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Conceivability and modal knowledgeIn Tamara Horowitz & Gerald J. Massey (eds.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1991.I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true.
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186Epistemology futures (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2006.How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Contrib…Read more
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77Knowledge puzzles: an introduction to epistemologyWestview Press. 1996.Despite the problems students often have with the theory of knowledge, it remains, necessarily, at the core of the philosophical enterprise. As experienced teachers know, teaching epistemology requires a text that is not only clear and accessible, but also capable of successfully motivating the abstract problems that arise.In Knowledge Puzzles, Stephen Hetherington presents an informal survey of epistemology based on the use of puzzles to illuminate problems of knowledge. Each topic is introduce…Read more
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34Stove's new irrationalismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2). 1998.This Article does not have an abstract
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33Parsons and possible objectsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3). 1984.This Article does not have an abstract
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27Sceptical insulation and sceptical objectivityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4). 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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32More on possible objectsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1). 1988.This Article does not have an abstract
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61Gettier and scepticismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3). 1992.This Article does not have an abstract
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63Gettieristic scepticismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1). 1996.This Article does not have an abstract
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43Technological Knowledge-That As Knowledge-How: a CommentPhilosophy and Technology 28 (4): 567-572. 2015.Norström has argued that contemporary epistemological debates about the conceptual relations between knowledge-that and knowledge-how need to be supplemented by a concept of technological knowledge—with this being a further kind of knowledge. But this paper argues that Norström has not shown why technological knowledge-that is so distinctive because Norström has not shown that such knowledge cannot be reduced conceptually to a form of knowledge-how. The paper thus applies practicalism to the cas…Read more
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16The Cartesian dreaming argument for external-world skepticismIn Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. 2011.
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135Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not DreamingCanadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1). 2002.Of course, if infallibilism about such knowledge is true, then it is true that one can never know that one is not dreaming. But, of course, if infallibilism is true, then there is also no special difficulty posed for one’s having knowledge in general by one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming: one would know either nothing or next to nothing anyway, regardless of one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming. Yet epistemologists have generally regarded the challenge o…Read more
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8Review of Nicholas Rescher, Ideas in Process: A Study on the Development of Philosophical Concepts (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (8). 2009.
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39Photosinthesis: How deceptive images imperil knowledge: Hetherington PhotosinthesisThink 4 (10): 99-107. 2005.An epistemological investigation into photography
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169Where is the Harm in Dying Prematurely? An Epicurean AnswerThe Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2): 79-97. 2013.Philosophers have said less than is needed about the nature of premature death, and about the badness or otherwise of that death for the one who dies. In this paper, premature death’s nature is clarified in Epicurean terms. And an accompanying argument denies that we need to think of such a death as bad in itself for the one who dies. Premature death’s nature is conceived of as a death that arrives before ataraxia does. (Ataraxia’s nature is also clarified. It is a pervasive inner peace that is …Read more
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131Abnormality and Gettier situations: An explanatory proposalRatio 24 (2): 176-191. 2011.Analytic epistemologists reach regularly for favoured ‘intuitions’. And the anti-luck intuition (as Duncan Pritchard calls it) is possibly one of the best-entrenched epistemological intuitions at present, seemingly guiding standard reactions to Gettier situations. But why is that intuition true (if it is)? This paper argues that the anti-luck intuition (like the ability intuition) rests upon something even more deeply explanatory – the normality intuition. And to recognise this is to understand …Read more
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168The Gettier-illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilismSynthese 188 (2): 217-230. 2012.Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge
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106Knowledge’s Boundary ProblemSynthese 150 (1): 41-56. 2006.Where is the justificatory boundary between a true belief's not being knowledge and its being knowledge? Even if we put to one side the Gettier problem, this remains a fundamental epistemological question, concerning as it does the matter of whether we can provide some significant defence of the usual epistemological assumption that a belief is knowledge only if it is well justified. But can that question be answered non-arbitrarily? BonJour believes that it cannot be -- and that epistemology sh…Read more
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Interest
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Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
M&E, Misc |
Philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies |