Philip Stratton-Lake

Ethical Intuitionism was the dominant moral theory in Britain for much of the 18th, 19th and the first third of the twentieth century. However, during the middle decades of the twentieth century ethical intuitionism came to be regarded as utterly untenable. It was thought to be either empty, or metaphysically and epistemologically extravagant, or both. This hostility led to a neglect of the central intuitionist texts, and encouraged the growth of a caricature of intuitionism that could easily be rejected before moving on to 'more serious' philosophical theories. More recently, however, this hostility towards ethical intuitionism has subsided. A wide range of moral philosophers, from Aristotelians, to rule-consequentialists, to expressivists, Kantians and deontologists, are beginning to look to the ethical intuitionists's work as a positive resource. It is, therefore, a good time to get clear on what it was that intuitionists said, and re-evaluate their contribution to our understanding of morality. This volume is the first serious engagement with ethical intuitionism in the light of contemporary developments in ethical theory. It contains essays by eminent moral philosophers working in very different traditions whose aim is to clarify and assess ethical intuitionism. Issues addressed include whether the plurality of basic principles intuitionists adhere to can be grounded in some more fundamental principle; the autonomy of ethics and self-evidence; moral realism and internalism; and the open question argument and naturalism.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;Kant's fundamental problematic is the articulation of a finite rationality. The central problematic of the finitude of reason is how to think of a manner of thinking which is appropriate to a finite being. The relevant aspect of the finitude of a finite being is its temporality: a finite being is a temporal historical being. A finite rationality will, therefore, be a manner of thinking appropriate to this temporality--that is, it will be a temporal, mobile rationality. The mobility of this rationality must be conceived of as unending, otherwise it will ultimately be conceived of as static. This constant mobility is achieved in Kant's writing by relating thinking to ideals which can only be approached in infinite approximation. Against a non-finite conception of reason as oriented by the present, Kant's conception of a finite rationality is one oriented by the future. However, this constant mobility--infinite approximation to a postulated ideal future--raises the question of how such a rationality can be conceived of positively: is not such a rationality a rationality of infinite defeat, a rationality of despair? If it is, then Kant will have not thought finitude, since a truly finite rationality--that is, a truly appropriate rationality--cannot be one which creates a negative self-conception. Such negativity reveals an inappropriate criterion, i.e., the opposite of what the question of finitude demands. So the central question of the finitude of reason is how to conceive of a manner of thinking which is temporal , and does not result in a negative self-conception. However these two demands seem to be exclusive. We will argue that this dilemma is addressed in Kant's attempt to articulate the finitude of reason by giving hope a central role in his account. In hope constant mobility can be embraced without leading to a negative self concept. For Kant, a finite rationality is ultimately a hopeful rationality

Ross divides prima facie duties into derivative and foundational ones, but seems to understand the notion of a derivative prima facie duty in two very different ways. Sometimes he understands them in a non-eliminativist way. According to this understanding, basic prima facie duties ground distinct derivative ones. According to the eliminativist understanding, basic duties do not ground distinct derivative duties, but replace them. On the eliminativist view, discovering that a prima facie duty is derivative is discovering that it is not genuine. The genuine one is the basic one. I argue that Ross is best understood as an eliminativist.

It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which Kant has influenced contemporary ethics. Whether or not one is sympathetic to his moral theory, one cannot ignore it, or the various ethical theories which draw their inspiration from it. Debates which have centred on Kantian themes include debates about whether moral requirements are categorical imperatives, whether they have an overriding authority, whether the various moral judgements we make can be codified, the role of duty in moral motivation, whether there are moral actions which are beyond the call of duty, the relation of morality to autonomy, and the very nature of moral judgement. The pervasiveness of Kant's influence makes it very difficult to write anything comprehensive on his relation to contemporary ethics, and I do not intend to attempt such an ambitious task here. Rather, in what follows I shall focus mainly on three distinctive features of Kant's ethics, which correspond roughly to the three chapters of the Groundwork

The Right and the Good, a classic of twentieth-century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton-Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and Stratton-Lake provides the context for a proper understanding of Ross's great work today

According to one formulation of Scanlon’s contractualist principle, certain acts are wrong if they are permitted by principles that are reasonably rejectable because they permit such acts. According to the redundancy objection, if a principle is reasonably rejectable because it permits actions which have feature F, such actions are wrong simply in virtue of having F and not because their having F makes principles permitting them reasonably rejectable. Consequently Scanlon’s contractualist principle adds nothing to the reasons we have not to act wrongly and is redundant.

_Kant, Duty and Moral Worth _is a fascinating and original examination of Kant's account of moral worth. The complex debate at the heart of Kant's philosophy is over whether Kant said moral actions have worth only if they are carried out from duty, or whether actions carried out from mixed motives can be good. Philip Stratton-Lake offers a unique account of acting from duty, which utilizes the distinction between primary and secondary motives. He maintains that the moral law should not be understood as a normative moral reason but as playing a transcendental role. Thus a Kantian account of moral worth is one where the virtuous agent may be responsive to concrete particular considerations, whilst preserving an essential role for universal moral principles. _Kant, Duty and Moral Worth _is a lucid examination of Kant's moral thought that will appeal to Kant scholars and anyone interested in moral theory.

Ethical intuitionists are often criticised on the ground that their view makes it possible for an agent to believe that she ought to ? whilst lacking any motive to ?-that is, on the ground that it involves, or implies a form of externalism. I begin by distinguishing this form of externalism (what I call 'belief externalism') from two other forms of ethical externalism-moral externalism, and reasons externalism. I then consider various reasons why one might think that ethical intuitionism is defective in so far as it involves, or implies belief externalism, and argue that these objections are unpersuasive