Philip Brey

In this paper the authors argue that many of the ethical problems raised by Ambient Intelligence stems from presupposing a behaviourist conception of the relation between human desires and behaviour. Insofar as Ambient Intelligence systems take overt, natural behaviour as input, they are likely to suffer from many of the same problems that have fuelled the widespread criticism of behaviourist explanations of human behaviour. If these limitations of the technology are not sufficiently recognized, the technology is likely to be insufficiently successful in supporting the needs and desires of human users. We will focus on four distinct challenges that result from this behaviourist presupposition, all of which ought to be taken into consideration at the design stage: reciprocal adaptation, bias towards isolated use, culture-specific behaviour, and inability to manually configure the system. By considering these issues, our purpose is to raise awareness of the ethical problems that can arise because of intelligent user interfaces that rely on natural, overt behaviour

This essay considers the impact of digital networks in organizations on worker autonomy. Worker autonomy, the control that workers have over their own work situation, is claimed in this essay to be a key determinant for the quality of work, as well as an important moral goal. Digital networks pose significant threats to worker autonomy as well as opportunities for its enhancement. In this essay, the notion of worker autonomy is analyzed and evaluated for its importance and moral relevance. It is then considered how digital networks both threaten worker autonomy and offer opportunities for its enhancement. Three major opportunities (enhanced communicative powers, increased informedness, teleworking) and threats (electronic monitoring, task prestructuring, and dependency creation) are discussed and analyzed. Finally, the dynamics that determine the impact on worker autonomy of the introduction of a digital network in organizations are investigated. A particular model for analyzing these dynamics and their impacts, Bryan Pfaffenberger's model of a technological drama. It will be illustrated how this model illuminates these dynamics by analyzing them as a dialectic of strategies of technological regularization by design constituencies and technological adjustment by impact constituencies. It will also be assessed what role network design has in this process.

This paper analyzes epistemological and ontological dimensions of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) through an analysis of the functions of computer systems in relation to their users. It is argued that the primary relation between humans and computer systems has historically been epistemic: computers are used as information-processing and problem-solving tools that extend human cognition, thereby creating hybrid cognitive systems consisting of a human processor and an artificial processor that process information in tandem. In this role, computer systems extend human cognition. Next, it is argued that in recent years, the epistemic relation between humans and computers has been supplemented by an ontic relation. Current computer systems are able to simulate virtual and social environments that extend the interactive possibilities found in the physical environment. This type of relationship is primarily ontic, and extends to objects and places that have a virtual ontology. Increasingly, computers are not just information devices, but portals to worlds that we inhabit. The aforementioned epistemic and ontic relationships are unique to information technology and distinguish human-computer relationships from other human-technology relationships.

This paper addresses social and ethical issues in computer‐mediated education, with a focus on higher education. It will be argued if computer‐mediated education is to be implemented in a socially and ethically sound way, four major social and ethical issues much be confronted. These are: (1) the issue of value transfer in higher education: can social, cultural and academic values be successfully transmitted in computer‐mediated education? (2) the issue of academic freedom: are computer‐mediated educational settings conducive for academic freedom or do they threaten to undermine it? (3) the issue of equality and diversity: does a reliance on computer networks in higher education foster equality and equity for students and does it promote diversity, or does it disadvantage certain social classes and force conformity? (4) the issue of ethical student and staff behaviour: What kinds of unethical behaviour by students and staff are made possible in computer‐mediated education, and what can be done against it? Existing studies relating to these four issues are examined and some tentative policy conclusions are drawn.

This essay addresses the question of how sustainable development is possible, giving special reference to the role of technology. It argues that the dominant strategy for sustainable development that is now operative, ecological modernization, is insufficient, and that the reform of technology and of systems of production alone will not yield sustainable development. After a brief discussion of the notion of sustainable development, the current strategy for sustainability, ecological modernization, is outlined (§ 1). This strategy is then subjected to a critique, because of its one-sided emphasis on the reform of production systems, its belief in a 'technological fix' and its retention of an unsustainable ideal of economic growth (§ 2). Finally (§ 3), it is argued that sustainable development requires a reform of lifestyles and systems of consumption, next to the ecological reform of systems of production. Reform of technology can actually contribute to the reform of lifestyles and consumption patterns, but only as part of a comprehensive reform strategy.

This essay addresses the question of how sustainable development is possible, giving special reference to the role of technology. It argues that the dominant strategy for sustainable development that is now operative, ecological modernization, is insufficient, and that the reform of technology and of systems of production alone will not yield sustainable development. After a brief discussion of the notion of sustainable development, the current strategy for sustainability, ecological modernization, is outlined (§ 1). This strategy is then subjected to a critique, because of its one-sided emphasis on the reform of production systems, its belief in a 'technological fix' and its retention of an unsustainable ideal of economic growth (§ 2). Finally (§ 3), it is argued that sustainable development requires a reform of lifestyles and systems of consumption, next to the ecological reform of systems of production. Reform of technology can actually contribute to the reform of lifestyles and consumption patterns, but only as part of a comprehensive reform strategy.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary philosophy of technology, and how may the field be developed and improved in the future? That is the question I will address in this paper. I will argue that in the past twenty-five years, philosophy of technology has entered a new era. This era has arrived with new and distinct issues and approaches that differ from those that came before it. Many of the new developments have been for the good. Yet, I will also argue, there are still large areas in the field that are currently underdeveloped or have been stagnant. I will identify these areas and suggest ways of moving forward in them.

In this paper I evaluate the implications of contemporary information and communication media for the quality of life, including both the new media from the digital revolution and the older media that remain in use. My evaluation of contemporary media proceeds in three parts. First I discuss the benefits of contemporary media, with special emphasis given to their immediate functional benefits. I then discuss four potential threats posed by contemporary media. In a final section I examine the future of digital media and the possibilities available to us in shaping that future.

In this essay, I will investigate the implications of human enhancement for personal identity and assess likely social and ethical consequences of these changes. Human enhancement, also called human augmentation, is an emerging field within medicine and bioengineering that aims to develop technologies and techniques for overcoming current limitations of human cognitive and physical abilities (Naam, 2004; Wilsdon and Miller, 2006; Garreau, 2005; Parens, 1998; Agar, 2004). Technologies developed in this field are called human enhancement technologies (HETs). HETs rely on advances in genetic engineering, pharmacology, bioengineering, cybernetics and nanotechnology. In these fields, it is becoming possible to develop techniques that improve human functions beyond a normal range. The envisioned applications are limitless, and include the enhancement of human traits like muscular strength, endurance, vision, intelligence, mood and personality.

This essay considers methodological aspects ofcomputer ethics and argues for a multi-levelinterdisciplinary approach with a central role forwhat is called disclosive computer ethics. Disclosivecomputer ethics is concerned with the moraldeciphering of embedded values and norms in computersystems, applications and practices. In themethodology for computer ethics research proposed inthe essay, research takes place at three levels: thedisclosure level, in which ideally philosophers,computer scientists and social scientists collaborateto disclose embedded normativity in computer systemsand practices, the theoretical level, in whichphilosophers develop and modify moral theory, and theapplication level, that draws from research performedat the other two levels, and at which normativeevaluations of computer systems and practices takesplace.

This paper analyzes ethical aspects of the new paradigm of Ambient Intelligence, which is a combination of Ubiquitous Computing and Intelligent User Interfaces (IUI’s). After an introduction to the approach, two key ethical dimensions will be analyzed: freedom and privacy. It is argued that Ambient Intelligence, though often designed to enhance freedom and control, has the potential to limit freedom and autonomy as well. Ambient Intelligence also harbors great privacy risks, and these are explored as well.

Since the internet's breakthrough as a mass medium, it has become a topic of discussion because of its implications for society. At one extreme, one finds those who only see great benefits and consider the Internet a tool for freedom, commerce, connectivity, and other societal benefits. At the other extreme, one finds those who lament the harms and disadvantages of the Internet, and who consider it a grave danger to existing social structures and institutions, to culture, morality and human relations. In between one finds the majority, those who recognize both benefits and harms in the Internet as it currently exists and who recognize its usefulness while worrying about some of its negative impacts.

This essay provides a critique of mainstream computer ethics and argues for the importance of a complementary approach called disclosive computer ethics, which is concerned with the moral deciphering of embedded values and norms in computer systems, applications and practices. Also, four key values are proposed as starting points for disclosive studies in computer ethics: justice, autonomy, democracy and privacy. Finally, it is argued that research in disclosive computer ethics should be multi-level and interdisciplinary, distinguishing between a disclosure level, a theoretical level, and an an application level.

In this paper, a critique will be developed and an alternative proposed to Luciano Floridi’s approach to Information Ethics (IE). IE is a macroethical theory that is to both serve as a foundation for computer ethics and to guide our overall moral attitude towards the world. The central claims of IE are that everything that exists can be described as an information object, and that all information objects, qua information objects, have intrinsic value and are therefore deserving of moral respect. In my critique of IE, I will argue that Floridi has presented no convincing arguments that everything that exists has some minimal amount of intrinsic value. I will argue, however, that his theory could be salvaged in large part if it were modified from a value-based into a respect-based theory, according to which many (but not all) inanimate things in the world deserve moral respect, not because of intrinsic value, but because of their (potential) extrinsic, instrumental or emotional value for persons.

This essay examines ethical aspects of the use of facial recognition technology for surveillance purposes in public and semipublic areas, focusing particularly on the balance between security and privacy and civil liberties. As a case study, the FaceIt facial recognition engine of Identix Corporation will be analyzed, as well as its use in “Smart” video surveillance (CCTV) systems in city centers and airports. The ethical analysis will be based on a careful analysis of current facial recognition technology, of its use in Smart CCTV systems, and of the arguments used by proponents and opponents of such systems. It will be argued that Smart CCTV, which integrates video surveillance technology and biometric technology, faces ethical problems of error, function creep and privacy. In a concluding section on policy, it will be discussed whether such problems outweigh the security value of Smart CCTV in public places.

The theme of this volume is the multi-faceted 'computational turn' that is occurring through the interaction of the disciplines of philosophy and computing. In computer and information sciences, there are significant conceptual and methodological questions that require reflection and analysis. Moreover, digital, information and communication technologies have had tremendous impact on society, which raises further philosophical questions. This book tries to facilitate the task to continuously work to ensure that its diversity of perspectives and methods proves a source of strength and collaboration rather than a source of instability and disintegration. The first three contributions explore the phenomenon of virtual worlds. The next four focus on robots and artificial agents. Then a group of chapters discusses the relation between human mentality and information processing in computers and the final section covers a broad range of issues at the interface of computers and society.

Introduces contemporary American philosophy of technology through six of its leading figures. The six American philosophers of technology whose work is profiled in this clear and concise introduction to the field--Albert Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, Andrew Feenberg, Donna Haraway, Don Ihde, and Langdon Winner--represent a new, empirical direction in the philosophical study of technology that has developed mainly in North America. In place of the grand philosophical schemes of the classical generation of European philosophers of technology (including Martin Heidgger, Jacques Ellul, and Hans Jonas), the contemporary American generation addresses concrete technological practices and the co-evolution of technology and society in modern culture. Six Dutch philosophers associated with Twente University survey and critique the full scope and development of their American colleagues' work, often illustrating shifts from earlier to more recent interests. Individual chapters focus on Borgmann's engagement with technology and everyday life; Dreyfus's work on the limits of artificial intelligence; Feenberg's perspectives on the cultural and social possibilities opened by technologies; Haraway's conception of the cyborg and its attendant blurring of boundaries; Ihde's explorations of the place of technology in the lifeworld; and Winner's fascination with the moral and political implications of modern technologies. American Philosophy of Technology offers an insightful and readable introduction to this new and distinctly American philosophical turn.