Dale Jamieson

El contraste que habitualmente se establece entre el Utilitarismo y la teoría de la virtud queda en entredicho en este ensayo. El Utilitarismo puede encamar cualquier conducta, ya que implica que deberíamos mentir, engañar, robar y aun apropiamos de Aristóteles, si con ello vamos a ocasionar los mejores resultados. En algunas situaciones y en algunos mundos posibles, lo mejor se obtendría centrándonos en los rasgos de carácter. El Cambio Medioambiental Global nos lleva al estudio de los caracteres, puesto que en este caso los mejores resultados se obtienen, generalmente, al disociar nuestro comportamiento del de los demás. Por ello, en este caso y en este mundo, los utilitaristas deberían ser teóricos de la virtud.

This volume is a collection of essays in appreciation, analysis and honor of Paul Ziff, one of the leading American philosophers of the post-World War II period. The essays address questions that loomed large in Ziff's own work. Essays by Zeno Vendler, Jay Rosenberg, and Tom Patton address topics in philosophy of language: understanding, misunderstanding, rules, regularities, and proper names. Michael Resnik examines the nature of numbers, Rita Nolan addresses `mutant predicates', and Peter Alexander discusses microscopes and corpuscles. Douglas C. Long ruminates on Ziff's claim that machines can neither think nor feel. The essays of Dale Jamieson, Bill E. Lawson, Douglas Dempster, and Joseph Ullian address various questions in aesthetics: aesthetic appreciation and morality, expression, the scope of appreciation, and the aesthetics of sport. In the spirit of Ziff, Douglas Stalker criticizes some of the `mush' that looms large in our intellectual lives. The volume begins with a reminiscence by Paul Benacerraf, and ends with selections from an unpublished volume of plays by Paul Ziff. The volume should appeal to anyone whose work has been influenced by Ziff, or is interested in central philosophical problems concerning language, mind, and art.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Future of Environmental PhilosophyJ. Baird Callicott (bio)The old guy in The Graduate had just one word for Dustin Hoffman's character, Ben: "plastics." This old guy has three words for the future pursuit of environmental philosophers, young and old: global climate change (GCC).GCC is emerging as the central environmental concern of the 21st century. Back in the 20th century, E. O. Wilson's mantra was (I paraphrase) 'abrupt mass anthropogenic species extinction is the crime for which posterity is least likely to forgive us.' In view of the multifaceted catastrophe graphically depicted in the recent acclaimed film, An Inconvenient Truth (AIT), Wilson's dictum seems quaint. Rather, a world whose very geography will be anthropogenically altered by risen sea levels, whose weather will be increasingly violent and erratic, whose seas will be stagnant and acidified by carbonic acid, etc., etc., is the crime for which posterity is least likely to forgive us—if there is any posterity to make a judgment.According to Al Gore in AIT anthropogenic GCC is a "moral" and "ethical" issue. But he doesn't elaborate. And at the end of the film he provides a lame list of things you and you and you and you—all of us individually AND voluntarily—can do to mitigate GCC, such as swap out halogen light bulbs for compact florescent ones and drive a hybrid car. Think "tragedy of the commons" for the efficacy of that approach to an adequate ethical response to the challenge of GCC.Gore's naivete apart, environmental ethics (EE) as we know it is singularly ill-prepared for dealing with GCC. The problem is one of scale, temporal as well as spatial. Spatially, EE concern was focused on the scale of biotic communities, ecosystems, and landscapes. And the relevant science was ecology. Temporally, the scale was also ecological: It might take Prince William Sound half a century, perhaps even a whole century, to fully recover from the Exxon Valdez spill. In temperate climates, after a clearcut a mature forest might spring up in a century and, through ecological succession, if left alone it will return to old growth in 300 years. Back in the 20th century that seemed like a long time, and we lamented that the ecological temporal scale and the economic temporal scale of [End Page 119] industries like the timber business and the oil business were out of phase, the former measured in decades the latter in quarters. But now, elderly environmental philosophers like me will personally witness little more than the initial environmental consequences of GCC—the occasional Katrina, the occasional hottest year on record, the disappearance of glaciers in Glacier National Park. We won't live to see (I hope) the cessation of the Gulf Stream or sea-levels rise more than a few centimeters. And the rectification of these consequences will be completed, if they ever are, only after thousands of years have elapsed.How then do we scale EE up to meet the moral challenge of GCC? Spatially we have a huge leap to make from the landscape scale to the biospheric scale. We have to become conversant with a new set of sciences; the relevant sciences are not ecology and conservation biology, but biogeochemistry and earth-systems science.Is a GCC EE even possible? Maybe ethics has temporal-scale limits? We used to marvel at the long view of the Iroquois who considered the consequences of present policies out seven generations. Wow! At 25 years per generation that is all of 250 years (adding on the 75-year life-span of the 7th generation). Can we have ethical concern for the 37th generation, a thousand years out? Or the 121st generation 3000 years out?J. Baird Callicott J. Baird Callicott is Regents Professor of Philosophy and Religion Studies in the Institute of Applied Sciences at the University of North Texas. From 1997–2000 he served the International Society for Environmental Ethics as president. He is author, editor, or co-editor of a score of books and more than a hundred journal articles and book chapters. Callicott's research proceeds on six major fronts: theoretical environmental ethics, land ethics, the philosophy of...

Il cambiamento climatico globale pone sfide senza precedenti ai nostri mo- di di concepire la morale e la politica. Siamo abituati a vedere un problema morale in situazioni in cui un individuo chiaramente identificabile inten- zionalmente ne danneggi un altro, a sua volta chiaramente identificabile; e in cui sia gli individui coinvolti, che il danno in questione, stiano fra loro in una relazione spazio-temporale di vicinanza. Il cambiamento climatico glo- bale danneggerà senz'altro milioni di persone, ma secondo modalità com- pletamente diverse da queste. Dal punto di vista politico, d'altro canto, l'in- trattabilità del fenomeno è dovuta al fatto che siamo abituati a prendere de- cisioni pubbliche in base a preferenze momentanee, piuttosto che interessi a lungo termine e valori condivisi. Per affrontare il cambiamento climatico globale abbiamo dunque bisogno di riformare sia i nostri modi di concepire la problematicità morale, che il nostro stile di deliberazione politica. Per fare questo, è necessario partire dagli individui: fornendo una visione ideale di che tipo di carattere sia più adatto per vivere in un mondo globalizzato e altamente interconnesso come il nostro.Global climate change poses unprecedented challenges to our moral and political systems. We are used to see a situation as morally problematic when a clearly identifiable individual intentionally damages another, her- self clearly identifiable; and when these individuals, as well as the damage done, are close in space and time. Global climate change will certainly da- mage millions of people, but will do so in ways quite different from that. From the political point of view, the intractability of the problem is due to our often taking public decisions based on transitory preferences, rather than long-term interests and shared values. In order to face global climate change, we thus need to reform both our ways of conceiving moral pro- blems, and our style of political deliberation. To do so, we must begin from individuals: providing an ideal of character for what is required to live in a highly interconnected, globalized world

Some ecologists, philosophers, and policy analysts believe that ecosystem health can be defined in a rigorous way and employed as a management goal in environmental policy. The idea of ecosystem health may have something to recommend it as part of a rhetorical strategy, but I am dubious about its utility as a technical term in environmental policy. I develop several objections to this latest version of scientism in environmental policy, and conclude that our environmental problems fundamentally involve problems in our institutions of governance, our systems of value, and our ways of knowing. These are the problems that most need to be addressed

In this paper I show that the definition of convention offered by david lewis in his book "convention: a philosophical study" fails to shed much light on "our common, Established concept of convention." first I set out lewis' definition of convention. I then show, Via counterexample, That satisfaction of lewis' definition is not a necessary condition for something to be a convention. I also show via counterexample that it is doubtful that satisfaction of lewis' definition is a sufficient condition for something to be a convention. I conclude that lewis has invented a new concept of convention that is seriously at odds with the established concept of convention