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652A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal PrincipleEpisteme 10 (1): 19-35. 2013.Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility [Joyce, 1998]. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations [Pettigrew, 2012]. Joyce’s argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in tha…Read more
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308An Improper Introduction to Epistemic utility theoryIn Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Proceedings of EPSA09, Springer. pp. 287--301. 2012.Beliefs come in different strengths. What are the norms that govern these strengths of belief? Let an agent's belief function at a particular time be the function that assigns, to each of the propositions about which she has an opinion, the strength of her belief in that proposition at that time. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that an agent's belief function at any time ought to be a probability function (Probabilism), and that she ought to update her belief function upon obtaining new…Read more
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916Identity and discernibility in philosophy and logicReview of Symbolic Logic 5 (1): 162-186. 2012.Questions about the relation between identity and discernibility are important both in philosophy and in model theory. We show how a philosophical question about identity and dis- cernibility can be ‘factorized’ into a philosophical question about the adequacy of a formal language to the description of the world, and a mathematical question about discernibility in this language. We provide formal definitions of various notions of discernibility and offer a complete classification of their logica…Read more
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219Modelling UncertaintyGrazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1): 308-316. 2010.Review essay on Huber, F. and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.) Degrees of Belief (Springer).
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