•  34
    The "Ellsberg phenomenon" has played a significant role in research on imprecise probabilities. Fox and Tversky [5] have attempted to explain this phenomenon in terms of their "comparative ignorance" hypothesis. We challenge that explanation and present empirical work suggesting an explanation that is much closer to Ellsberg's own diagnosis
  •  128
    The logic of conditionals
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2007.
    entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.
  •  36
    Let L be a language containing the modal operator B - for full belief. An information model is a set E of stable L-theories. A sentence is valid if it is accepted in all theories of every model
  •  84
    forthcoming in Studies on Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford.
  •  99
    Belief revision conditionals: basic iterated systems
    Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3): 3-28. 1999.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the questio…Read more
  •  61
  •  132
    Iterative probability kinematics
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5): 479-524. 2001.
    Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability function…Read more
  •  23
    Contextual Modals
    with William Taysom
    In a series of recent articles Angelika Kratzer has argued that the standard account of modality along Kripkean lines is inadequate in order to represent context-dependent modals. In particular she argues that the standard account is unable to deliver a non-trivial account of modality capable of overcoming inconsistencies of the underlying conversational background
  •  161
    Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) a…Read more
  • The Description–Experience Gap in Risky and Ambiguous Gambles
    with Varun Dutt, Jeffrey Helzner, and Cleotilde Gonzalez
    Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 27 (4): 316-327. 2014.
  • Review (review)
    Theoria 73 (1): 87-93. 2007.