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34Book review: Interpreting the quantum world by Jeffrey Bub (review)Foundations of Physics 28 (4): 683-689. 1998.
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53Critical Notice of Brian Ellis, Rational Belief Systems (review)Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3): 497-511. 1980.
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36A Topological Proof of the Löwenheim‐Skolem, Compactness, and Strong Completeness Theorems for Free LogicMathematical Logic Quarterly 14 (13-17): 245-254. 1968.
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13Appearance vs. Reality as a Scientific ProblemPhilosophic Exchange 35 (1): 34-67. 2005.The history of science is replete with ideals that involve some criterion of completeness. One such criterion requires that physics explain how the appearances are produced in reality. This paper argues that it is scientifically acceptable to reject this criterion, along with all other completeness criteria that have been proposed for modern science.
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29A Topological Proof of the Löwenheim‐Skolem, Compactness, and Strong Completeness Theorems for Free LogicMathematical Logic Quarterly 14 (13‐17): 245-254. 1968.
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63Calibration: A Frequency Justification for Personal ProbabilityIn Robert S. Cohen & Larry Laudan (eds.), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum, D. Reidel. 1983.
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10Bressan and Suppes on ModalityPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972 323-330. 1972.
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161Belief and the willIn Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, Routledge. pp. 235-256. 2010.
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Arguments Concerning Scientific RealismIn C. Van Fraassen Bas (ed.), The scientific image, Oxford University Press. 1980.This chapter examines and criticizes the main arguments offered for scientific realism, here identified as the following view: Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. In contrast, constructive empiricism, which also opts for a literal understanding of scientific language, is the following view: Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptan…Read more
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Alternatives to RealismIn Robert Klee (ed.), Scientific inquiry: readings in the philosophy of science, Oxford University Press. 1999.
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228Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirensPhilosophical Studies 77 (1): 7-37. 1995.This is surely a bit of Socrates' famous irony. He draws the analogy to explain how his friends should regard poetry as they regretfully banish it from the ideal state. But lovers were no more sensible then than they are now. The advice to banish poetry, undermined already by Plato's own delight and skill in drama, is perhaps undermined still further by this evocation of a 'sensible' lover who counts love so well lost. Yet Socrates' image is one of avowed rationality and prudence. The sensible l…Read more
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19Conditionalization, a new argument forTopoi 18 (2): 93-96. 1999.Probabilism in epistemology does not have to be of the Bayesian variety. The probabilist represents a person''s opinion as a probability function; the Bayesian adds that rational change of opinion must take the form of conditionalizing on new evidence. I will argue that this is the correct procedure under certain special conditions. Those special conditions are important, and instantiated for example in scientific experimentation, but hardly universal. My argument will be related to the much mal…Read more
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121A problem for relative information minimizers in probability kinematicsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4): 375-379. 1981.
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A Problem for Relative Information MinimizersBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32. 1981.
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179Armstrong on laws and probabilitiesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3). 1987.The question of David Armstrong's recent book, What Is a Law of Nature? would seem to have little point unless there really are laws of nature. However that may be, so much philosoFhical thinking has utilized this concept, that an inquiry of this sort was needed whether there are or not. The book begins with a devastating attack on so-called Regularity views of law, and then proceeds with an exposition of Armstrong's own answer to the question. I wish …Read more
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140Against Transcendental EmpiricismIn The Question of Hermeneutics, . pp. 309-335. 1994.What is empiricism? There can be no authoritative answer to any such question. A historian of philosophy can at best try to call what is common to philosophers who either identified themselves, or have traditionally been identified, as empiricists. But what has set those philosophers apart from others, and especially from those whom they criticized, may not be captured in common views or doctrines. The historian may, in trying to fix the label, rely tacitly on a view of what philosophical positi…Read more
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28A philosophical approach to foundations of scienceFoundations of Science 1 (1): 5-18. 1995.Foundational research focuses on the theory, but theories are to be related also to other theories, experiments, facts in their domains, data, and to their uses in applications, whether of prediction, control, or explanation. A theory is to be identified through its class of models, but not so narrowly as to disallow these roles. The language of science is to be studied separately, with special reference to the relations listed above, and to the consequent need for resources other than for theor…Read more
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55A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers, ContinuedBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4): 453-463. 1986.
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250Arguments concerning scientific realismIn Martin Curd & Jan A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton. 1998.
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126Making the abstract concrete: The role of norms and values in experimental modelingStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46 3-10. 2014.Experimental modeling is the construction of theoretical models hand in hand with experimental activity. As explained in Section 1, experimental modeling starts with claims about phenomena that use abstract concepts, concepts whose conditions of realization are not yet specified; and it ends with a concrete model of the phenomenon, a model that can be tested against data. This paper argues that this process from abstract concepts to concrete models involves judgments of relevance, which are irre…Read more
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