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Conceivability and modal knowledgeIn Tamara Horowitz & Gerald J. Massey (eds.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1991.I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true.
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186Epistemology futures (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2006.How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Contrib…Read more
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77Knowledge puzzles: an introduction to epistemologyWestview Press. 1996.Despite the problems students often have with the theory of knowledge, it remains, necessarily, at the core of the philosophical enterprise. As experienced teachers know, teaching epistemology requires a text that is not only clear and accessible, but also capable of successfully motivating the abstract problems that arise.In Knowledge Puzzles, Stephen Hetherington presents an informal survey of epistemology based on the use of puzzles to illuminate problems of knowledge. Each topic is introduce…Read more
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39Parsons and possible objectsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3). 1984.This Article does not have an abstract
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34Sceptical insulation and sceptical objectivityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4). 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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39Stove's new irrationalismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2). 1998.This Article does not have an abstract
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67Gettier and scepticismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3). 1992.This Article does not have an abstract
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67Gettieristic scepticismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1). 1996.This Article does not have an abstract
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33More on possible objectsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1). 1988.This Article does not have an abstract
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97Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian PhilosophyPhilosophy 87 (3): 375-393. 2012.For a while now, there has been much conceptual discussion about the respective natures of knowledge-that and knowledge-how, along with the intellectualist idea that knowledge-how is really a kind of knowledge-that. Gilbert Ryle put in place most of the terms that have so far been distinctive of that debate, when he argued for knowledge-how's conceptual distinctness from knowledge-that. But maybe those terms should be supplemented, expanding the debate. In that spirit, the conceptual option of p…Read more
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1Lawrence BonJour, In Defense of Pure ReasonAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1): 111-112. 1999.
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96Why there need not be any grue problem about inductive inference as suchPhilosophy 76 (1): 127-136. 2001.I argue that Goodman's puzzle of grue at least poses no real challenge about inductive inference. By drawing on Stove's characterisation of Hume's characterisation of inductive inference, we see that the premises in an inductive inference report experienced impressions; and Goodman can be interpreted as posing a real challenge about inductive inference only if we treat an epistemic subject's observations more as logical contents and less as experienced impressions. So, even though the grue puzzl…Read more
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126A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier ProblemJournal of Philosophical Research 26 307-324. 2001.How can a person avoid being Gettiered? This paper provides the first answer to that question that is both fallibilist and purely internalist. It is an answer that allows the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge to survive Gettier’s attack (albeit as a nonreductionist analysis of knowledge).
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148Knowledge Can Be LuckyIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 164. 2013.
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59The Gettier Non-ProblemLogos and Episteme 1 (1): 85-107. 2010.This paper highlights an aspect of Gettier situations, one standardly not accorded interpretive significance. A remark of Gettier’s suggests its potential importance. And once that aspect’s contribution is made explicit, an argument unfolds for the conclusion that it is fairly simple to have knowledge within Gettier situations. Indeed, that argument dissolves the traditional Gettier problem.
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91So-far incompatibilism and the so-far consequence argumentGrazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1): 163-178. 2006.The consequence argument is at the core of contemporary incompatibilism about causal determinism and freedom of action. Yet Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele have shown how, on a Humean conception of laws of nature, the consequence argument is unsound. Nonetheless, this paper describés how, by generalising their main idea, we may restore the essential point and force (whatever that might turn out to be) of the consequence argument. A modified incompatibilist argument — which will be called the so-far…Read more
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118How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2011.Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and _How to Know_ does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge. Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemology Offers a dissolution of epistemology’s infamous Gettier problem — explaining …Read more
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30Review of Mitchell green, John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (8). 2007.
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133Epistemic ResponsibilityThe Monist 85 (3): 398-414. 2002.Might epistemic justification be, to some substantive extent, a function of epistemic responsibility—a belief's being formed, or its being maintained, in an epistemically responsible way? I will call any analysis of epistemic justification endorsing that kind of idea epistemic responsibilism—or, for short, responsibilism. Many epistemic internalists are responsibilists, because they think that what makes a belief justified is its being appropriately related to one's good evidence for it, and bec…Read more
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71Not actually Hume's problem: On induction and knowing-howPhilosophy 83 (4): 459-481. 2008.Philosophers talk routinely of 'Hume's problem of induction'. But the usual accompanying exegesis is mistaken in a way that has led epistemologists to conceive of 'Hume's problem' in needlessly narrow terms. They have overlooked a way of articulating the conceptual problem, along with a potential way of solving it. Indeed, they have overlooked Hume's own way. In explaining this, I will supplement Hume's insights by adapting Ryle's thinking on knowledge-how and knowledge-that. We will also see wh…Read more
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247Knowing-that, knowing-how, and knowing philosophicallyGrazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1): 307-324. 2008.This paper outlines how we may understand knowing-that as a kind of knowing-how-to, and thereby as an ability. (Contrast this form of analysis with the more commonly attempted reduction, of knowing-how-to to knowing-that.) The sort of ability in question has much potential complexity. In general, questioning can, but need not, be part of this complexity. However, questioning is always an element in the complexity that is philosophical knowing. The paper comments on the nature of this particular …Read more
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
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Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
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