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126Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full beliefJournal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4): 349-377. 1995.
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1Figures in a Probability LandscapeIn J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 345-356. 1990.
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From a view of science to a new empiricismIn Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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23Earman on the Causal Theory of TimeSynthese 24 (1): 87-95. 1972.There is an important point behind Earman's criticisms of the causal theory of time and space-time. This point has been made perspicuously in a recent paper by Glymour. It concerns the novel problems raised for a theory of space-time by the general theory of relativity, and I shall explain it briefly in Section II below. Section I briefly states my own view of the status of the causal theory, and Sections III and IV deal with Earman's specific criticisms.
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2Extension, intension, and comprehensionIn Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Logic and ontology, New York University Press. 1973.
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452Explanation through representation, and its limitsEpistemologia 1 30-46. 2012.Why-questions and how-possibly-questions are two common forms of explanation request. Answers to the former ones require factual assertions, but the latter ones can be answered by displaying a representation of the targeted phenomenon. However, in an extreme case, a representation could come accompanied by the assertion that it displays the only possible way a phenomenon could develop. Using several historical controversies concerning statistical modeling, it is argued that such cases must inevi…Read more
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Después del fundacionismo: entre el círculo vicioso y el regreso al infinitoDianoia 38 (38): 217. 1992.
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102Elgin on Lewis’s Putnam’s ParadoxJournal of Philosophy 94 (2): 85-93. 1997.In "Unnatural Science"(1) Catherine Elgin examines the dilemma which David Lewis sees posed by Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism. One horn of the dilemma commits us to seeing truth as something all too easily come by, a virtue to be attributed to any theory meeting relatively minimal conditions of adequacy. The other horn commits us to "anti-nominalism", some version of the ancient doctrine that language must "carve nature at the joints": that there are natural kinds or classes w…Read more
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74Aristotle's Physics presents us with a clear view of the structure of nature and natural processes, and also, in conjunction with the Posterior Analytics , of the structure of the science that deals with nature. Similarly, his Poetics describes the structure of the human condition and human events as depicted in tragedies, as well as the structure of those tragedies that dramatize this aspect of human existence.
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40Conventionality in the axiomatic foundations of the special theory of relativityPhilosophy of Science 36 (1): 64-73. 1969.In this paper we examine Ellis and Bowman's argument, that simultaneity in inertial frames of reference is not conventional, from the axiomatic point of view. In Part I we examine the role of conventions in an axiomatic physical theory, and in Part II the relation of simultaneity in Reichenbach's axiomatization of the space-time theory of special relativity
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20Comments on Peter Roeper's “The Link Between Probability Functions and Logical Consequence”Dialogue 36 (1): 27-. 1997.Professor Roeper adresses a large question, whether probabilistic semantics is a kind of semantics at all. Happily, he does this via an exploration of a specific issue on which he and Professor Leblanc have done important work. That is the issue of how the relationship of logical consequence can be characterized as a relation denned in terms of probability. Let us follow him in calling a relevant relationship of the latter sort the degree of implication, and follow Professor Roeper on his quest …Read more
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381Constructive Empiricism NowPhilosophical Studies 106 (1-2): 151-170. 2001.Constructive empiricism, the view introduced in The Scientific Image, is a view of science, an answer to the question "what is science?" Arthur Fine's and Paul Teller's contributions to this symposium challenge especially two key ideas required to formulate that view, namely the observable/unobservable and acceptance/belief distinctions. I wish to thank them not only for their insightful critique but also for the support they include. For they illuminate and counter some misunderstandings of Con…Read more
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34Book review: Interpreting the quantum world by Jeffrey Bub (review)Foundations of Physics 28 (4): 683-689. 1998.
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53Critical Notice of Brian Ellis, Rational Belief Systems (review)Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3): 497-511. 1980.
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36A Topological Proof of the Löwenheim‐Skolem, Compactness, and Strong Completeness Theorems for Free LogicMathematical Logic Quarterly 14 (13-17): 245-254. 1968.
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13Appearance vs. Reality as a Scientific ProblemPhilosophic Exchange 35 (1): 34-67. 2005.The history of science is replete with ideals that involve some criterion of completeness. One such criterion requires that physics explain how the appearances are produced in reality. This paper argues that it is scientifically acceptable to reject this criterion, along with all other completeness criteria that have been proposed for modern science.
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29A Topological Proof of the Löwenheim‐Skolem, Compactness, and Strong Completeness Theorems for Free LogicMathematical Logic Quarterly 14 (13‐17): 245-254. 1968.
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