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609Causes need not be physically connected to their effects: The case for negative causationIn Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, Blackwell. pp. 197--216. 2004.Negative causation occurs when an absence serves as cause, effect, or causal intermediary. Negative causation is genuine causation, or so I shall argue. It involves no physical connection between cause and effect. Thus causes need not be physically connected to their effects.
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455Social construction as grounding; or: fundamentality for feminists, a reply to Barnes and MikkolaPhilosophical Studies 174 (10): 2449-2465. 2017.Feminist metaphysics is guided by the insight that gender is socially constructed, yet the metaphysics behind social construction remains obscure. Barnes and Mikkola charge that current metaphysical frameworks—including my grounding framework—are hostile to feminist metaphysics. I argue that not only is a grounding framework hospitable to feminist metaphysics, but also that a grounding framework can help shed light on the metaphysics behind social construction. By treating social construction cl…Read more
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835Causation by disconnectionPhilosophy of Science 67 (2): 285-300. 2000.The physical and/or intrinsic connection approach to causation has become prominent in the recent literature, with Salmon, Dowe, Menzies, and Armstrong among its leading proponents. I show that there is a type of causation, causation by disconnection, with no physical or intrinsic connection between cause and effect. Only Hume-style conditions approaches and hybrid conditions-connections approaches appear to be able to handle causation by disconnection. Some Hume-style, extrinsic, absence-relati…Read more
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615Overdetermining causesPhilosophical Studies 114 (1-2). 2003.When two rocks shatter the window at once, what causes the window to shatter? Is the throwing of each individual rock a cause of the window shattering, or are the throwings only causes collectively? This question bears on the analysis of causation, and the metaphysics of macro-causation. I argue that the throwing of each individual rock is a cause of the window shattering, and generally that individual overdeterminers are causes.
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608Knowledge, relevant alternatives and missed cluesAnalysis 61 (3): 202-208. 2001.The classic version of the relevant alternatives theory (RAT) identifies knowledge with the elimination of relevant alternatives (Dretske 1981, Stine 1976, Lewis 1996, inter alia). I argue that the RAT is trapped by the problem of the missed clue, in which the subject sees but does not appreciate decisive information.
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1225The Internal Relatedness of All ThingsMind 119 (474): 341-376. 2010.The argument from internal relatedness was one of the major nineteenth century neo-Hegelian arguments for monism. This argument has been misunderstood, and may even be sound. The argument, as I reconstruct it, proceeds in two stages: first, it is argued that all things are internally related in ways that render them interdependent; second, the substantial unity of the whole universe is inferred from the interdependence of all of its parts. The guiding idea behind the argument is that failure of …Read more
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790From contextualism to contrastivismPhilosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 73-104. 2004.Contextualism treats ‘knows’ as an indexical that denotes different epistemic properties in different contexts. Contrastivism treats ‘knows’ as denoting a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition. I will argue that contrastivism resolves the main philosophical problems of contextualism, by employing a better linguistic model. Contextualist insights are best understood by contrastivist theory.
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479The Action of the WholeAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1): 67-87. 2013.I discuss an argument for the monistic idea that the cosmos is the one and only fundamental thing, drawing on the idea that the cosmos is the one and only thing that evolves by the fundamental laws
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419Causation, influence, and effluenceAnalysis 61 (1). 2001.Causation, says David Lewis now, is to be understood as the ancestral of counterfactual influence, where C influences E (roughly) iff little changes in C map onto big changes in E. I argue that the influence account provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for causation, and suggest that what is missing is the notion of effluence, or physical connection.
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Physical Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
| Metaphysics |