-
Idealization and Empirical TestingDissertation, University of Miami. 2000.It has been argued that the presence of idealizations in physical theories implies that scientific realism is false. Furthermore, it has also been argued that because physical theories incorporate idealizations scientific theories must be accepted a priori, because the objects, processes, etc. quantified over in such expressions cannot be observed in the actual world. I argue against the former view by showing that scientific realism is compatible with the fact that all theoretical claims depend…Read more
-
671Defusing the Miners ParadoxFilosofiska Notiser 5 57-67. 2018.This paper presents a case for the claim that the infamous miners paradox is not a paradox. This contention is based on some important observations about the nature of ignorance with respect to both disjunctions and conditional obligations and their modal features. The gist of the argument is that given the uncertainty about the location of the miners in the story and the nature of obligations, the apparent obligation to block either mine shaft is cancelled.
-
808Knowledge of Abstract Objects in Physics and MathematicsActa Analytica 32 (4): 397-409. 2017.In this paper a parallel is drawn between the problem of epistemic access to abstract objects in mathematics and the problem of epistemic access to idealized systems in the physical sciences. On this basis it is argued that some recent and more traditional approaches to solving these problems are problematic.
-
595Foley’s Threshold View of Belief and the Safety Condition on KnowledgeMetaphilosophy 49 (4): 589-594. 2018.This paper introduces a new argument against Richard Foley’s threshold view of belief. His view is based on the Lockean Thesis (LT) and the Rational Threshold Thesis (RTT). The argument introduced here shows that the views derived from the LT and the RTT violate the safety condition on knowledge in way that threatens the LT and/or the RTT.
-
501Internalism, Evidentialism and Appeals to Expert KnowledgeLogos and Episteme 8 (3): 291-305. 2017.Given the sheer vastness of the totality of contemporary human knowledge and our individual epistemic finitude it is commonplace for those of us who lack knowledge with respect to some proposition(s) to appeal to experts (those who do have knowledge with respect to that proposition(s)) as an epistemic resource. Of course, much ink has been spilled on this issue and so concern here will be very narrowly focused on testimony in the context of epistemological views that incorporate evidentialism a…Read more
-
1247Grounding Reichenbach’s Pragmatic Vindication of InductionPolish Journal of Philosophy 11 (1): 43-55. 2017.This paper has three interdependent aims. The first is to make Reichenbach’s views on induction and probabilities clearer, especially as they pertain to his pragmatic justification of induction. The second aim is to show how his view of pragmatic justification arises out of his commitment to extensional empiricism and moots the possibility of a non-pragmatic justification of induction. Finally, and most importantly, a formal decision-theoretic account of Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification …Read more
-
385Bealer on the autonomy of philosophical and scientific knowledgeMetaphilosophy 38 (1). 2007.In a series of influential articles, George Bealer argues for the autonomy of philosophical knowledge on the basis that philosophically known truths must be necessary truths. The main point of his argument is that the truths investigated by the sciences are contingent truths to be discovered a posteriori by observation, while the truths of philosophy are necessary truths to be discovered a priori by intuition. The project of assimilating philosophy to the sciences is supposed to be rendered ille…Read more
-
575A Defeater of the Claim that Belief in God’s Existence is Properly BasicPhilo 7 (1): 57-70. 2004.Some contemporary theologically inclined epistemologists, the reformed epistemologists, have attempted to show that belief in God is rational by appealing directly to a special kind of experience. To strengthen the appeal to this particular, and admittedly peculiar, type of experience these venture to draw a parallel between such experiences and normal perceptual experiences in order to show that, by parity of reasoning, if beliefs formed on the basis of the later are taken to be justified and …Read more
-
1225Lakatos’ Quasi-empiricism in the Philosophy of MathematicsPolish Journal of Philosophy 9 (2): 71-80. 2015.Imre Lakatos' views on the philosophy of mathematics are important and they have often been underappreciated. The most obvious lacuna in this respect is the lack of detailed discussion and analysis of his 1976a paper and its implications for the methodology of mathematics, particularly its implications with respect to argumentation and the matter of how truths are established in mathematics. The most important themes that run through his work on the philosophy of mathematics and which culminat…Read more
-
307Three Problematic Theories of Conditional AcceptanceLogos and Episteme 2 (1): 117-125. 2011.In this paper it is argued that three of the most prominent theories of conditional acceptance face very serious problems. David Lewis' concept of imaging, the Ramsey test and Jonathan Bennett's recent hybrid view all face viscious regresses, or they either employ unanalyzed components or depend upon an implausibly strong version of doxastic voluntarism.
-
1070Some epistemological concerns about dissociative identity disorder and diagnostic practices in psychologyPhilosophical Psychology 18 (1): 1-29. 2005.In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of …Read more
-
310Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-contravening CommitmentsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1): 73-82. 2013.Defenders of doxastic voluntarism accept that we can voluntarily commit ourselves to propositions, including belief-contravening propositions. Thus, defenders of doxastic voluntarism allow that we can choose to believe propositions that are negatively implicated by our evidence. In this paper it is argued that the conjunction of epistemic deontology and doxastic voluntarism as it applies to ordinary cases of belief-contravening propositional commitments is incompatible with evidentialism. In …Read more
-
568Bursting Bealer’s Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against QuineCanadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1): 87-106. 2004.In his 1993 article George Bealer offers three separate arguments that are directed against the internal coherence of empiricism, specifically against Quine’s version of empiricism. One of these arguments is the starting points argument (SPA) and it is supposed to show that Quinean empiricism is incoherent. We argue here that this argument is deeply flawed, and we demonstrate how a Quinean may successfully defend his views against Bealer’s SPA. Our defense of Quinean empiricism against the SP…Read more
-
210Stanley and the Stakes HypothesisThe Reasoner 11 73-74. 2017.The main examples of pragmatic encroachment presented by Jason Stanley involve the idea that knowledge ascription occurs more readily in cases where stakes are low rather than high. This is the stakes hypothesis. In this paper an example is presented showing that in some cases knowledge ascription is more readily appropriate where stakes are high rather than low.
-
453A Thoroughly Modern WagerLogos and Episteme 8 (2): 207-231. 2017.This paper presents a corrected version of Pascal's wager that makes it consonant with modern decision theory. The corrected wager shows that not committing to God's existence is the rational choice.
-
405Theories of Violence and the Explanation of Ultra-violent BehaviorIn T. Levin (ed.), Violence: Mercurial Gestalt, . 2008.Theorists in various scientific disciplines offer radically different accounts of the origin of violent behavior in humans, but it is not clear how the study of violence is to be scientifically grounded. This problem is made more complicated because both what sorts of acts constitute violence and what needs to be appealed to in explaining violence differs according to social scientists, biologists, anthropologists and neurophysiologists, and this generates serious problems with respect to even …Read more
-
506Probability and Tempered Modal EliminativismHistory and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4): 305-318. 2004.In this paper the strategy for the eliminative reduction of the alethic modalities suggested by John Venn is outlined and it is shown to anticipate certain related contemporary empiricistic and nominalistic projects. Venn attempted to reduce the alethic modalities to probabilities, and thus suggested a promising solution to the nagging issue of the inclusion of modal statements in empiricistic philosophical systems. However, despite the promise that this suggestion held for laying the ‘ghost o…Read more
-
18Counterfactuals and Scientific RealismPalgrave MacMillan. 2012.This book is a sustained defense of the compatibility of the presence of idealizations in the sciences and scientific realism. So, the book is essentially a detailed response to the infamous arguments raised by Nancy Cartwright to the effect that idealization and scientific realism are incompatible.
-
1250A logical hole in the chinese roomMinds and Machines 19 (2): 229-235. 2009.Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) has been the object of great interest in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science since its initial presentation in ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ in 1980. It is by no means an overstatement to assert that it has been a main focus of attention for philosophers and computer scientists of many stripes. It is then especially interesting to note that relatively little has been said about the detailed logic of the argument, whatever sign…Read more
-
260Might/Would Duality and The Probabilities of CounterfactualsLogique and Analyse 242 119-124. 2018.In this paper it is shown that Lewis' MWD (might/would duality) and imaging principles lead to wildly implausible probability assignments for would counterfactuals.
-
228The Ramsey Principle and The Principle of Informational EquilibriumThe Reasoner 5 (3): 37-39. 2011.This paper challenges the soundness of an argument given in support of a Ramseyan analysis of belief defended by Dokic and Engel in their 2001 book.
-
297The Constitutive A Priori and Epistemic JustificationIn Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the A Priori?, Open Court. pp. 193. 2011.In this paper I argue that Michael Friedman's conception of the contitutive a priori faces two serious problems. These two problems show that the view collapses into a form of conventionalism.
-
457Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of AcceptanceJournal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25 337-353. 2013.Paradoxes have played an important role both in philosophy and in mathematics and paradox resolution is an important topic in both fields. Paradox resolution is deeply important because if such resolution cannot be achieved, we are threatened with the charge of debilitating irrationality. This is supposed to be the case for the following reason. Paradoxes consist of jointly contradictory sets of statements that are individually plausible or believable. These facts about paradoxes then give r…Read more
-
456Bayesianism, convergence and social epistemologyEpisteme 5 (2). 2008.Following the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayes…Read more
-
203In this paper I argue that Tyler Burge's non-reductive view of testiomonial knowledge cannot adeqautrely discriminate between fallacious ad vericumdium appeals to expet testimony and legitimate appeals to authority.
-
218E Does Not Equal KThe Reasoner 7 30-31. 2013.This paper challenges Williamson's "E = K" thesis on the basis of evidential practice. The main point is that most evidence is only approximately true and so cannot be known if knowledge is factive.
-
341The publicity of belief, epistemic wrongs and moral wrongsSocial Epistemology 20 (1). 2006.It is a commonplace belief that many beliefs, e.g. religious convictions, are a purely private matter, and this is meant in some way to serve as a defense against certain forms of criticism. In this paper it is argued that this thesis is false, and that belief is really often a public matter. This argument, the publicity of belief argument, depends on one of the most compelling and central thesis of Peircean pragmatism. This crucial thesis is that bona fide belief cannot be separated from action…Read more
-
233Reflection, Conditionalization and Indeterminacy about the FutureThe Reasoner 8 65-66. 2014.This paper shows that any view of future contingent claims that treats such claims as having indeterminate truth values or as simply being false implies probabilistic irrationality. This is because such views of the future imply violations of reflection, special reflection and conditionalization.
-
192Coherence, Justification, and the AGM Theory of Belief RevisionIn Yves Bouchard (ed.), Perspectives on Coherentism, Editions Du Scribe. pp. 139--160. 2002.In a recent article, Peter Gärdenfors (1992) has suggested that the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson) theory of belief revision can be given an epistemic basis by interpreting the revision postulates of that theory in terms of a version of the coherence theory of justification. To accomplish this goal Gärdenfors suggests that the AGM revision postulates concerning the conservative nature of belief revision can be interpreted in terms of a concept of epistemic entrenchment and that ther…Read more
-
211A Paradox for Possible World SemanticsLogique Et Analyse 49 (195): 307-317. 2006.The development of possible worlds semantics for modal claims has led to a more general application of that theory as a complete semantics for various formal and natural languages, and this view is widely held to be an adequate (philosophical) interpretation of the model theory for such languages. We argue here that this view generates a self-referential inconsistency that indicates either the falsity or the incompleteness of PWS.