-
36A Topological Proof of the Löwenheim‐Skolem, Compactness, and Strong Completeness Theorems for Free LogicMathematical Logic Quarterly 14 (13-17): 245-254. 1968.
-
13Appearance vs. Reality as a Scientific ProblemPhilosophic Exchange 35 (1): 34-67. 2005.The history of science is replete with ideals that involve some criterion of completeness. One such criterion requires that physics explain how the appearances are produced in reality. This paper argues that it is scientifically acceptable to reject this criterion, along with all other completeness criteria that have been proposed for modern science.
-
29A Topological Proof of the Löwenheim‐Skolem, Compactness, and Strong Completeness Theorems for Free LogicMathematical Logic Quarterly 14 (13‐17): 245-254. 1968.
-
128A problem for relative information minimizers in probability kinematicsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4): 375-379. 1981.
-
A Problem for Relative Information MinimizersBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32. 1981.
-
168Armstrong on laws and probabilitiesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3). 1987.The question of David Armstrong's recent book, What Is a Law of Nature? would seem to have little point unless there really are laws of nature. However that may be, so much philosoFhical thinking has utilized this concept, that an inquiry of this sort was needed whether there are or not. The book begins with a devastating attack on so-called Regularity views of law, and then proceeds with an exposition of Armstrong's own answer to the question. I wish …Read more
-
140Against Transcendental EmpiricismIn The Question of Hermeneutics, . pp. 309-335. 1994.What is empiricism? There can be no authoritative answer to any such question. A historian of philosophy can at best try to call what is common to philosophers who either identified themselves, or have traditionally been identified, as empiricists. But what has set those philosophers apart from others, and especially from those whom they criticized, may not be captured in common views or doctrines. The historian may, in trying to fix the label, rely tacitly on a view of what philosophical positi…Read more
-
28A philosophical approach to foundations of scienceFoundations of Science 1 (1): 5-18. 1995.Foundational research focuses on the theory, but theories are to be related also to other theories, experiments, facts in their domains, data, and to their uses in applications, whether of prediction, control, or explanation. A theory is to be identified through its class of models, but not so narrowly as to disallow these roles. The language of science is to be studied separately, with special reference to the relations listed above, and to the consequent need for resources other than for theor…Read more
-
123A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers, ContinuedBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4): 453-463. 1986.
-
339Conditionalization, a new argument forTopoi 18 (2): 93-96. 1999.Probabilism in epistemology does not have to be of the Bayesian variety. The probabilist represents a person''s opinion as a probability function; the Bayesian adds that rational change of opinion must take the form of conditionalizing on new evidence. I will argue that this is the correct procedure under certain special conditions. Those special conditions are important, and instantiated for example in scientific experimentation, but hardly universal. My argument will be related to the much mal…Read more
-
126Making the abstract concrete: The role of norms and values in experimental modelingStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46 3-10. 2014.Experimental modeling is the construction of theoretical models hand in hand with experimental activity. As explained in Section 1, experimental modeling starts with claims about phenomena that use abstract concepts, concepts whose conditions of realization are not yet specified; and it ends with a concrete model of the phenomenon, a model that can be tested against data. This paper argues that this process from abstract concepts to concrete models involves judgments of relevance, which are irre…Read more
-
3Existence and Explanation: Essays presented in Honor of Karel Lambert (edited book)Springer Verlag. 2012.This collection of essays is dedicated to 'Joe' Karel Lambert. The contributors are all personally affected to Joe in some way or other, but they are definitely not the only ones. Whatever excuses there are - there are some -, the editors apologize to whomever they have neglected. But even so the collection displays how influential Karel Lambert has been, personally and through his teaching and his writings. The display is in alphabetical order - with one exception: Bas van Fraassen, being about…Read more
-
A Defense of the Observational/Theoretical DistinctionIn Robert Klee (ed.), Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press. 1999.
-
248Arguments concerning scientific realismIn Martin Curd & Jan Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton. 1998.
-
The Pragmatics of ExplanationIn Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge. pp. 56. 2002.
-
72Vague expectation value lossPhilosophical Studies 127 (3). 2006.Vague subjective probability may be modeled by means of a set of probability functions, so that the represented opinion has only a lower and upper bound. The standard rule of conditionalization can be straightforwardly adapted to this. But this combination has difficulties which, though well known in the technical literature, have not been given sufficient attention in probabilist or Bayesian epistemology. Specifically, updating on apparently irrelevant bits of news can be destructive of one’s e…Read more
-
43Symmetry Arguments in Probability KinematicsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984 851-869. 1984.Probability kinematics is the theory of how subjective probabilities change with time, in response to certain constraints . Rules are classified by the imposed constraints for which the rules prescribe a procedure for updating one's opinion. The first is simple conditionalization , and the second Jeffrey conditionalization . It is demonstrated by a symmetry argument that these rules are the unique admissible rules for those constraints, and moreover, that any probability kinematic rule must be e…Read more
-
26Probabilistic semantics objectified: II. Implication in probabilistic model sets (review)Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (4). 1981.
-
16The perils of Perrin, in the hands of philosophersPhilosophical Studies 143 (1): 5-24. 2009.The story of how Perrin’s experimental work established the reality of atoms and molecules has been a staple in (realist) philosophy of science writings (Wesley Salmon, Clark Glymour, Peter Achinstein, Penelope Maddy, …). I’ll argue that how this story is told distorts both what the work was and its significance, and draw morals for the understanding of how theories can be or fail to be empirically grounded.
-
45Probabilistic semantics objectified: I. Postulates and logics (review)Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (3). 1981.
San Francisco, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |