Anton Leist

The degradation of natural resources in the environment is, technically speaking, a form of depleting a public good. Public goods are notorious for free-riding among egoists, but the marginality of individual contributions provides no less an obstacle, both to moral duty and motivation. This article discusses the problems of minimized and missing causal involvement on the empirical side; and, in the applicability of classical moral arguments, on the ethical side. It. suggests that individual responsibility is derived on the basis of implicit advantage-taking from participation in collective action.

Among philosophers and social scientists, Hume’s idea of justice is generally identified with a system of rules based on mutual advantage, their moral quality playing either an insignificant or no part at all. This conventional or contractarian model, respectively, is not adequate to the special institution of morality or, in Hume, to the virtues, artificial or natural. It is not self-interest but sympathy in combination with the indirect passions of pride and humility that gives conventions their moral quality and social relevance. This article suggests exegetic and systematic reasons for the normative importance of Hume’s moral psychology, which should open the way to a developing morality much more in agreement with actual Western societies than a static morality based on self-interest would allow.

The article gives an overview on arguments typically used within discussions on the ethical aspects of abortion. Five types of argument especially are analyzed more closely. Only one type withstands critical scrutiny: so-called interest-arguments, arguments referring to whether or when being killed (as involved in abortion) is against the interest of the fetus. In critical revision of a proposal due to Peter Singer the result is that abortion should be seen as morally neutral up to four months of pregnancy

In acting within large groups the single actor typically suffers from the symptom of irrelevance of his contribution. A single contributory effect may be extremely small or, due to ‘threshold effects’, even non-existent. Given such conditions not only self-interested action, also purely altruistically motivated contribution seems to be rendered irrational. The article reasons that the famous ‘principles of generalization’ are of no help on this problem. However, a ‘principle of division’ could be used in showing, that in many situations of collective action altruistically motivated contribution is rationally sound.

The article argues for a synthesis between analytical philosophy and social sciences as relevant and necessary. The motivation and framework of such a synthesis is outlined on the basis of a critical social science. The authors illuminate such a perspective negatively in a critique of empirical and theoretical sociology, then positively in a clarification of the critical standpoint. Four theses, two under each-aspect, are defended: 1. Concerning empirical social sciences Neither the quantitative nor the qualitative paradigm of empirical social science is able to put forward adequate methods for social research. Instead, the development of reconstructive methods is proposed to combine the advantages and eliminate the disadvantages of the quantitative and qualitative paradigms. 2. Concerning theoretical sociology Macrosociological theories tend to resist empirical corrobation. Pure theoretical and philosophical justification abounds instead. In this situation the tools of analytic theory of science are proposed in order to clarify the necessary steps towards a further development of theories, which can be empirically tested. 3. Concerning the critique of society A critical social science must incorporate a theory of a just society in order to analyse social institutions in a normative way. In this context an ethical realist approach is offered which tries to fulfill two conditions for sociologically relevant normative reasonings: satisfaction of individual interests and the rational consensus of all persons concerned. 4. Concerning critique of ideology The tools of analytic philosophy can be given new application by combining them with an analysis of interests under the title of critique of ideology.

Today philosophy falls apart into a “theoretical” and a “practical” sub-discipline, a situation to the detriment of both. On the back of a sketch of three stages of Western philosophy a diagnosis is made as to the practical origin of the theoretical/practical split, which also already contains within it the clue for a therapy. Both parts of philosophy could be set on a convergent path by recognizing two practical conflicts underlying philosophical problems: the biographical conflict of accepting the world and the social conflict of accepting others. A non-reductivist study of these conflicts might mitigate the present alienation within philosophy

Die Kantische Ethik gilt bis heute als die dominante Theorie der Moral, und das nicht nur mit Blick auf ihre moralischen Inhalte, sondern mehr noch mit Bezug auf ihre Begründung der moralischen Prinzipien aus der Vernunft. Die Auseinandersetzung mit Kant führt jedoch zu der Einsicht, daß wir unsere Vorstellungen vom Verhältnis zwischen Ethik und Moral, sowie von der Verbindung von Moral und sozialer Realität reformulieren müssen. Die im vorliegenden Buch gesammelten Artikel verbindet die Erwartung, daß die Moral statt über die Vernunft über ihre Funktion im Rahmen sozialer Beziehungen besser zu verstehen und gestalten sein sollte. Den konkreten Reichtum unserer Handlungsziele, Beziehungsmöglichkeiten und sozialen Fähigkeiten sind wir nur dann in der Lage zu erschließen, wenn wir das Werkzeug der abstrakten Vernunft als unbrauchbar beiseite legen und statt dessen mit den alltäglichen, persönlichen und überpersönlichen, Erfahrungen arbeiten, nit denen wir uns auskennen. Weil einzig aus den Beziehungsformen Normativität erwächst, sollten uns diese selbst, ihre Bedeutungen und ihre Wandelbarkeit interessieren, weniger kodifizierbare moralische Pflichten und Regeln. Gegenstand der Ethik der Beziehungen sind die konkreten Spielräume und Kräfte der sozialen Verhältnisse zwischen Menschen, nicht die abstrakten Fingerzeige eines von den Beziehungen unabhängigen ‚moralischen Gesetzes'.