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Horacio Arlo-Costa
(1956 - 2011)

Last affiliation: Carnegie Mellon University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    38
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    23

 More details
  • Carnegie Mellon University
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
Homepage
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Probability
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Social Science
Philosophy of Probability
General Philosophy of Science
1 more
  • All publications (38)
  •  128
    Epistemological foundations for the representation of discourse context
    forthcoming in Studies on Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford.
    Discourse
  •  126
    Similarity in logical reasoning and decision-making
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1): 14-15. 2005.
    Normative accounts in terms of similarity can be deployed in order to provide semantics for systems of context-free default rules and other sophisticated conditionals. In contrast, procedural accounts of decision in terms of similarity (Rubinstein 1997) are hard to reconcile with the normative rules of rationality used in decision-making, even when suitably weakened.
    Connectives
  •  133
    Models of preference reversals and personal rules: Do they require maximizing a utility function with a specific structure?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5): 650-651. 2005.
    One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
    Practical Reason, MiscDecision-Theoretic PuzzlesUtilityPreferences in Decision TheoryThe WillRationa…Read more
    Practical Reason, MiscDecision-Theoretic PuzzlesUtilityPreferences in Decision TheoryThe WillRationality and Cognitive Science
  •  67
    Contextual Modals
    with William Taysom
    In a series of recent articles Angelika Kratzer has argued that the standard account of modality along Kripkean lines is inadequate in order to represent context-dependent modals. In particular she argues that the standard account is unable to deliver a non-trivial account of modality capable of overcoming inconsistencies of the underlying conversational background.
    Semantics
  •  89
    Review of Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1). 2010.
    Subjective ProbabilityDegrees of Belief
  •  92
    Full Belief, Supposition, and Personal Probablility
    Pragmatics, MiscAttitude Ascriptions
  •  650
    Bayesian epistemology and epistemic conditionals: On the status of the export-import laws
    Journal of Philosophy 98 (11): 555-593. 2001.
    Epistemic Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsLogic of ConditionalsBayesian Reasoning, MiscEthicsBeli…Read more
    Epistemic Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsLogic of ConditionalsBayesian Reasoning, MiscEthicsBelief Revision
  •  160
    The logic of conditionals
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2007.
    entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.
    Logic of Conditionals
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