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67The Psychology of Personhood: Philosophical, Historical, Social-Developmental, and Narrative Perspectives (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2012.Machine generated contents note: 1. Introducing persons and the psychology of personhood Jack Martin and Mark H. Bickhard; Part I. Philosophical, Conceptual Perspectives: 2. The person concept and the ontology of persons Michael A. Tissaw; 3. Achieving personhood: the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology Charles Guignon; Part II. Historical Perspectives: 4. Historical psychology of persons: categories and practice Kurt Danziger; 5. Persons and historical ontology Jeff Sugarman; 6. Critical p…Read more
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65Toward a Model of Functional Brain Processes I: Central Nervous System Functional Micro-architectureAxiomathes 25 (3): 217-238. 2015.Standard semantic information processing models—information in; information processed; information out —lend themselves to standard models of the functioning of the brain in terms, e.g., of threshold-switch neurons connected via classical synapses. That is, in terms of sophisticated descendants of McCulloch and Pitts models. I argue that both the cognition and the brain sides of this framework are incorrect: cognition and thought are not constituted as forms of semantic information processing, a…Read more
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61Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mindBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 33-34. 1993.
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53If the general arguments concerning the involvement of variation and selection in explanations of “fit” are valid, then variation and selection explanations should be appropriate, or at least potentially appropriate, outside the paradigm historistic domains of biology and knowledge. In this discussion, I wish to indicate some potential roles for variation and selection in foundational physics – specifically in quantum field theory. I will not be attempting any full coherent ontology for quantum …Read more
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51Toward a Model of Functional Brain Processes II: Central Nervous System Functional Macro-architectureAxiomathes 25 (4): 377-407. 2015.The first paper in this pair (Bickhard in Axiomathes, 2015) developed a model of the nature of representation and cognition, and argued for a model of the micro-functioning of the brain on the basis of that model. In this sequel paper, starting with part III, this model is extended to address macro-functioning in the CNS. In part IV, I offer a discussion of an approach to brain functioning that has some similarities with, as well as differences from, the model presented here: sometimes called th…Read more
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51What could cognition be if not computation…Or connectionism, or dynamic systems?Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35 (1): 53-66. 2015.
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47Does Process Matter? An Introduction to the Special Issue on InteractivismAxiomathes 21 (1): 1-2. 2011.
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459 The emergent ontology of personsIn Jack Martin & Mark H. Bickhard (eds.), The Psychology of Personhood: Philosophical, Historical, Social-Developmental and Narrative Perspectives, Cambridge University Press. pp. 165. 2012.
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43If human cognition is adaptive, can human knowledge consist of encodings?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3): 488-489. 1991.
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42Representing is something that we do, not a structure that we “use”: Reply to GładziejewskiNew Ideas in Psychology 1 (49): 27-37. 2018.The interactivist model of representation makes foundational criticisms of assumptions concerning representation that have been standard since the pre-Socratics and presents a positive model that differs from others on offer in several ways. The interactivist model of representation (or re- presenting), consequently, does not fit well within standard categories (though it is closest to the general pragmatist framework), and, consequently, is often miscategorized and misunderstood. A recent pape…Read more
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41You can't get there from here: Foundationalism and developmentBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 124-125. 2011.The thesis of our commentary is that the framework used to address what are taken by Carey to be the open issues is highly problematic. The presumed necessity of an innate stock of representational primitives fails to account for the emergence of representation out of a nonrepresentational base. This failure manifests itself in problematic ways throughout Carey's book.
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41Mechanism is not enoughPragmatics and Cognition 15 (3): 573-585. 2007.I will argue that mechanism is not sufficient to capture representation, thus cognition. More generally, mechanism is not sufficient to capture normativity of any sort. I will also outline a model of emergent normativity, representational normativity in particular, and show how it transcends these limitations of mechanism. To begin, I will address some illustrative attempts to model representation within mechanistically naturalistic frameworks, first rather generally, and then in the cases of th…Read more
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38Benny Shanon, the representational and the presentational: An essay on cognition and the study of the mind, hemel hempstead, hertfordshire, U.k.: Harvester wheatsheaf, 1993, ISBN 0-7450-1095-4; paramus, NJ: Prentice-hall, 1994, VI + 409 pp., $66.00 (paper), ISBN 0-13-302225- (review)Minds and Machines 10 (2): 313-317. 2000.
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37The interactivist approach to development generates a framework of types of constraints on what can be constructed. The four constraint types are based on: (1) what the constructed systems are about; (2) the representational relationship itself; (3) the nature of the systems being constructed; and (4) the process of construction itself. We give illustrations of each constraint type. Any developmental theory needs to acknowledge all four types of constraint; however, some current theories conflat…Read more
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37Is cognition an autonomous subsystemIn S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind, John Benjamins. pp. 115--131. 1997.
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35The interactivist approach to development generates a framework of types of constraints on what can be constructed. The four constraint types are based on: (1) what the constructed systems are about; (2) the representational relationship itself; (3) the nature of the systems being constructed; and (4) the process of construction itself. We give illustrations of each constraint type. Any developmental theory needs to acknowledge all four types of constraint; however, some current theories conflat…Read more
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35Action, Anticipation, and Construction: The Cognitive CoreConstructivist Foundations 9 (1): 62-63. 2013.Open peer commentary on the article “A Computational Constructivist Model as an Anticipatory Learning Mechanism for Coupled Agent–Environment Systems” by Filipo Studzinski Perotto. Upshot: Interaction-based models of cognition force anticipatory and constructivist models. The CALM model offers significant development of such models within a machine learning framework. It is suggested that moving to an entirely interactive-based model offers still further advantages
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35We all believe an unbounded number of things about the way the world is and about the way the world works. For example, I believe that if I move this book into the other room, it will not change color -- unless there is a paint shower on the way, unless I carry an umbrella through that shower, and so on; I believe that large red trucks at high speeds can hurt me, that trucks with polka dots can hurt me, and so on; that if I move this book, the room will stay in place -- unless there is a pressur…Read more
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34Critical principles: on the negative sideNew Ideas in Psychology 20 1-34. 2002.neglected aspect: knowledge of error, or ‘‘negative’’ knowledge. The development of knowledge of what counts as error occurs via a kind of internal variation and selection, or quasi-evolutionary, process. Processes of reflection generate a hierarchy of principles of error.
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33Variations in Variation and Selection: The Ubiquity of the Variation-and-Selective-Retention Ratchet in Emergent Organizational Complexity, Part II: Quantum Field Theory (review)Foundations of Science 8 (3): 283-293. 2003.If the general arguments concerning theinvolvement of variation and selection inexplanations of ``fit'' are valid, then variationand selection explanations should beappropriate, or at least potentiallyappropriate, outside the paradigm historisticdomains of biology and knowledge. In thisdiscussion, I wish to indicate some potentialroles for variation and selection infoundational physics â specifically inquantum field theory. I will not be attemptingany full coherent ontology for quantum fieldth…Read more
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33Representation: Emulation and anticipationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3): 418-418. 2004.We address the issue of the normativity of representation and how Grush might address it for emulations as constituting representations. We then proceed to several more detailed issues concerning the learning of emulations, a possible empirical counterexample to Grush's model, and the choice of Kalman filters as the form of model-based control.
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25Why believe in beliefs?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1): 100-101. 2004.A central pillar of Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) argument is Wittgenstein's later work on language. I suggest that this support is not as strong as might be wished, and offer an alternative approach to their conclusion that language learning, especially of folk psychology, involves a socially embedded constructivism.
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25On Emergence, AgainMetaphysica 24 (2): 381-406. 2023.The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we are interested in assessing the validity of one version of Kim’s argument against genuine higher level causation. Second, we discuss Wilson’s proposal to consider a weaker notion of emergence as genuinely metaphysical and compatible with Non-Reductive Physicalism. Our conclusion is that both proposals fail: the first in preempting genuine (strong) emergent causation, whereas the second in ensuring a genuinely metaphysical status to weak emergenc…Read more
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24Information, Representation, BiologyBiosemiotics 10 (2): 179-193. 2017.Biosemiotics contains at its core fundamental issues of naturalism: are normative properties, such as meaning, referent, and others, part of the natural world, or are they part of a second, intentional and normative, metaphysical realm — one that might be analogically applied to natural phenomena, such as within biological cells — but a realm that nevertheless remains metaphysically distinct? Such issues are manifestations of a fundamental metaphysical split between a “natural” realm and a realm…Read more
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23Interactive knowing: The metaphysics of intentionalityIn Roberto Poli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives, Springer Verlag. pp. 207--229. 2010.
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22Encodingism is not just a bad metaphorBehavioral and Brain Sciences 42. 2019.Brette's criticism of the coding metaphor focuses on its presence in neurosciences. We argue that this problematic view, which we call “encodingism,” is pernicious in any model of cognition that adopts it. We discuss some of the more specific problems it begets and then elaborate on Brette's action-based alternative to the coding framework.
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16Encultured minds, not error reduction mindsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 43. 2020.There are serious theoretical problems with the free-energy principle model, which are shown in the current article. We discuss the proposed model's inability to account for culturally emergent normativities, and point out the foundational issues that we claim this inability stems from.
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