This is the first part of a two-part paper devoted to a study of some historical, logical and philosophical issues arising from a reading of Tarski´s celebrated “Wahrheitsbegriff” monograph. This first part starts with an exposition of Tarski´s “Wahrheitsbegriff” theory of truth which is historically accurate but more easily intelligible to the modern reader than Tarski´s “Wahrheitsbegriff” presentation. This exposition is then used in the refutation of some historical, logical and philosophical…
Read moreThis is the first part of a two-part paper devoted to a study of some historical, logical and philosophical issues arising from a reading of Tarski´s celebrated “Wahrheitsbegriff” monograph. This first part starts with an exposition of Tarski´s “Wahrheitsbegriff” theory of truth which is historically accurate but more easily intelligible to the modern reader than Tarski´s “Wahrheitsbegriff” presentation. This exposition is then used in the refutation of some historical, logical and philosophical ideas appearing in the literature on Tarski, and in particular of the idea that he did not define or even considered in his work of this period the notion of “truth in a structure”. The second part of the paper will concentrate on issues related to Tarski´s “Wahrheitsbegriff” version of the theorem on the indefinability of truth.