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130II—Pluralism about Belief StatesAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1): 187-204. 2015.With his Humean thesis on belief, Leitgeb seeks to say how beliefs and credences ought to interact with one another. To argue for this thesis, he enumerates the roles beliefs must play and the properties they must have if they are to play them, together with norms that beliefs and credences intuitively must satisfy. He then argues that beliefs can play these roles and satisfy these norms if, and only if, they are related to credences in the way set out in the Humean thesis. I begin by raising qu…Read more
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129The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of IndifferenceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2017.In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this paper, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two …Read more
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101Internalism, Externalism, and the KK PrincipleErkenntnis 86 (6): 1-20. 2019.This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemological theses of externalism and internalism. In particular we examine arguments from Okasha :80–86, 2013) and Greco :169–197, 2014) which deny that we can derive the denial of the KK principle from externalism.
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87Accuracy and EvidenceDialectica 67 (4): 579-596. 2013.In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Jim Joyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms to which this g…Read more
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75Accuracy and the belief-credence connectionPhilosophers' Imprint 15 1-20. 2015.Probabilism says an agent is rational only if her credences are probabilistic. This paper is concerned with the so-called Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. This argument begins with the claim that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for a credence is its accuracy. It then shows that, however we measure accuracy, any non-probabilistic credences are accuracy-dominated: that is, there are alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than them. It follows that …Read more
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71The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of IndifferenceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2): 605-619. 2020.In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this article, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are tw…Read more
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69Accuracy and the Credence-Belief ConnectionPhilosophers' Imprint 15 1-20. 2015.Probabilism says an agent is rational only if her credences are probabilistic. This paper is concerned with the so-called Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. This argument begins with the claim that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for a credence is its accuracy. It then shows that, however we measure accuracy, any non-probabilistic credences are accuracy-dominated: that is, there are alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than them. It follows that …Read more
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69Aggregating incoherent agents who disagreeSynthese 196 (7): 2737-2776. 2019.In this paper, we explore how we should aggregate the degrees of belief of a group of agents to give a single coherent set of degrees of belief, when at least some of those agents might be probabilistically incoherent. There are a number of ways of aggregating degrees of belief, and there are a number of ways of fixing incoherent degrees of belief. When we have picked one of each, should we aggregate first and then fix, or fix first and then aggregate? Or should we try to do both at once? And wh…Read more
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68Internalism, Externalism, and the KK PrincipleErkenntnis 86 (6): 1713-1732. 2019.This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemological theses of externalism and internalism. In particular we examine arguments from Okasha (Analysis 73(1):80–86, 2013) and Greco (J Philos 111(4):169–197, 2014) which deny that we can derive the denial of the KK principle from externalism.
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66A note on deterministic updating and van Fraassen’s symmetry argument for conditionalizationPhilosophical Studies 178 (2): 665-673. 2021.In a recent paper, Pettigrew argues that the pragmatic and epistemic arguments for Bayesian updating are based on an unwarranted assumption, which he calls deterministic updating, and which says that your updating plan should be deterministic. In that paper, Pettigrew did not consider whether the symmetry arguments due to Hughes and van Fraassen make the same assumption Scientific inquiry in philosophical perspective. University Press of America, Lanham, pp. 183–223, 1987). In this note, I show …Read more
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59John P. Burgess. Rigor and Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-0-19-872222-9 ; 978-0-19-103360-5 . Pp. xii + 215 (review)Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1): 129-136. 2016.
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46Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of CredencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3): 749-754. 2018.
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42Précis and replies to contributors for book symposium on accuracy and the laws of credenceEpisteme 14 (1): 1-30. 2017.ABSTRACTThis book symposium onAccuracy and the Laws of Credenceconsists of an overview of the book’s argument by the author, Richard Pettigrew, together with four commentaries on different aspects of that argument. Ben Levinstein challenges the characterisation of the legitimate measures of inaccuracy that plays a central role in the arguments of the book. Julia Staffel asks whether the arguments of the book are compatible with an ontology of doxastic states that includes full beliefs as well as…Read more
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28Reviewed Work(s): An introduction to the philosophy of mathematics by Mark ColyvanAssociation for Symbolic Logic: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (3): 396-397. 2013.Review by: Richard Pettigrew The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 396-397, September 2013
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22Competing reasons, incomplete preferences, and framing effectsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 45. 2022.The quasi-cyclical preferences that Bermúdez ascribes to Agamemnon and others in analogous situations do not best represent them. I offer two alternative accounts. One works best if the preference ordering is taken to be the agent's personal betterness ordering of acts; the other works best if it is taken to provide a summary of the agent's dispositions to act.
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15Mark Colyvan. An introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2012, 198 pp (review)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (3): 396-397. 2013.
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15Replies to commentators on Accuracy and the Laws of CredencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3): 784-800. 2018.
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7What Chance‐Credence Norms Should Not BeNoûs 49 (1): 177-196. 2015.A chance‐credence norm states how an agent's credences in propositions concerning objective chances ought to relate to her credences in other propositions. The most famous such norm is the Principal Principle (PP), due to David Lewis. However, Lewis noticed that PP is too strong when combined with many accounts of chance that attempt to reduce chance facts to non‐modal facts. Those who defend such accounts of chance have offered two alternative chance‐credence norms: the first is Hall's and Thau…Read more
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6Illness as Transformative ExperienceThe Lancet 388. 2017.We propose that certain forms of chronic illness can be transformative experiences, in the sense described by L.A. Paul.
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Making Things Right: The True Consequences of Decision Theory in EpistemologyIn Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism, Oxford University Press. pp. 220-239. 2018.
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