-
256Perceptual knowledge derailedPhilosophical Studies 112 (1): 31-45. 2003.The tracking theory treats knowledge as counterfactual covariation of belief and truth through a sphere of possibilities. I argue that the tracking theory cannot respect perceptual knowledge, because perceptual belief covaries with truth through a discontinuous scatter of possibilities.
-
2768Monism: The Priority of the WholePhilosophical Review 119 (1): 31-76. 2010.Consider a circle and a pair of its semicircles. Which is prior, the whole or its parts? Are the semicircles dependent abstractions from their whole, or is the circle a derivative construction from its parts? Now in place of the circle consider the entire cosmos (the ultimate concrete whole), and in place of the pair of semicircles consider the myriad particles (the ultimate concrete parts). Which if either is ultimately prior, the one ultimate whole or its many ultimate parts?
-
1286Is there a fundamental level?Noûs 37 (3). 2003.‘‘Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not—I do not say divisible—but actually divided; and consequently the least particle ought to be considered as a world full of an infinity of different creatures.’’ (Leibniz, letter to Foucher).
-
738What Not to Multiply Without NecessityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4): 644-664. 2015.The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity
-
726Disconnection and ResponsibilityLegal Theory 18 (4): 399-435. 2012.Michael Moore’s Causation and Responsibility offers an integrated conception of the law, morality, and metaphysics, centered on the notion of causation, grounded in a detailed knowledge of case law, and supported on every point by cogent argument. This is outstanding work. It is a worthy successor to Harte and Honoré’s classic Causation in the Law, and I expect that it will guide discussion for many years to come.
-
426The individuation of tropesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2). 2001.A tropel is a particular property: the redness of a rose, the roundness of the moon. It is generally supposed that tropes are individuated by primitive quantity: this redness, that roundness. I argme that the trope theorist is far better served by individuating tropes by spatiotemporal relation: here redness, there roundness. In short, tropes are not this-suches but here-suches
-
642Closure, Contrast, and AnswerPhilosophical Studies 133 (2): 233-255. 2007.How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is, given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows, I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invariantist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the contrastivist can adequately formulate closure.
-
1064Spacetime the one substancePhilosophical Studies 145 (1). 2009.What is the relation between material objects and spacetime regions? Supposing that spacetime regions are one sort of substance, there remains the question of whether or not material objects are a second sort of substance. This is the question of dualistic versus monistic substantivalism. I will defend the monistic view. In particular, I will maintain that material objects should be identified with spacetime regions. There is the spacetime manifold, and the fundamental properties are pinned dire…Read more
-
291Overlappings: Probability-raising without causationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1). 2000.The leading regularity, counterfactual, and agential accounts of causation converge on the idea that causation is probability-raising. While the necessity of probability-raising for causation remains in dispute, the sufficiency of probability-raising for causation is generally assumed, at least in the direct (no intermediaries involved) and precisely described case. I offer a class of counterexamples: overlappings.
-
511Knowing the Answer Redux: Replies to Brogaard and KallestrupPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2): 477-500. 2009.In "Knowing the Answer" I argued that knowledge-wh is question-relative. For example, to know when the movie starts is to know the answer p to the question Q of when the movie starts. Berit Brogaard and Jesper Kallestrup have each responded with insightful critiques of my argument, and novel accounts of knowledge-wh. I am grateful to them both for continuing the discussion in so thoughtful a way.
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Physical Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
| Metaphysics |