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134Similarity in logical reasoning and decision-makingBehavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1): 14-15. 2005.Normative accounts in terms of similarity can be deployed in order to provide semantics for systems of context-free default rules and other sophisticated conditionals. In contrast, procedural accounts of decision in terms of similarity (Rubinstein 1997) are hard to reconcile with the normative rules of rationality used in decision-making, even when suitably weakened.
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137Models of preference reversals and personal rules: Do they require maximizing a utility function with a specific structure?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5): 650-651. 2005.One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
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67In a series of recent articles Angelika Kratzer has argued that the standard account of modality along Kripkean lines is inadequate in order to represent context-dependent modals. In particular she argues that the standard account is unable to deliver a non-trivial account of modality capable of overcoming inconsistencies of the underlying conversational background.
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89Review of Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1). 2010.
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661Bayesian epistemology and epistemic conditionals: On the status of the export-import lawsJournal of Philosophy 98 (11): 555-593. 2001.
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166The logic of conditionalsStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2007.entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.
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82Let L be a language containing the modal operator B - for full belief. An information model is a set E of stable L-theories. A sentence is valid if it is accepted in all theories of every model.
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551Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and EntrenchmentSynthese 152 (1): 129-154. 2006.We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure promi…Read more
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
| Philosophy of Probability |