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213Science as representation: Flouting the criteriaPhilosophy of Science 71 (5): 794-804. 2004.Criteria of adequacy for scientific representation of the phenomena pertain to accuracy and truth. But that representation is selective and may require distortion even in the selected parameters; this point is intimately connected with the fact that representation is intentional, and its adequacy relative to its particular purpose. Since observation and measurement are perspectival and the appearances to be saved are perspectival measurement outcomes, the question whether this “saving” is an exp…Read more
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15II—Bas C. van Fraassen: Structuralism(s) about Science: Some Common ProblemsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 45-61. 2007.
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38Representational of conditional probabilitiesJournal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3): 417-430. 1976.
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118Sola Experientia?—Feyerabend's Refutation of Classical EmpiricismPhilosophy of Science 64 (Supplement): 385-395. 1997.Feyerabend's “Classical Empiricism” draws on a 17th century Jesuit argument against Protestant fundamentalism. The argument is very general, and applies to any simple foundationalist epistemology. Feyerabend uses it against Classical Empiricism—roughly, the view that what is to be believed is exactly what experience establishes, and no more—which he identifies as among other things Newton's “dogmatic ideology.”
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22Relational quantum mechanics: Rovelli's worldDiscusiones Filosóficas 11 (17): 13-51. 2010.El inspirador Relational Quantum Mechanicsde Carlo Rovelli cumple varios propósitosde manera simultánea: proporciona unanueva visión de cómo es el mundo de lamecánica cuántica y ofrece un programapara derivar el formalismo de la teoría deun conjunto de postulados simples quepertenecen al procesamiento de la información.Enesteartículopropongoquenosconcentremostotalmente en lo primero,para explorar el mundo de la mecánicacuántica tal como lo representa Rovelli.Es un mundo fascinante, en parte debi…Read more
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206Rovelli’s WorldFoundations of Physics 40 (4): 390-417. 2010.Carlo Rovelli’s inspiring “Relational Quantum Mechanics” serves several aims at once: it provides a new vision of what the world of quantum mechanics is like, and it offers a program to derive the theory’s formalism from a set of simple postulates pertaining to information processing. I propose here to concentrate entirely on the former, to explore the world of quantum mechanics as Rovelli depicts it. It is a fascinating world in part because of Rovelli’s reliance on the information-theory appro…Read more
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149Reply to contessa, Ghins, and HealeyAnalysis 70 (3): 547-556. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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325Representation: The problem for structuralismPhilosophy of Science 73 (5): 536-547. 2006.What does it mean to embed the phenomena in an abstract structure? Or to represent them by doing so? The semantic view of theories runs into a severe problem if these notions are construed either naively, in a metaphysical way, or too closely on the pattern of the earlier syntactic view. Constructive empiricism and structural realism will then share those difficulties. The problem will be posed as in Reichenbach's The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, and realist reactions will be exa…Read more
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Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist ApproachBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3): 436-439. 1995.
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7Probabilistic Semantics Objectified: II. Implication in Probabilistic Model SetsJournal of Philosophical Logic 10 (4): 495-510. 1981.
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3Presuppositions: Supervaluations and Free LogicIn K. Lambert (ed.), The Logical Way of Doing Things, Yale University Press. pp. 67-92. 1969.
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53Rational Belief and Probability KinematicsPhilosophy of Science 47 (2): 165-. 1980.A general form is proposed for epistemological theories, the relevant factors being: the family of epistemic judgments, the epistemic state, the epistemic commitment , and the family of possible epistemic inputs . First a simple theory is examined in which the states are probability functions, and the subject of probability kinematics introduced by Richard Jeffrey is explored. Then a second theory is examined in which the state has as constituents a body of information and a recipe that determin…Read more
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24Review of Brian Ellis, Rational Belief Systems (review)Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3): 497--511. 1980.
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13Probabilistic Semantics Objectified: I. Postulates and LogicsJournal of Philosophical Logic 10 (3): 371-394. 1981.
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7Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity—Graham Oppy (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2): 257-258. 2008.
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51On the Radical Incompleteness of the Manifest ImagePSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976 335-343. 1976.
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40Philosophical perspectives on infinity—graham OppyInternational Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2): 257-258. 2008.
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240Putnam's paradox: Metaphysical realism revamped and evadedPhilosophical Perspectives 11 17-42. 1997.Hilary Putnam's argument against metaphysical realism (commonly referred to as the "model theoretic argument") has now enjoyed two decades of discussion.(1) The text is rich and contains variously construable arguments against variously construed philosophical positions. David Lewis isolated one argument and called it "Putnam's Paradox".(2) That argument is clear and concise; so is the paradoxical conclusion it purports to demonstrate; and so is Lewis' paradox-avoiding solution. His solution inv…Read more
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48On Taking Stances: An interview with Bas van FraassenThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (2): 86-102. 2005.
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37Probabilité conditionnelle et certitudeDialogue 36 (1): 69-. 1997.Personal probability is now a familiar subject in epistemology, together with such more venerable notions as knowledge and belief. But there are severe strains between probability and belief; if either is taken as the more basic, the other may suffer. After explaining the difficulties of attempts to accommodate both, I shall propose a unified account which takes conditional personal probability as basic. Full belief is therefore a defined, derivative notion. Yet we will still be able to picture …Read more
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20Propositional attitudes in weak pragmaticsStudia Logica 38 (n/a): 365. 1979.Sentences attributing beliefs, doubts, wants, and the like have posed a major problem for semantics. Recently the pragmatic description of language has become more systematic. I shall discuss the formalization of pragmatics, and propose an analysis of belief attribution that avoids some main problems apparently inherent in the semantic approach.
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119On the extension of Beth's semantics of physical theoriesPhilosophy of Science 37 (3): 325-339. 1970.A basic aim of E. Beth's work in philosophy of science was to explore the use of formal semantic methods in the analysis of physical theories. We hope to show that a general framework for Beth's semantic analysis is provided by the theory of semi-interpreted languages, introduced in a previous paper. After developing Beth's analysis of nonrelativistic physical theories in a more general form, we turn to the notion of the 'logic' of a physical theory. Here we prove a result concerning the conditi…Read more
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