Peter Lamarque

The paper offers a mildly deflationary account of narrative, drawing attention to the minimal, thus easily satisfied, conditions of narrativity and showing that many of the more striking claims about narrative are either poorly supported or refer to distinct classes of narrative—usually literary or fictional—which provide a misleading paradigm for narration in general. An enquiry into structural, referential, pragmatic, and valuebased features of narrative helps circumscribe the limits of narration and the test case of the narrative definition of the self is examined and shown to yield rather less that is often claimed

The paper considers what kinds of things are musical, literary, pictorial and sculptural works, how they relate to physical objects or abstract types, and what their identity and survival conditions are. Works are shown to be cultural objects with essential intentional and relational properties. These essential properties are connected to conditions of production and conditions of reception, of both a generic and work-specific kind. It is argued that work-identity is value-laden, whereby essential to the survival of a work is the quality of the experience the work affords. However, the overall stance is realist, defending the view that works are real, perceivable, and objectively characterisable

This paper looks at some of the principles behind restoration and conservation applied to ancient artefacts and architecture. A number of case studies are discussed, from medieval stained glass to buildings that have been damaged by fire. The paper ends with some remarks about the conservation of ruins. Underlying the discussion are questions about the kinds of obligations—both ethical and aesthetic—that might constrain the practices of restoration: what ought and ought not to be done in particular cases and how such decisions might be made. A broad conclusion is that different principles seem to operate in different cases and accordingly that different obligations obtain. Consideration is given to what grounds such principles and obligations.

The paper offers an overview of, and critical comments on, Michael Krausz’s Limits of Rightness. It focuses on three key aspects of the book’s intellectual framework: the ideals of interpretation, the objects of interpretation, and the ontological commitments of interpretation. The paper discusses how exactly these aspects are related Krausz’s views on constructive realism, in particular its relation to objects of interpretation, become crucial. His comments on Paul Thom’s theory of interpretations provide a context for examining the role of ‘construction’ in objects per se and in works of art and a tripartite distinction between object, work and interpretation is proposed.

The familiar idea that literature is embedded in social practices that help explain both its existence and its value took a distinctive form in analytic philosophy, drawing on speech act theory and a conception of ‘rules’. A major influence was John Rawls's seminal paper ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ (1955) in which he introduced the ‘practice conception of rules’ according to which certain practices are defined by rules that in turn make possible certain kinds of action. The idea underlies the notion of ‘constitutive rules’ in speech act theory and draws on a comparison with games. The origin of this idea can clearly be traced to Wittgenstein, with his highly original thoughts on practices, rules, and games. Yet the Wittgensteinian influence is not sufficiently acknowledged in this context (that is, the context of literary aesthetics). As someone who holds the idea of a practice or ‘institution’ to be of crucial importance in philosophy of literature, I therefore thought it would be useful to put the record straight and remind ourselves what Wittgenstein says about practices (and games) to see just what the relation is between the roots of that idea (in Wittgenstein) and its current manifestations in literary aesthetics. The results suggest that there is much to be learned from Wittgenstein and that his model might be more fruitful than that of Rawls

The paper examines the relation between interpretation and the objects of interpretation, principally, but not exclusively, in the realm of art. Several theses are defended: that interpretation cannot proceed without prior determination of the kind of thing being interpreted; that the mode of interpretation is determined by the nature of its object; that interpretation, of a meaning‐determining rather than generic kind, focuses at the level of works, not descending to a bedrock of “mere objects”; that because works and their appropriate mode of interpretation are constituted by convention‐bound practices, it follows that no clear line can be drawn between properties “in” a work and those “imputed to” it through interpretive procedures endorsed by the practice. The debate over constructivism or “imputationalism”– between Margolis and Krausz, on the one hand, and Stecker and Levinson, on the other – is engaged with an attempt to show a core of truth in each of the conflicting theories, once the right distinction between object, work, and interpretation is in place.

The paper argues that there is a proper place for literature within aesthetics but that care must be taken in identifying just what the relation is. In characterising aesthetic pleasure associated with literature it is all too easy to fall into reductive accounts, for example, of literature as merely “fine writing”. Belleslettrist or formalistic accounts of literature are rejected, as are two other kinds of reduction, to pure meaning properties and to a kind of narrative realism. The idea is developed that literature—both poetry and prose fiction—invites its own distinctive kind of aesthetic appreciation which far from being at odds with critical practice, in fact chimes well with it.

By exploring central issues in the philosophy of literature, illustrated by a wide range of novels, poems, and plays, _Philosophy of Literature_ gets to the heart of why literature matters to us and sheds new light on the nature and interpretation of literary works. Provides a comprehensive study, along with original insights, into the philosophy of literature Develops a unique point of view - from one of the field's leading exponents Offers examples of key issues using excerpts from well-known novels, poems, and plays from different historical periods.

Various aspects of poetic meaning are discussed, centred on the relation of form and content. A C Bradley's thesis of form-content identity, suitably reformulated, is defended against criticisms by Peter Kivy. It is argued that the unity of form-content is not discovered in poetry so much as demanded of it when poetry is read 'as poetry'. A shift of emphasis from talking about 'meaning' in poetry to talking about 'content' is promoted, as is a more prominent role for 'experience' in characterising responses to poetry and its value. It is argued that the key to poetic meaning lies less in a theory of meaning, more in a theory of poetry, where what matters are modes of reading poetry. Content-identity in poetry is said to be 'interest-relative' such that no absolute answer, independent of the interests of the questioner, can determine when a poem and a paraphrase have the same content. Interpretation of poetry need not focus exclusively on meaning, but on ways in which the experience of a poem can be heightened.