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13A Dharmakirtian critique of NagarjuniansIn Mario D'Amato, Jay L. Garfield & Tom J. F. Tillemans (eds.), Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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Carnap's Pragmatism and the Two TruthsIn Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 181--188. 2011.
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68Three Schools of ParaconsistencyAustralasian Journal of Logic 1 28-42. 2003.A logic is said to be paraconsistent if it does not allow everything to follow from contradictory premises. There are several approaches to paraconsistency. This paper is concerned with several philosophical positions on paraconsistency. In particular, it concerns three ‘schools’ of paraconsistency: Australian, Belgian and Brazilian. The Belgian and Brazilian schools have raised some objections to the dialetheism of the Australian school. I argue that the Australian school of paraconsistency nee…Read more
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24Boolean Conservative Extension Results for some Modal Relevant LogicsAustralasian Journal of Logic 8 (5): 31-49. 2011.This paper shows that a collection of modal relevant logics are conservatively extended by the addition of Boolean negation.
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39The Blackwell guide to philosophical logicAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3): 394. 2002.Book Information The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Edited by Lou Goble. Blackwell Publishers. Oxford. 2001. Pp. x + 510. Paperback, £16.99.
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453Making Sense of Paraconsistent Logic: The Nature of Logic, Classical Logic and Paraconsistent LogicIn Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications, Springer. pp. 15--25. 2013.Max Cresswell and Hilary Putnam seem to hold the view, often shared by classical logicians, that paraconsistent logic has not been made sense of, despite its well-developed mathematics. In this paper, I examine the nature of logic in order to understand what it means to make sense of logic. I then show that, just as one can make sense of non-normal modal logics (as Cresswell demonstrates), we can make `sense' of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I turn the tables on classical logicians and ask what…Read more
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59Contradictions in DōgenPhilosophy East and West 63 (3): 322-334. 2013.In "The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism," Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest argue that some (though not all) of the contradictions that appear in Buddhist texts should be accepted. An examination of their argument depends on what sort(s) of negation is (are) used in the texts. In order to see apparently contradictory statements as affirmations of true contradictions, we must assume that 'not' (or its variance) is used as a contradiction-forming operator. In thi…Read more
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963Don't Think! Just Act!In Graham Priest & Damon Young (eds.), Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Open Court. 2010.Kenzo saw a slight movement of his opponent. “Now is the time to strike!” he thought. He started moving. But before he had time to raise his shinai (sword) he was struck on the men (head) by his opponent. “Ippon!” the judge called.
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120Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist PhilosophyOxford University Press. 2011.The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd ct CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and yet distinct. One o…Read more
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306In defense of Priest -- a reply to MortensenPhilosophy East and West 57 (2): 257-259. 2007.None
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127Anger and moral judgmentAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2): 269-286. 2014.Although theorists disagree about precisely how to characterize the link between anger and moral judgment, that they are linked is routinely taken for granted in contemporary metaethics and philosophy of emotion. One problem with this assumption is that it ignores virtues like patience, which thinkers as different as Cassian, Śāntideva, and Maimonides have argued are characteristic of mature moral agents. The patient neither experience nor plan to experience anger in response to (at least some) …Read more
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126The limit of language in daoismAsian Philosophy 14 (2). 2004.The paper is concerned with the development of the paradoxical theme of Daoism. Based on Chad Hansen's interpretation of Daoism and Chinese philosophy in general, it traces the history of Daoism by following their treatment of the limit of language. The Daoists seem to have noticed that there is a limit to what language can do and that the limit of language is paradoxical. The 'theoretical' treatment of the paradox of the limit of language matures as Daoism develops. Yet the Daoists seem to have…Read more
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59Owen Flanagan , The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (4): 285-287. 2013.
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285Dharmakīrti and Priest on an inconsistent theory of change — a comment to MortensenPhilosophy East and West 57 (2): 244-252. 2007.None
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1Ethics for MādhyamikasIn Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 221--31. 2011.
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11Review of J.L Alferes and L.M. Pereira Reasoning with Logic Programming (review)Studia Logica 67 118-120. 2001.
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367Inference in the mengzi 1a: 7Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38 (3): 444-454. 2011.In 1A:7 of the Mengzi, Mengzi tries to convince King Xuan of Qi that he is a “true” king. As a reading of Mengzi’s reasoning involved in his attempt at persuasion, David Nivison advances an inferential view, according to which Mengzi’s persuasion involves inferences. In this paper, I consider the assumptions underlying the objections raised against Nivison’s inferential view. I argue that these objections assume a contemporary Western view about the nature of logic and inferences. I propose an a…Read more
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Australian National UniversitySchool of PhilosophyAustralian Research Council Future Fellow (Part-time)
Canberra, ACT, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Asian Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Asian Philosophy |
Paraconsistent Logic |
Buddhist Logic |