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John MacFarlane

University of California, Berkeley
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    36
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    6
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 More details
  • University of California, Berkeley
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Berkeley, California, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Language
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
1 more
  • All publications (36)
  •  371
    Simplicity made difficult (review)
    Philosophical Studies 156 (3). 2011.
    Context and Context-Dependence, MiscRelativism about TruthTruth Bearers
  •  126
    Précis of Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1): 168-170. 2016.
    Philosophy of LinguisticsRelativism about Truth
  •  109
    Facing Facts (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 200208. 2002.
    Facts and States of Affairs
  •  286
    Boghossian, Bellarmine, and Bayes
    Philosophical Studies 141 (3): 391-398. 2008.
    As Paul Boghossian sees it, postmodernist relativists and constructivists are paralyzed by a “fear of knowledge.” For example, they lack the courage to say, in the face of the Lakotas’ claim that their ancestors came from inside the earth, that it is a matter of known fact that their ancestors came across the Bering Strait. To avoid this, they accept the nonconfrontational view Boghossian calls..
    Epistemic Relativism, MiscBayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  403
    What Does It Mean to Say That Logic is Formal?
    Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. 2000.
    Much philosophy of logic is shaped, explicitly or implicitly, by the thought that logic is distinctively formal and abstracts from material content. The distinction between formal and material does not appear to coincide with the more familiar contrasts between a priori and empirical, necessary and contingent, analytic and synthetic—indeed, it is often invoked to explain these. Nor, it turns out, can it be explained by appeal to schematic inference patterns, syntactic rules, or grammar. What doe…Read more
    Much philosophy of logic is shaped, explicitly or implicitly, by the thought that logic is distinctively formal and abstracts from material content. The distinction between formal and material does not appear to coincide with the more familiar contrasts between a priori and empirical, necessary and contingent, analytic and synthetic—indeed, it is often invoked to explain these. Nor, it turns out, can it be explained by appeal to schematic inference patterns, syntactic rules, or grammar. What does it mean, then, to say that logic is distinctively formal?
    Logical Consequence and Entailment
  •  84
    Review of Stephen Neale, Facing Facts (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (8). 2002.
    Meaning
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