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Conceivability and modal knowledgeIn Tamara Horowitz & Gerald J. Massey (eds.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1991.I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true.
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186Epistemology futures (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2006.How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Contrib…Read more
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77Knowledge puzzles: an introduction to epistemologyWestview Press. 1996.Despite the problems students often have with the theory of knowledge, it remains, necessarily, at the core of the philosophical enterprise. As experienced teachers know, teaching epistemology requires a text that is not only clear and accessible, but also capable of successfully motivating the abstract problems that arise.In Knowledge Puzzles, Stephen Hetherington presents an informal survey of epistemology based on the use of puzzles to illuminate problems of knowledge. Each topic is introduce…Read more
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27Sceptical insulation and sceptical objectivityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4). 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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34Stove's new irrationalismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2). 1998.This Article does not have an abstract
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33Parsons and possible objectsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3). 1984.This Article does not have an abstract
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63Gettieristic scepticismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1). 1996.This Article does not have an abstract
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32More on possible objectsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1). 1988.This Article does not have an abstract
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62Gettier and scepticismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3). 1992.This Article does not have an abstract
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136Concessive knowledge-attributions: fallibilism and gradualismSynthese 190 (14): 2835-2851. 2013.Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism
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53Not Actually Hume's Problem: On Induction and Knowing-HowPhilosophy 83 (4): 459. 2008.Philosophers talk routinely of ‘Hume's problem of induction’. But the usual accompanying exegesis is mistaken in a way that has led epistemologists to conceive of ‘Hume's problem’ in needlessly narrow terms. They have overlooked a way of articulating the conceptual problem, along with a potential way of solving it. Indeed, they have overlooked Hume's own way. In explaining this, I will supplement Hume's insights by adapting Ryle's thinking on knowledge-how and knowledge-that. We will also see wh…Read more
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13Knowledge that works: A tale of two conceptual modelsIn Aspects of Knowing, Elsevier Science. pp. 219--240. 2006.
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83Understanding Fallible Warrant and Fallible Knowledge: Three ProposalsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2): 270-282. 2015.One of contemporary epistemology's more important conceptual challenges is that of understanding the nature of fallibility. Part of why this matters is that it would contribute to our understanding the natures of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. This article evaluates two candidates – and describes a shared form of failing. Each is concealedly infallibilist. This failing is all-too-representative of the difficulty of doing justice to the notion of fallibility within the notions of fallib…Read more
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34Knowledge and the Gettier ProblemCambridge University Press. 2016.Edmund Gettier's 1963 verdict about what knowledge is not has become an item of philosophical orthodoxy, accepted by philosophers as a genuine epistemological result. It assures us that - contrary to what Plato and later philosophers have thought - knowledge is not merely a true belief well supported by epistemic justification. But that orthodoxy has generated the Gettier problem - epistemology's continuing struggle to understand how to accommodate Gettier's apparent result within an improved co…Read more
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37Transient global amnesia and Kantian perceptionThink 13 (38): 69-72. 2014.Kant's monumental Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) begins with his account of perception. Look around you. An experience is the result. You seem to see a chair and a person, say even perhaps of its content – are coming to you from the world, according to Kant. What else is involved?
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270Gettier problemsInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.Gettier problems or cases are named in honor of the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who discovered them in 1963. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original article had a d…Read more
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11Re: Brains in a VatDialectica 54 (4): 307-312. 2000.The hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is one which we believe to be false. Could it possibly be true, however? Metaphysical realists accept that our believing it to be false does not entail its falsity. They also accept that if –as brains in a vat –we were to say or think “We are brains in a vat”, then we would be correct. Ever the claimed foe of the metaphysical realist, though, Hilary Putnam argues that the brains‐in‐a‐vat hypothesis cannot be true, in particular that if we were brains in…Read more
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86Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays (edited book)Elsevier Science. 2006.AcknowledgementsContributors1. Introduction: The art of precise epistemology Stephen HetheringtonPart A. Epistemology as scientific?2.
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42Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Guided Anthology (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2013._Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Guided Anthology_ presents a comprehensive introductory overview of key themes, thinkers, and texts in metaphysics and epistemology. Presents a wide-ranging collection of carefully excerpted readings on metaphysics and epistemology Blends classic and contemporary works to reveal the historical development and present directions in the fields of metaphysics and epistemology Provides succinct, insightful commentary to introduce the essence of each selection at the …Read more
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67Review: Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism (review)Mind 116 (464): 1088-1092. 2007.
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Interest
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Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
M&E, Misc |
Philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies |