Jean-Philippe Deranty

Bubbio’s new book is a synthesis of his earlier interventions in Hegel studies, nourished by his research on the notion of sacrifice. It offers an unabashed defence of the theological moment in Hegel’s idealism that is bound to attract much interest and critical attention. The book situates itself expertly in the current landscape. Aside from the original proposal it presents, it is a lucid introduction to the state of discussions in current Hegel scholarship. Many sections have great informative value, notably the one on figural reading in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the overall thesis defended by the book will be viewed critically by a number of readers.

This article seeks to re-evaluate the importance of the political in the thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The article first shows that Sartre’s description of Merleau-Ponty’s intellectual trajectory as one of increasing political apathy from the 1950s onwards is inaccurate. The article then demonstrates that throughout the post-war period, including in his project for a new ontology, Merleau-Ponty believed that a revised version of Marxism would provide the methodological framework within which philosophical work could address the political challenges of the present. This revised Marxism was to be a direct alternative to the reifying uses of Marx’s thinking. It would rely upon the latter’s self-reflexive historicism, which meant its very failures showed how philosophy might transform itself in connection with its own time. Cet article tente souligner la place du politique dans la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. On contestera d’abord la description faite par Sartre de sa trajectoire intellectuelle, selon laquelle il aurait fait preuve d’une apathie croissante, à partir des années cinquante, vis-à-vis des questions politiques. On montrera ensuite que durant toute la période d’après-guerre, jusque dans les recherches ontologiques ultimes, Merleau-Ponty a pensé qu’un usage renouvelé du marxisme permettrait au travail philosophique de répondre aux défis politiques du présent. Une telle révision du marxisme représentait une alternative directe aux usages réifiant de la pensée de Marx. Cette révision serait rendue possible par la réflexivité historiciste de cette pensée, qui fait que, dans ses erreurs mêmes, celle-ci révèle la capacité de la philosophie à se transformer au contact de son temps.

Neste artigo considerarei as principais objeções marxistas ao modelo de Honneth para uma Teoria Crítica da sociedade e também as objeções centrais de Honneth aos modelos inspirados em Marx. Depois tentarei esboçar uma reaproximação entre ambas posições ao mostrar como o conceito normativo de reconhecimento de Honneth não é oposto a argumentos funcionalistas, e sim que ele contém uma dimensão socioteórica: a ideia de que a reprodução social e a evolução social revolvem ao redor de lutas pela interpretação de normas sociais centrais. Ao iluminar o lado socioteórico do reconhecimento, é possível esboçar um modelo de Teoria Crítica da sociedade que, de fato, corresponda às características descritivas e normativa delineadas pelo próprio Marx. No entanto, o preço desta reaproximação para a Teoria Crítica de Honneth é uma ênfase maior na divisão do trabalho como o mecanismo central da reprodução social.

From John Maynard Keynes’s prediction of a fifteen-hour workweek to present-day speculation about automation, we have not stopped forecasting the end of work. Critical theory and political philosophy have turned their attention away from the workplace to focus on other realms of domination and emancipation. But far from coming to an end, work continues to occupy a central place in our lives. This is not only because of the amount of time people spend on the job. Many of our deepest hopes and fears are bound up in our labor—what jobs we perform, how we relate to others, how we might flourish. The Return of Work in Critical Theory presents a bold new account of the human significance of work and the human costs of contemporary forms of work organization. A collaboration among experts in philosophy, social theory, and clinical psychology, it brings together empirical research with incisive analysis of the political stakes of contemporary work. The Return of Work in Critical Theory begins by looking in detail at the ways in which work today fails to meet our expectations. It then sketches a phenomenological description of work and examines the normative premises that underlie the experience of work. Finally, it puts forward a novel conception of work that can renew critical theory’s engagement with work and point toward possibilities for transformation. Inspired by Max Horkheimer’s vision of critical theory as empirically informed reflection on the sources of social suffering with emancipatory intent, The Return of Work in Critical Theory is a lucid diagnosis of the malaise and pathologies of contemporary work that proposes powerful remedies.

Axel Honneth’s philosophical reflections always had significant historical dimensions, but it is only recently, in Recognition. A Chapter in the History of European Ideas, that he has attended to the history of recognition as a concept. This essay examines the cogency and the implications of this turn to intellectual history in the theory of recognition. The first section summarises the main historical claims put forward by Honneth. Section two raises critical doubts regarding three aspects of his narrative: the cultural contexts that are said to have influenced particular conceptions of recognition; the conceptions of recognition that are supposed to be tied to national cultures; and the method of linking particular meanings of recognition to national cultures. The third section broadens the scope and attempts to show why this turn to intellectual history, despite some shortcomings, raises tantalising questions for recognition theory, and beyond it, for critical theory.

Axel Honneth is best known for his critique of modern society centered on a concept of recognition. Jacques Rancière has advanced an influential theory of modern politics based on disagreement. Underpinning their thought is a concern for the logics of exclusion and domination that structure contemporary societies. In a rare dialogue, these two philosophers explore the affinities and tensions between their perspectives to provoke new ideas for social and political change. Honneth sees modern society as a field in which the logic of recognition provides individuals with increasing possibilities for freedom and is a constant catalyst for transformation. Rancière sees the social as a policing order and the political as a force that must radically assert equality. Honneth claims Rancière's conception of the political lies outside of actual historical societies and involves a problematic desire for egalitarianism. Rancière argues that Honneth's theory of recognition relies on an overly substantial conception of identity and subjectivity. While impassioned, their exchange seeks to advance critical theory's political project by reconciling the rift between German and French post-Marxist traditions and proposing new frameworks for justice.

Axel Honneth a élaboré une critique de la société moderne au prisme du concept de reconnaissance. Jacques Rancière a construit une théorie de la politique moderne à partir du concept de mésentente. Ils s'attachent tous deux à analyser les logiques d’exclusion et de domination qui structurent les sociétés contemporaines. Dans un précieux dialogue, les deux philosophes explorent les affinités et les tensions entre leurs approches respectives. Ils contribuent ainsi à renouveler le cadre d’une théorie critique et à repenser les conditions du changement social et politique. La discussion est enrichie par des textes des deux penseurs, et elle est précédée d’une présentation substantielle qui remet en perspective ce dialogue critique.

Although relatively unknown a decade ago, the work of Jacques Ranciere is fast becoming a central reference in the humanities and social sciences. His thinking brings a fresh, innovative approach to many fields, notably the study of work, education, politics, literature, film, art, as well as philosophy. This is the first, full-length introduction to Ranciere's work and covers the full range of his contribution to contemporary thought, presenting in clear, succinct chapters the key concepts Ranciere has developed in his writings over the last forty years. Students new to Ranciere will find this work accessible and comprehensive, an ideal introduction to this major thinker. For readers already familiar with Ranciere, the in-depth analysis of each key concept, written by leading scholars, should provide an ideal reference

Axel Honneth, célèbre théoricien allemand de la reconnaissance qui s’inscrit dans la filiation de l’École de Francfort et notamment de Jürgen Habermas, et Jacques Rancière, éminent penseur français de la mésentente qui a rompu avec la tradition althussérienne, sont deux figures centrales du paysage intellectuel contemporain. Leurs pensées se situent dans deux traditions distinctes, mais elles ont toutes deux à voir avec le marxisme pris au sens large, qu’elles considèrent sous un angle critique. Les deux penseurs portent intérêt à des domaines spécifiques au sein de la philosophie et hors d’elle. S’ils partagent tous deux un souci du domaine politique, Axel Honneth se meut dans la philosophie sociale, la philosophie morale et la philosophie du droit ; il fait un usage important et réfléchi des sciences sociales. Jacques Rancière se tourne, pour sa part, vers l’histoire, l’esthétique et la littérature. Mais une confrontation entre leurs deux pensées paraît s’imposer, tant leurs modèles sont influents dans le champ des sciences sociales, de la théorie politique et de la philosophie critique aujourd’hui. Il s’agit de savoir si les paradigmes qu’ils mettent en avant pour critiquer la société, pour rendre raison de son évolution et des transformations qui doivent la rendre plus juste ou plus libre, le paradigme de la reconnaissance et celui de la mésentente, sont concurrents, s’ils sont exclusifs l’un de l’autre, ou s’ils sont compatibles.

German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) is now a relatively obscure figure and yet he played a key role in the German intellectual scene in the middle of the nineteenth century. He received his training from Hegel but moved away from Hegel's absolute idealism early on. In his mature work he sought to reuse aspects of the Hegelian method to propose a new, materialist theory of knowledge, and, most famously, of religious belief. He was a major influence on the budding socialist movement in Germany and on the young Marx in particular. It is in that respect at first that he counts as an interesting figure in the prehistory of sociological disciplines. However, his writings deserve to be studied for themselves, as they contain many rich insights that anticipate, sometimes in amazing ways, concepts and arguments propounded by sociologists and social theorists a century or more later.