-
8The theoretical question of the practical considerations: Some Carnapian reflectionsSouth African Journal of Philosophy 36 (2): 206-216. 2017.
-
40Syntactical Informational Structural RealismMinds and Machines 28 (4): 623-643. 2018.Luciano Floridi’s informational structural realism takes a constructionist attitude towards the problems of epistemology and metaphysics, but the question of the nature of the semantical component of his view remains vexing. In this paper, I propose to dispense with the semantical component of ISR completely. I outline a Syntactical version of ISR. The unified entropy-based framework of information has been adopted as the groundwork of SISR. To establish its realist component, SISR should be abl…Read more
-
27On Logic, Syntax, and SlienceStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 42 (1): 195-209. 2015.The relationship between Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has been interpreted in several ways during past decades. One of the interpretations has gained keen advocates among Carnap scholars. It was originally provoked by what Caranp said in LSL, and it consists of two parts. First, it indicates that in TLP the possibility of speaking about the logical form of a language within the same language had been foresworn by Wittgenstein, but Carnap p…Read more
-
36Much Ado About Nothing: Toward a Structural Realist Theory of IntentionalityAxiomathes 28 (3): 293-308. 2018.Building upon Brentano’s Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Routledge, London, [1874] Brentano 1995) reintroduction of the concept of intentionality to the contemporary philosophy, Tim Crane has famously presented the intentionality as the mark of the mental. Accordingly, the problem of “intentional existence” has resurfaced in Crane’s revival of the Brentanoian theme. Here, I revise Crane’s construal of Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistence and reinterpret it in terms of a moderate…Read more
-
64The Downward Path to Epistemic Informational Structural RealismActa Analytica 33 (2): 181-197. 2018.
-
53Epistemic Informational Structural RealismMinds and Machines 26 (4): 323-339. 2016.The paper surveys Floridi’s attempt for laying down informational structural realism. After considering a number of reactions to the pars destruens of Floridi’s attack on the digital ontology, I show that Floridi’s enterprise for enriching the ISR by borrowing elements from the ontic form of structural realism is blighted by a haunting inconsistency. ISR has been originally developed by Floridi as a restricted and level dependent form of structural realism which remains mainly bonded within the …Read more
-
76Structural realist account of the selfSynthese 193 (12): 3727-3740. 2016.In this paper, inspired by the late twentieth century developments in philosophy of science, I propose an ontological scheme to accommodate the scientifically-informed anti-substantivalist views of the self. I call the position structural realist theory of the self. More specifically, I argue that SRS provides a middle ground for bringing a metaphysical reconciliation between the two recurring, and apparently competing forms of such anti-substantivalist views, i.e., eliminativism and pluralism. …Read more
-
57The Code Model of Biosemiotics and the Fate of the Structuralist Theory of Mental RepresentationBiosemiotics 10 (1): 99-107. 2017.In this paper I am advocating a structuralist theory of mental representation. For a structuralist theory of mental representation to be defended satisfactorily, the naturalistic and causal constraints have to be satisfied first. The more intractable of the two, i.e., the naturalistic constraint, indicates that to account for the mental representation, we should not invoke “a full-blown interpreting mind”. So, the aim of the paper is to show how the naturalistic and causal constraints could be s…Read more
-
36On the Thinking Brains and Tinkering with the Scientific ModelsAxiomathes 28 (1): 37-51. 2018.The paper aims to provide a detailed assessment of Tim Crane’s recent invocation of the notion of scientific models in the way of dealing with the issue of the brain’s representational states. In this paper, I assess Crane’s proposal under a charitable and a less charitable reading. I argue that Crane’s use of scientific models is at best compatible with his expression of psychological realism. However, Crane’s use of model-based strategy by no means underlay, support, or strengthen his psycholo…Read more
-
649On the Ontology of Linguistic Frameworks Toward a Comprehensive Version of EmpiricismPhilodophia Scientiae 19 (1): 115-126. 2015.Can the abstract entities be designated? While the empiricists usually took the positive answer to this question as the first step toward Platonism, in his ``Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’’ [Carnap 1950], Carnap tried to make a reconciliation between the language referring to abstract entities on the one hand, and empiricism on the other. In this paper, firstly, I show that the ingenuity of Carnap’s approach notwithstanding, it is prone to criticism from different aspects. But I also show …Read more
-
53On What Is Not There. Quine, Meinong, and the Indispensability ArgumentHumana.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (25): 77-94. 2013.Using the theory of definite descriptions, Russell and, following him, Quine masterfully challenged Meinong’s Theory of Objects (TO). In this paper, firstly I try to show that although the Russell-Quine’s interpretation of TO has been taken seriously even by many notable Neo-Meinongians and first-rate scholars, yet it is not the ultimately convincing reading of the Theory, at least not when we boil down the theory to Meinong’s primary motives and his essential arguments. Moreover, I show …Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
General Philosophy of Science |