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Conceivability and modal knowledgeIn Tamara Horowitz & Gerald J. Massey (eds.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1991.I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true.
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185Epistemology futures (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2006.How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Contrib…Read more
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77Knowledge puzzles: an introduction to epistemologyWestview Press. 1996.Despite the problems students often have with the theory of knowledge, it remains, necessarily, at the core of the philosophical enterprise. As experienced teachers know, teaching epistemology requires a text that is not only clear and accessible, but also capable of successfully motivating the abstract problems that arise.In Knowledge Puzzles, Stephen Hetherington presents an informal survey of epistemology based on the use of puzzles to illuminate problems of knowledge. Each topic is introduce…Read more
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33Parsons and possible objectsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3). 1984.This Article does not have an abstract
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27Sceptical insulation and sceptical objectivityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4). 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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33Stove's new irrationalismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2). 1998.This Article does not have an abstract
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61Gettier and scepticismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3). 1992.This Article does not have an abstract
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63Gettieristic scepticismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1). 1996.This Article does not have an abstract
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32More on possible objectsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1). 1988.This Article does not have an abstract
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26Alternate Possibilities and Avoidable Moral ResponsibilityAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3). 2003.
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62Knowing (How It Is) That P: Degrees and Qualities of KnowledgeVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4): 129-152. 2005.Pode o conhecimento de uma dada verdade admitir gradações? Sim, de fato, segundo o gradualismo deste artigo. O artigo introduz o conceito do saber-como que p – isto é, o conceito de saber como é que p. Saber-como que p é claramente gradual – admitindo gradações, dado que se pode saber mais ou menos como é que p. E a vinculação que este artigo faz entre sabercomo que p e saber que p revela que este último tipo de conhecimento também é gradual (mesmo que disfarçadamente). A teoria dos criadores-de…Read more
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86The redundancy problem: From knowledge-infallibilism to knowledge-minimalismSynthese 195 (11): 4683-4702. 2018.Among the epistemological ideas commonly associated with the Descartes of the Meditations, at any rate, is a knowledge-infallibilism. Such an idea was seemingly a vital element in Descartes’s search for truth within that investigative setting: only a true belief gained infallibly could be knowledge, as the Meditations conceived of this. Contemporary epistemologists are less likely than Descartes was to advocate our ever seeking knowledge-infallibility, if only because most are doubtful as to its…Read more
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93Is this a world where knowledge has to include justification?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1). 2007.If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism-the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in whichknowledge has to be robust. Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that…Read more
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125The Cogito: Indubitability without Knowledge?Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (1): 85-92. 2009.How should we understand both the nature, and the epistemic potential, of Descartes’s Cogito? Peter Slezak’s interpretation of the Cogito’s nature sees it strictly as a selfreferential kind of denial: Descartes cannot doubt that he is doubting. And what epistemic implications flow from this interpretation of the Cogito? We find that there is a consequent lack of knowledge being described by Descartes: on Cartesian grounds, indubitability is incompatible with knowing. Even as the Cogito halts dou…Read more
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91Scepticism and ordinary epistemic practicePhilosophia 34 (3): 303-310. 2006.It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge ca…Read more
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183Good knowledge, bad knowledge: on two dogmas of epistemologyOxford University Press. 2001.What is knowledge? How hard is it for a person to have knowledge? Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge confronts contemporary philosophical attempts to answer those classic questions, offering a theory of knowledge that is unique in conceiving of knowledge in a non-absolutist way.
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96Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian PhilosophyPhilosophy 87 (3): 375-393. 2012.For a while now, there has been much conceptual discussion about the respective natures of knowledge-that and knowledge-how, along with the intellectualist idea that knowledge-how is really a kind of knowledge-that. Gilbert Ryle put in place most of the terms that have so far been distinctive of that debate, when he argued for knowledge-how's conceptual distinctness from knowledge-that. But maybe those terms should be supplemented, expanding the debate. In that spirit, the conceptual option of p…Read more
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1Lawrence BonJour, In Defense of Pure ReasonAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1): 111-112. 1999.
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95Why there need not be any grue problem about inductive inference as suchPhilosophy 76 (1): 127-136. 2001.I argue that Goodman's puzzle of grue at least poses no real challenge about inductive inference. By drawing on Stove's characterisation of Hume's characterisation of inductive inference, we see that the premises in an inductive inference report experienced impressions; and Goodman can be interpreted as posing a real challenge about inductive inference only if we treat an epistemic subject's observations more as logical contents and less as experienced impressions. So, even though the grue puzzl…Read more
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126A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier ProblemJournal of Philosophical Research 26 307-324. 2001.How can a person avoid being Gettiered? This paper provides the first answer to that question that is both fallibilist and purely internalist. It is an answer that allows the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge to survive Gettier’s attack (albeit as a nonreductionist analysis of knowledge).
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148Knowledge Can Be LuckyIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 164. 2013.
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Interest
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Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
M&E, Misc |
Philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies |