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200Gideon Rosen on constructive empiricismPhilosophical Studies 74 (2). 1994.In response to parts I-III of G Rosen's "What is Constructive Empiricism?", "Philosophical Studies", 74, 1994, 143-178, this paper examines several construals of the position of constructive empiricism. At issue, in part, is the equation of intentional aspects of science with the intentions and opinions of scientists. In addition it is necessary to distinguish the constructive empiricist -- a philosopher holding that acceptance of theories in science need not involve belief that they are true --…Read more
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200Scientific structuralism: Structuralism(s) about science: Some common problemsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1). 2007.
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194Armstrong, Cartwright, and Earman on Laws and SymmetryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2). 1993.
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193One or Two Gentle Remarks about Hans Halvorson’s Critique of the Semantic ViewPhilosophy of Science 81 (2). 2014.In recent papers Hans Halvorson has offered a critique of the semantic view of theories, showing that theories may be the same although the corresponding sets of models are different and, conversely, that theories may be different although the corresponding sets of models are the same. This critique will be assessed, first, as it pertains to issues concerning scientific models in the empirical sciences and, second, independent of any concern with empirical science.
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168Armstrong on laws and probabilitiesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3). 1987.The question of David Armstrong's recent book, What Is a Law of Nature? would seem to have little point unless there really are laws of nature. However that may be, so much philosoFhical thinking has utilized this concept, that an inquiry of this sort was needed whether there are or not. The book begins with a devastating attack on so-called Regularity views of law, and then proceeds with an exposition of Armstrong's own answer to the question. I wish …Read more
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160Time in physical and narrative structureIn John B. Bender & David E. Wellbery (eds.), Chronotypes: The Construction of Time, Stanford University Press. pp. 19-37. 1991.When the reader turns to a text, he conceives of the narrated events as ordered in time. When the natural philosopher turns to the world, he also conceives of its events as ordered in time—or lately, in space-time. But each has the task of constituting this order on the basis of clues present in what is to be ordered. Interrogating the parallels to be found in their problems and methods, I shall argue that in both cases the definiteness of the relation between the order and what is ordered resid…Read more
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160Belief and the willIn Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, Routledge. pp. 235-256. 2010.
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150The perils of Perrin, in the hands of philosophersPhilosophical Studies 143 (1). 2009.The story of how Perrin’s experimental work established the reality of atoms and molecules has been a staple in (realist) philosophy of science writings (Wesley Salmon, Clark Glymour, Peter Achinstein, Penelope Maddy, …). I’ll argue that how this story is told distorts both what the work was and its significance, and draw morals for the understanding of how theories can be or fail to be empirically grounded.
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149Reply to contessa, Ghins, and HealeyAnalysis 70 (3): 547-556. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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146Scientific realism and the empiricist challenge: An introduction to Ernan McMullin's Aquinas lectureZygon 48 (1): 131-142. 2013.In The Inference That Makes Science, Ernan McMullin recounts the clear historical progress he saw toward a vision of the sciences as conclusions reached rationally on the basis of empirical evidence. Distinctive of this vision was his view of science as driven by a specific form of inference, retroduction. To understand this properly, we need to disentangle the description of retroductive inference from the claims made on its behalf. To end I will suggest that the real rival to McMullin's vision…Read more
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146How is Scientific Revolution / Conversion Possible?Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 73 63-80. 1999.
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141What is Scientific Realism?Spontaneous Generations 9 (1): 12-25. 2018.Decades of debate about scientific realism notwithstanding, we find ourselves bemused by what different philosophers appear to think it is, exactly. Does it require any sort of belief in relation to scientific theories and, if so, what sort? Is it rather typified by a certain understanding of the rationality of such beliefs? In the following dialogue we explore these questions in hopes of clarifying some convictions about what scientific realism is, and what it could or should be. En route, we e…Read more
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140Against Transcendental EmpiricismIn The Question of Hermeneutics, . pp. 309-335. 1994.What is empiricism? There can be no authoritative answer to any such question. A historian of philosophy can at best try to call what is common to philosophers who either identified themselves, or have traditionally been identified, as empiricists. But what has set those philosophers apart from others, and especially from those whom they criticized, may not be captured in common views or doctrines. The historian may, in trying to fix the label, rely tacitly on a view of what philosophical positi…Read more
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138Modeling and Measurement: The Criterion of Empirical GroundingPhilosophy of Science 79 (5): 773-784. 2012.A scientific theory offers models for the phenomena in its domain; these models involve theoretical quantities, and a model's structure is the set of relations it imposes on these quantities. A fundamental demand in scientific practice is for those quantities to be clearly and feasibly related to measurement. This demand for empirical grounding can be articulated by displaying the theory-dependent criteria for a procedure to count as a measurement and for identifying the quantity it measures.
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135Identity over time: Objectively, subjectivelyPhilosophical Quarterly 58 (230): 15-35. 2008.In the philosophy of science, identity over time emerges as a central concern both as an ontological category in the interpretation of physical theories, and as an epistemological problem concerning the conditions of possibility of knowledge. In Reichenbach and subsequent writers on the problem of indistinguishable quantum particles we see the return of a contrast between Leibniz and Aquinas on the subject of individuation. The possibility of rejecting the principle of the identity of indiscerni…Read more
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127Armstrong, Cartwright, and Earman on Laws and SymmetryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 431--44. 1993.
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125Bas C. van Fraassen                          Princeton University       My topics today are the relation between science and myth, and the possibility of empiricism as an approach to life as well as to science. But philosophy is a thoroughly historical enterprise, a dialogue that continues in the present but is always almost entirely shaped by our past. So I will devote the first half of this talk to setting the historical stage.
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125Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full beliefJournal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4): 349-377. 1995.
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124Making the abstract concrete: The role of norms and values in experimental modelingStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46 3-10. 2014.Experimental modeling is the construction of theoretical models hand in hand with experimental activity. As explained in Section 1, experimental modeling starts with claims about phenomena that use abstract concepts, concepts whose conditions of realization are not yet specified; and it ends with a concrete model of the phenomenon, a model that can be tested against data. This paper argues that this process from abstract concepts to concrete models involves judgments of relevance, which are irre…Read more
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124A problem for relative information minimizers in probability kinematicsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4): 375-379. 1981.
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122A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers, ContinuedBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4): 453-463. 1986.
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118Sola Experientia?—Feyerabend's Refutation of Classical EmpiricismPhilosophy of Science 64 (Supplement): 385-395. 1997.Feyerabend's “Classical Empiricism” draws on a 17th century Jesuit argument against Protestant fundamentalism. The argument is very general, and applies to any simple foundationalist epistemology. Feyerabend uses it against Classical Empiricism—roughly, the view that what is to be believed is exactly what experience establishes, and no more—which he identifies as among other things Newton's “dogmatic ideology.”
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118I grew up with a cat and so I know that cats are the most intelligent, graceful, and insightful beings in the Universe. (This is already an example of how we humans can achieve a small measure of wisdom if we live with cats.) My whole family has always been into cats, and since I don't have a cat of my own now, I will tell you about some of theirs. My sister Gina's cat Tuti was remarkable by any measure.
San Francisco, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |