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7Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson and Shue, eds. Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford. (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2010.A collection of seminal articles in climate ethics and climate justice.
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155Responsibility and Climate ChangeGlobal Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 8 (2). 2015.I begin by providing some background to conceptions of responsibility. I note the extent of disagreement in this area, the diverse and cross-cutting distinctions that are deployed, and the relative neglect of some important problems. These facts make it difficult to attribute responsibility for climate change, but so do some features of climate change itself which I go on to illuminate. Attributions of responsibility are often contested sites because such attributions are fundamentally pragmatic…Read more
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12Rational Egoism and Animal RightsEnvironmental Ethics 3 (2): 167-171. 1981.Jan Narveson has suggested that rational egoism might provide a defensible moral perspective that would put animals out of the reach of morality without denying that they are capable of suffering. I argue that rational egoism provides a principled indifference to the fate of animals at high cost: the possibility of principled indifference to the fate of “marginal humans.”
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211Animal Liberation is an Environmental EthicEnvironmental Values 7 (1): 41-57. 1998.I begin by briefly tracing the history of the split between environmental ethics and animal liberation, go on to sketch a theory of value that I think is implicit in animal liberation, and explain how this theory is consistent with strong environmental commitments. I conclude with some observations about problems that remain
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61Jack, Jill, and Jane in a Perfect Moral StormPhilosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 3 (1). 2013.download
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Review of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh et al: Language Comprehension in Ape and Child (review)Philosophical Psychology 8 398-399. 1995.
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1Singer and Pratical Ethics MovementIn Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 1--17. 1999.
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72Readings in Animal Cognition (edited book)MIT Press. 1996.This collection of 24 readings is the first comprehensive treatment of important topics by leading figures in the rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of...
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67Sober and Wilson on Psychological AltruismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 702-710. 2002.The problem of Evolutionary Altruism (EA) "is to show how\nbehaviors that benefit others at the expense of self can\nevolve;" group selection is the key to the solution of this\nproblem. The problem of Psychological Altruism (PA) is to\ndetermine whether people "have altruistic desires that are\npsychologically ultimate." After carefully considering the\narguments of both psychologists and philosophers, Sober and\nWilson render the verdict "not proven." But just in the\nnick of time, evolutionar…Read more
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2Duties to the distant: Humanitarian aid, development assistance, and humanitarian interventionThe Journal of Ethics 9 (1-2). 2005.
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741Consequentialism, Climate Change, and the Road AheadChicago Journal of International Law 13 (2): 439-468. 2013.In this paper I tell the story of the evolution of the climate change regime, locating its origins in "the dream of Rio," which supposed that the nations of the world would join in addressing the interlocking crises of environment and development. I describe the failure at Copenhagen and then go on to discuss the "reboot" of the climate negotiations advocated by Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach. I bring out some ambiguities in their notion of International Paretianism, which is supposed to effe…Read more
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59Klimawandel und globale Gerechtigkeit: Neues Problem, altes Paradigma?In Angela Kallhoff (ed.), Klimagerechtigkeit Und Klimaethik, De Gruyter. pp. 23-38. 2015.
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2On the ethics of the use of animals in scienceIn Tom Regan & Donald VanDeVeer (eds.), And justice for all: new introductory essays in ethics and public policy, Rowman & Littlefield. 1982.
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22The “trivial neuron doctrine” is not trivialBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 841-842. 1999.I argue that the trivial neuron doctrine as characterized by Gold & Stoljar is not trivial; it appears to be inconsistent with property dualism as well as some forms of functionalism and externalism. I suggest that the problem is not so much with the particular way in which Gold & Stoljar draw the distinction as with the unruliness of the distinction itself. Their failure to see this may be why they misunderstand the views of the Churchlands.
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29Great Apes and the Human Resistance to equalityIn Peter Singer & Paola Cavalieri (eds.), The Great Ape Project, St. Martin's Griffin. pp. 223--229. 1993.
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19Teaching ethics in science and engineering: Animals in researchScience and Engineering Ethics 1 (2): 185-186. 1995.
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New York UniversityDepartment of Philosophy
Animal Studies Initiative, Environmental Studies ProgramOther faculty (Postdoc, Visiting, etc)