted Confucian philosophy selectively to serve its own purposes and thus compromised the integrity of Confucianism. Throughout Chinese history, countless Confucian officials attempted to help rulers to do the right thing. They often failed when their advice went against the fundamental interest of rulers. On reflection, this outcome should not be unexpected. The primary goal of rulers is to solidify power; the primary concern of Confucianism is the wellbeing of the people. When the two conflict, it is highly unlikely for a government to prioritize Confucian ideals. In a democratic era, Confucianism can influence society without joining the state apparatus. It can and must promote its social ideals through grassroots democratic participation rather than leave itself to the mercy of state sponsorship.