Jean-Philippe Deranty

This review seeks to present a comprehensive picture of recent discussions in the social sciences of the anticipated impact of AI on the world of work. Issues covered include: technological unemployment, algorithmic management, platform work and the politics of AI work. The review identifies the major disciplinary and methodological perspectives on AI’s impact on work, and the obstacles they face in making predictions. Two parameters influencing the development and deployment of AI in the economy are highlighted: the capitalist imperative and nationalistic pressures.

In recent years, theorists have contended that we should move to a mode of social organisation where work and the values attached to it are no longer central, a ‘post-work society’. For these theorists, the modern ideology of work is intrinsically unjust, even irrational and no longer suited to the challenges of our time. The article presents an alternative response to the problems of work and employment. Rather than moving to a ‘post-work’ society, the article argues that we should transform the world of work, precisely by keeping in view why working is important to individuals and the community. In fact, it is not realistic to believe that human societies could ever do without work. Because human societies are by necessity work societies, and work, if organised correctly, entails many goods, we cannot really, and we should not, wish work away.

This paper attempts to show that an expansive normative vision can be drawn from Hegel's texts, one whose scope significantly exceeds the anthropocentric model presented in the ‘objective spirit’ parts of his system. This expansion of normativity is linked to an expansive vision of relationality underpinning Hegel's model of ‘concrete freedom’. In order to put into sharper relief the links between expansive relationality and normativity, the late thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is mobilized as a heuristic contrasting point. In the ‘subjective spirit’ sections of theEncyclopaediaare found insights that anticipate key features of Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’. Locating these insights allows us to detect the underlying thread this paper seeks to mine. Hegel's own ‘theory of flesh’ culminates in the notion of ‘constitutive attachments’, the idea that the content of subjectivity is made up of all the bonds linking the human subject to her surrounding worlds and objects. Since freedom for Hegel is ‘being with’, and since normative demands arise from the different ways in which freedom is concretely realized, it would seem that Hegel's relational conception of subjectivity should lead to an equally expansive conception of normativity. Against the objection that Hegel denied any normative status to non-human beings, the paper points to passages in his work, notably his account of aesthetic judgement and natural beauty, which appear to suggest the opposite.

Bringing together leading international scholars within the fields of social and political theory and philosophy, this book explores how we should understand work and its role(s) in our lives and wider society. What challenges are posed by work in our changing economy and the new economic forms that are beginning to emerge, and how can we best address these challenges? In what ways do patterns of working, as well as work technologies, shape people’s lives within and outside work, in particular their life opportunities and their social and natural environment? How might we organize—or seek to reorganize—workplaces so that the experience of work better reflects our shared ethical ideals and normative principles? This volume examines these vital questions in a comprehensive and systematic manner in order to provide much needed theoretical insight and practical guidance in reflecting on the nature, problems, and possibilities of work currently. This book will be of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students and established academics in the areas of contemporary political theory and philosophy, social theory, legal philosophy, labour studies, the sociology of work, practical ethics, critical theory, and political activism.

Neste artigo considerarei as principais objeções marxistas ao modelo de Honneth para uma Teoria Crítica da sociedade e também as objeções centrais de Honneth aos modelos inspirados em Marx. Depois tentarei esboçar uma reaproximação entre ambas posições ao mostrar como o conceito normativo de reconhecimento de Honneth não é oposto a argumentos funcionalistas, e sim que ele contém uma dimensão socioteórica: a ideia de que a reprodução social e a evolução social revolvem ao redor de lutas pela interpretação de normas sociais centrais. Ao iluminar o lado socioteórico do reconhecimento, é possível esboçar um modelo de Teoria Crítica da sociedade que, de fato, corresponda às características descritivas e normativa delineadas pelo próprio Marx. No entanto, o preço desta reaproximação para a Teoria Crítica de Honneth é uma ênfase maior na divisão do trabalho como o mecanismo central da reprodução social.

The chapter begins by establishing the absence of organizations in the organization of philosophy as a specialist academic discipline. The second section highlights the reasons why this gap is detrimental to philosophical inquiries. The third section seeks to clarify how philosophy, as a type of theoretical inquiry, can contribute to the study of organizations. Three basic features are proposed as underpinning the philosophical method. Hegel’s social theory is then put forward as an exemplary model of what a philosophical account of organizations might achieve. The fourth and final section shifts the perspective to focus on the life of individuals in organizations. Following a recent book combining post-Hegelian critical theory and Christophe Dejours’ psychodynamic approach, the paper highlights important aspects of individual and collective work that lead to a cooperative conception of management.

Ludwig Feuerbach is famous for his critical hermeneutics of religion. At the heart of it lie arguments of philosophical anthropology that directly anticipate contemporary developments in the theory of recognition. He counts amongst the great philosophers who, immediately following Kant, emphasised the constitutive importance for human beings of interpersonal and social relations. Indeed, his theory of intersubjectivity contains features that are highly original, notably the link between individual and community, and between recognition and recollection.

Two key axes carry the parameters that define Rancière’s approach to poetry. The first axis is constituted by his well-known account of aesthetic modernity as a democratic “regime of the arts”, which breaks with the previous, “representative” one, by allowing all subjects and all genres to be appropriated in expressive gestures. These expressive gestures can no longer rely on the old representational rules and references and therefore require constantly reinvented creative forms. The second axis that emerges from the dismantlement of the old regime of representation is therefore a new mode of expressive creativity inherent in individual and collective action. The combination of these two principles creates the structural conditions and the contradictions of the modern aesthetic field, within which individual poets define their tasks and encounter new limits and difficulties. Viewed as a series of individual, situated attempts at linguistic creation within a field in which the structures of perception and diction are inherently up for grabs, poetry becomes a particularly significant exercise. The great poets provide exemplary models of what saying and doing can mean in the conditions of modernity as a regime of equality; and from their individual exemplarity, profound theoretical implicit lessons can be drawn. Rancière’s writings on poetry as a result always seek to accomplish two aims: provide substantive hermeneutic reconstructions of writing practices, taken as exemplary forms of modern “poiesis”; and critique alternative theoretical uses of poetry and through these, alternative conceptions of modern practice and theory. To review these aspects of Rancière’s approach to poetry, I have adopted a genealogical approach, as it is the simplest way to give a sense of the richness of Rancière’s long engagement with the works of poets.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty was an important twentieth century contributor to the theory of recognition, even though he made literal reference to the concept only sparingly. He emphasized the importance of recognition, not only at the level of inter-personal relations and in the individual’s inclusion in the social, but also in terms of the capacity of human beings to communicate across cultures and across historical distances. The shift towards ontology in his later work provided a renewed grounding for his interest in intersubjectivity and cross-cultural communication. Such continuity might be traced to lasting Hegelian and Marxian legacies in his thinking, which inflected his political interpretation of recognition.

Axel Honneth was born on 18 July 1949 in Essen, Germany, in the coal-mining part of North Rhine Westphalia, the son of Horst Honneth, a medical doctor, and Annemarie Honneth. His adolescence and early adulthood coincided with the eruption of radical movements around the world, notably in his native country. The legacies of his early involvement in politics can be traced throughout his work. His postgraduate research focused on social and political issues, and embraced the “critical theory” tradition of the Frankfurt School. This is a strand in the Western philosophical landscape whose defining characteristic is precisely that it seeks to establish strong connections between philosophical analysis and the reality of the social and political worlds. In particular, the philosophers of the Frankfurt School seek to align their theoretical work with the progressive movements within the social that aim to challenge and transform oppressive social structures. The political bent of Honneth’s philosophical work can be witnessed in the positive references to Marx in his early articles, his criticisms of Habermas’ theoretical models, and his attempt recently to recalibrate a socialist project for the new century.

In the first part of the paper I consider the relative neglect of hope in the tradition of critical theory. I attribute this neglect to a low estimation of the cognitive, aesthetic, and moral value of hope, and to the strong—but, argue, contingent—association that holds between hope and religion. I then distinguish three strategies for thinking about the justification of social hope; one which appeals to a notion of unfulfilled or frustrated natural human capacities, another which invokes a providential order, and a third which questions the very appropriateness of justification, turning instead to a notion of ungroundable hope. Different senses of ungroundable hope are distinguished and by way of conclusion I briefly consider their relevance for the project of critique today.

In this article we examine the idea of a politics of misrecognition of working activity. We begin by introducing a distinction between the kind of recognition and misrecognition that attaches to one’s identity, and the kind of recognition and misrecognition that attaches to one’s activity. We then consider the political significance of the latter kind of recognition and misrecognition in the context of work. Drawing first on empirical research undertaken by sociologists at the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt, we argue for a differentiated concept of recognition that shows the politics of misrecognition at work to be as much a matter of conflict between modes of recognition as it is a struggle for recognition as opposed to non -recognition. The differentiated concept of recognition which allows for this empirical insight owes much to Axel Honneth’s theory. But as we argue in the section that follows, this theory is ambiguous about the normative content of the expectations of recognition that are bound up with the activity of working. This in turn makes it unclear how we should understand the normative basis of the politics of the misrecognition of what one does at work. In the final sections of the article, we suggest that the psychodynamic model of work elaborated by Christophe Dejours and others at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers in Paris can shed light on this matter; that is to say, it can help to clarify the normative significance and political stakes of the misrecognition of working activity

Axel Honneth a élaboré une critique de la société moderne au prisme du concept de reconnaissance. Jacques Rancière a construit une théorie de la politique moderne à partir du concept de mésentente. Ils s'attachent tous deux à analyser les logiques d’exclusion et de domination qui structurent les sociétés contemporaines. Dans un précieux dialogue, les deux philosophes explorent les affinités et les tensions entre leurs approches respectives. Ils contribuent ainsi à renouveler le cadre d’une théorie critique et à repenser les conditions du changement social et politique. La discussion est enrichie par des textes des deux penseurs, et elle est précédée d’une présentation substantielle qui remet en perspective ce dialogue critique.

German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) is now a relatively obscure figure and yet he played a key role in the German intellectual scene in the middle of the nineteenth century. He received his training from Hegel but moved away from Hegel's absolute idealism early on. In his mature work he sought to reuse aspects of the Hegelian method to propose a new, materialist theory of knowledge, and, most famously, of religious belief. He was a major influence on the budding socialist movement in Germany and on the young Marx in particular. It is in that respect at first that he counts as an interesting figure in the prehistory of sociological disciplines. However, his writings deserve to be studied for themselves, as they contain many rich insights that anticipate, sometimes in amazing ways, concepts and arguments propounded by sociologists and social theorists a century or more later.

This article seeks to re-evaluate the importance of the political in the thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The article first shows that Sartre’s description of Merleau-Ponty’s intellectual trajectory as one of increasing political apathy from the 1950s onwards is inaccurate. The article then demonstrates that throughout the post-war period, including in his project for a new ontology, Merleau-Ponty believed that a revised version of Marxism would provide the methodological framework within which philosophical work could address the political challenges of the present. This revised Marxism was to be a direct alternative to the reifying uses of Marx’s thinking. It would rely upon the latter’s self-reflexive historicism, which meant its very failures showed how philosophy might transform itself in connection with its own time. Cet article tente souligner la place du politique dans la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. On contestera d’abord la description faite par Sartre de sa trajectoire intellectuelle, selon laquelle il aurait fait preuve d’une apathie croissante, à partir des années cinquante, vis-à-vis des questions politiques. On montrera ensuite que durant toute la période d’après-guerre, jusque dans les recherches ontologiques ultimes, Merleau-Ponty a pensé qu’un usage renouvelé du marxisme permettrait au travail philosophique de répondre aux défis politiques du présent. Une telle révision du marxisme représentait une alternative directe aux usages réifiant de la pensée de Marx. Cette révision serait rendue possible par la réflexivité historiciste de cette pensée, qui fait que, dans ses erreurs mêmes, celle-ci révèle la capacité de la philosophie à se transformer au contact de son temps.

Bubbio’s new book is a synthesis of his earlier interventions in Hegel studies, nourished by his research on the notion of sacrifice. It offers an unabashed defence of the theological moment in Hegel’s idealism that is bound to attract much interest and critical attention. The book situates itself expertly in the current landscape. Aside from the original proposal it presents, it is a lucid introduction to the state of discussions in current Hegel scholarship. Many sections have great informative value, notably the one on figural reading in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the overall thesis defended by the book will be viewed critically by a number of readers.

The book forms the first critical study of Jacques Rancière’s impact and contribution to contemporary theoreticaland interdisciplinary studies. It showcases the work of leading scholars infields such as political theory, history and aesthetic theory; each of whom areuniquely situated to engage with the novelty of Rancière’s thinking withintheir respective fields. Each of the essays provides aninvestigation into the critical stance Rancière takes towards hiscontemporaries, concentrating on the versatile application of his thought todiverse fields of study. The aim ofthis collection is to use the critical interventions Rancière’s writing makeson current topics and themes as a way of offering new critical perspectives onhis thought. Wielding their individual expertise, each contributor assesses hisperspectives and positions on thinkers and topics of contemporary importance.The edition includes a new essay by Jacques Rancière, which charts thedifferent problems and motivations that have shaped his work.

I focus on exploitation from the point of view of those who suffer from it, and so I take exploitation as a category of subjective experience. Adopting a subjective perspective on exploitation highlights important conceptual aspects about it and suggests important methodological rules on how to critically discuss social forms of exploitation. I start by introducing some key conceptual distinctions in the first two sections. These distinctions lead me to formulate a first, general definition of exploitation as a subjective category, in the third section of the paper. In the fourth section, I ask what relationship there is between the objective and subjective senses of exploitation, and I turn to the work of Marx. This is because, as I try to argue, Marx's approach is exemplary for tying together an objective and a subjective sense of exploitation. Based on a schematic rendition of Marx's use of a dual perspective on exploitation, in the last sections of the paper, I draw a number of conceptual and normative conclusions.

Of all the parts of the System, the Philosophy of Right has one unique feature. It is the only part for which, throughout his entire career, Hegel published one of his few books, while giving lectures on the very same topic. This peculiarity of the Philosophy of Right puts a special demand on those who try to interpret it. Although the version published by the author himself should constitute the ultimate reference of his social and political doctrine, because he has worked on the topic all through his philosophical life, one must also read the lectures to gain a full knowledge of Hegel’s social philosophy. However, this demand itself places the reader in an awkward position, as there are some obvious discrepancies on some crucial points between the lectures themselves, as well as between the lectures and the book. These discrepancies are particularly obvious in the first two lectures, held in Heidelberg in the winter semester 1817/1818 and the first Berlin lectures 1818/1819.

This paper analyses the model of interaction at the heart of Axel Honneth's social philosophy. It argues that interaction in his mature ethics of recognition has been reduced to intercourse between human persons and that the role of nature is now missing from it. The ethics of recognition takes into account neither the material dimensions of individual and social action, nor the normative meaning of non-human persons and natural environments. The loss of nature in the mature ethics of recognition is made visible through a comparison with Honneth's initial formulation of his project. As an anthropology of intersubjectivity combining the teaching of the German philosophical anthropologists and G.H. Mead, his first model sought to ground social theory in the natural preconditions of human action. The last part of the article argues that a return to Mead's theory of practical intersubjectivity informed by Merleau-Ponty's germane theory of intercorporeity provides essential conceptual tools to enable the integration of the natural and the material within the theory of recognition.