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34The "Ellsberg phenomenon" has played a significant role in research on imprecise probabilities. Fox and Tversky [5] have attempted to explain this phenomenon in terms of their "comparative ignorance" hypothesis. We challenge that explanation and present empirical work suggesting an explanation that is much closer to Ellsberg's own diagnosis
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128The logic of conditionalsStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2007.entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.
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36Let L be a language containing the modal operator B - for full belief. An information model is a set E of stable L-theories. A sentence is valid if it is accepted in all theories of every model
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84forthcoming in Studies on Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford.
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99Belief revision conditionals: basic iterated systemsAnnals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3): 3-28. 1999.It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the questio…Read more
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61Review of Sherrilyn Roush, Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence and Science (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (7). 2006.
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132Iterative probability kinematicsJournal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5): 479-524. 2001.Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability function…Read more
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23In a series of recent articles Angelika Kratzer has argued that the standard account of modality along Kripkean lines is inadequate in order to represent context-dependent modals. In particular she argues that the standard account is unable to deliver a non-trivial account of modality capable of overcoming inconsistencies of the underlying conversational background
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161Ambiguity aversion: the explanatory power of indeterminate probabilitiesSynthese 172 (1): 37-55. 2010.Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) a…Read more
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The Description–Experience Gap in Risky and Ambiguous GamblesJournal of Behavioral Decision Making 27 (4): 316-327. 2014.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Probability |