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1071Some epistemological concerns about dissociative identity disorder and diagnostic practices in psychologyPhilosophical Psychology 18 (1): 1-29. 2005.In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of …Read more
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310Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-contravening CommitmentsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1): 73-82. 2013.Defenders of doxastic voluntarism accept that we can voluntarily commit ourselves to propositions, including belief-contravening propositions. Thus, defenders of doxastic voluntarism allow that we can choose to believe propositions that are negatively implicated by our evidence. In this paper it is argued that the conjunction of epistemic deontology and doxastic voluntarism as it applies to ordinary cases of belief-contravening propositional commitments is incompatible with evidentialism. In …Read more
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568Bursting Bealer’s Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against QuineCanadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1): 87-106. 2004.In his 1993 article George Bealer offers three separate arguments that are directed against the internal coherence of empiricism, specifically against Quine’s version of empiricism. One of these arguments is the starting points argument (SPA) and it is supposed to show that Quinean empiricism is incoherent. We argue here that this argument is deeply flawed, and we demonstrate how a Quinean may successfully defend his views against Bealer’s SPA. Our defense of Quinean empiricism against the SP…Read more
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211Stanley and the Stakes HypothesisThe Reasoner 11 73-74. 2017.The main examples of pragmatic encroachment presented by Jason Stanley involve the idea that knowledge ascription occurs more readily in cases where stakes are low rather than high. This is the stakes hypothesis. In this paper an example is presented showing that in some cases knowledge ascription is more readily appropriate where stakes are high rather than low.
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454A Thoroughly Modern WagerLogos and Episteme 8 (2): 207-231. 2017.This paper presents a corrected version of Pascal's wager that makes it consonant with modern decision theory. The corrected wager shows that not committing to God's existence is the rational choice.
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405Theories of Violence and the Explanation of Ultra-violent BehaviorIn T. Levin (ed.), Violence: Mercurial Gestalt, . 2008.Theorists in various scientific disciplines offer radically different accounts of the origin of violent behavior in humans, but it is not clear how the study of violence is to be scientifically grounded. This problem is made more complicated because both what sorts of acts constitute violence and what needs to be appealed to in explaining violence differs according to social scientists, biologists, anthropologists and neurophysiologists, and this generates serious problems with respect to even …Read more
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506Probability and Tempered Modal EliminativismHistory and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4): 305-318. 2004.In this paper the strategy for the eliminative reduction of the alethic modalities suggested by John Venn is outlined and it is shown to anticipate certain related contemporary empiricistic and nominalistic projects. Venn attempted to reduce the alethic modalities to probabilities, and thus suggested a promising solution to the nagging issue of the inclusion of modal statements in empiricistic philosophical systems. However, despite the promise that this suggestion held for laying the ‘ghost o…Read more
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18Counterfactuals and Scientific RealismPalgrave MacMillan. 2012.This book is a sustained defense of the compatibility of the presence of idealizations in the sciences and scientific realism. So, the book is essentially a detailed response to the infamous arguments raised by Nancy Cartwright to the effect that idealization and scientific realism are incompatible.
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1250A logical hole in the chinese roomMinds and Machines 19 (2): 229-235. 2009.Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) has been the object of great interest in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science since its initial presentation in ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ in 1980. It is by no means an overstatement to assert that it has been a main focus of attention for philosophers and computer scientists of many stripes. It is then especially interesting to note that relatively little has been said about the detailed logic of the argument, whatever sign…Read more
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228The Ramsey Principle and The Principle of Informational EquilibriumThe Reasoner 5 (3): 37-39. 2011.This paper challenges the soundness of an argument given in support of a Ramseyan analysis of belief defended by Dokic and Engel in their 2001 book.
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260Might/Would Duality and The Probabilities of CounterfactualsLogique and Analyse 242 119-124. 2018.In this paper it is shown that Lewis' MWD (might/would duality) and imaging principles lead to wildly implausible probability assignments for would counterfactuals.
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301The Constitutive A Priori and Epistemic JustificationIn Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the A Priori?, Open Court. pp. 193. 2011.In this paper I argue that Michael Friedman's conception of the contitutive a priori faces two serious problems. These two problems show that the view collapses into a form of conventionalism.
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457Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of AcceptanceJournal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25 337-353. 2013.Paradoxes have played an important role both in philosophy and in mathematics and paradox resolution is an important topic in both fields. Paradox resolution is deeply important because if such resolution cannot be achieved, we are threatened with the charge of debilitating irrationality. This is supposed to be the case for the following reason. Paradoxes consist of jointly contradictory sets of statements that are individually plausible or believable. These facts about paradoxes then give r…Read more
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456Bayesianism, convergence and social epistemologyEpisteme 5 (2). 2008.Following the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayes…Read more
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203In this paper I argue that Tyler Burge's non-reductive view of testiomonial knowledge cannot adeqautrely discriminate between fallacious ad vericumdium appeals to expet testimony and legitimate appeals to authority.