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Representation in natural and artificial agentsIn Edwina Taborsky (ed.), Semiosis. Evolution. Energy: Towards a Reconceptualization of the Sign, Shaker Verlag. pp. 15--26. 1999.
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13On the concept of conceptJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 31 (2): 102-105. 2011.This commentary is in two parts: 1) a short review of problems with representational theories of mind, and 2) a critique and diagnosis of what I claim are fundamental problems with Wittgensteinian notions of grammatical analysis. These problems turn on an incomplete characterization of normativity in Wittgenstein's work. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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35We all believe an unbounded number of things about the way the world is and about the way the world works. For example, I believe that if I move this book into the other room, it will not change color -- unless there is a paint shower on the way, unless I carry an umbrella through that shower, and so on; I believe that large red trucks at high speeds can hurt me, that trucks with polka dots can hurt me, and so on; that if I move this book, the room will stay in place -- unless there is a pressur…Read more
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37Is cognition an autonomous subsystemIn S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind, John Benjamins. pp. 115--131. 1997.
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77Persons are biological beings who participate in social environments. Is human sociality different from that of insects? Is human sociality different from that of a computer or robot with elaborate rules for social interaction in its program memory? What is the relationship between the biology of humans and the sociality of persons? I argue that persons constitute an emergent ontological level that develops out of the biological and psychological realm, but that is largely social in its own cons…Read more
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100Part II: Applications of process-based theories: Process and emergence: Normative function and representation (review)Axiomathes 14 (1-3): 121-155. 2004.Kim's argument appears to render causally efficacious emergence impossible: Hume's argument appears to render normative emergence impossible, and, in its general form, it precludes any emergence at all. I argue that both of these barriers can be overcome, and, in fact, that they each constitute reductions of their respective underlying presuppositions. In particular, causally efficacious ontological emergence can be modeled, but only within a process metaphysics, thus avoiding Kim's argument, an…Read more
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319The Process Dynamics of Normative FunctionThe Monist 85 (1): 3-28. 2002.Outlines the etiological theory of normative functionality. Analysis of the autonomous system; Function of systems-oriented approaches; Specifications of system identity
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227Motivation and Emotion: An Interactive Process ModelIn Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization, John Benjamins. pp. 161. 2000.In this chapter, I outline dynamic models of motivation and emotion. These turn out not to be autonomous subsystems, but, instead, are deeply integrated in the basic interactive dynamic character of living systems. Motivation is a crucial aspect of particular kinds of interactive systems -- systems for which representation is a sister aspect. Emotion is a special kind of partially reflective interaction process, and yields its own emergent motivational aspects. In addition, the overall model acc…Read more
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33Variations in Variation and Selection: The Ubiquity of the Variation-and-Selective-Retention Ratchet in Emergent Organizational Complexity, Part II: Quantum Field Theory (review)Foundations of Science 8 (3): 283-293. 2003.If the general arguments concerning theinvolvement of variation and selection inexplanations of ``fit'' are valid, then variationand selection explanations should beappropriate, or at least potentiallyappropriate, outside the paradigm historisticdomains of biology and knowledge. In thisdiscussion, I wish to indicate some potentialroles for variation and selection infoundational physics â specifically inquantum field theory. I will not be attemptingany full coherent ontology for quantum fieldth…Read more
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263How does the environment affect the person?In L. T. Winegar & Jaan Valsiner (eds.), Children's Development Within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Erlbaum. 1992.How Does the Environment Affect the Person? Mark H. Bickhard invited chapter in Children's Development within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Erlbaum. edited by L. T. Winegar, J. Valsiner, in press
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127A Process Model of the Emergence of RepresentationIn G. L. Farre & T. Oksala (eds.), Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization, Selected and Edited Papers From the Echo Iii Conference, Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica. pp. 3-7. 1998.Two challenges to the very possibility of emergence are addressed, one metaphysical and one logical. The resolution of the metaphysical challenge requires a shift to a process metaphysics, while the logical challenge highlights normative emergence, and requires a shift to more powerful logical tools -- in particular, that of implicit definition. Within the framework of a process metaphysics, two levels of normative emergence are outlined: that of function and that of representation
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116The Emergence of Contentful ExperienceIn T. Kitamura (ed.), What Should Be Computed to Understand and Model Brain Function?, World Scientific. 2001.There are many facets to mental life and mental experience. In this chapter, I attempt to account for some central characteristics among those facets. I argue that normative function and representation are emergent in particular forms of the self-maintenance of far from thermodynamic equilibrium systems in their essential far-from-equilibrium conditions. The nature of representation that is thereby modeled
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176Some Consequences (and Enablings) of Process MetaphysicsAxiomathes 21 (1): 3-32. 2011.The interactivist model has explored a number of consequences of process metaphysics. These include reversals of some fundamental metaphysical assumptions dominant since the ancient Greeks, and multiple further consequences throughout the metaphysics of the world, minds, and persons. This article surveys some of these consequences, ranging from issues regarding entities and supervenience to the emergence of normative phenomena such as representation, rationality, persons, and ethics
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42If human cognition is adaptive, can human knowledge consist of encodings?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3): 488-489. 1991.
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34Critical principles: on the negative sideNew Ideas in Psychology 20 1-34. 2002.neglected aspect: knowledge of error, or ‘‘negative’’ knowledge. The development of knowledge of what counts as error occurs via a kind of internal variation and selection, or quasi-evolutionary, process. Processes of reflection generate a hierarchy of principles of error.
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78Operational definitions were a neo-Machean development that connected with the positivism of Logical Positivism. Logical Positivism failed, with the failure of operational definitions being just one of multiple and multifarious failures of Logical Positivism more broadly. Operationalism, however, has continued to seduce psychology more than half a century after it was repudiated by philosophers of science, including the very Logical Positivists who had first taken it seriously. It carries with i…Read more
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41You can't get there from here: Foundationalism and developmentBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 124-125. 2011.The thesis of our commentary is that the framework used to address what are taken by Carey to be the open issues is highly problematic. The presumed necessity of an innate stock of representational primitives fails to account for the emergence of representation out of a nonrepresentational base. This failure manifests itself in problematic ways throughout Carey's book.
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162The dynamic emergence of representationIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind, Elsevier. pp. 71--90. 2004.A final version of this paper is in press as: Bickhard, M. H.. The Dynamic Emergence of Representation. In H. Clapin, P. Staines, P. Slezak Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Praeger
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53If the general arguments concerning the involvement of variation and selection in explanations of “fit” are valid, then variation and selection explanations should be appropriate, or at least potentially appropriate, outside the paradigm historistic domains of biology and knowledge. In this discussion, I wish to indicate some potential roles for variation and selection in foundational physics – specifically in quantum field theory. I will not be attempting any full coherent ontology for quantum …Read more
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33Representation: Emulation and anticipationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3): 418-418. 2004.We address the issue of the normativity of representation and how Grush might address it for emulations as constituting representations. We then proceed to several more detailed issues concerning the learning of emulations, a possible empirical counterexample to Grush's model, and the choice of Kalman filters as the form of model-based control.
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102Mind as processIn F.G. Riffert & Marcel Weber (eds.), Searching for New Contrasts, Vienna: Peter Lang. pp. 285-294. 2002.assumptions about the phenomena of interest with process models. Thus, phlogiston has been replaced by combustion, caloric by random thermal motion, and vital fluid by far- from-equilibrium self-reproducing organizations of process. The most significant exceptions to this historical pattern are found in studies of the mind. Here, substance assumptions are still ubiquitous, ranging from models of representation to those of emotions to personality and psychopathology. Substance assumptions do pern…Read more
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25Why believe in beliefs?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1): 100-101. 2004.A central pillar of Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) argument is Wittgenstein's later work on language. I suggest that this support is not as strong as might be wished, and offer an alternative approach to their conclusion that language learning, especially of folk psychology, involves a socially embedded constructivism.
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1Automata Theory, Artificial Intelligence and Genetic EpistemologyRevue Internationale de Philosophie 36 (4): 549. 1982.
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262The interactivist modelSynthese 166 (3). 2009.A shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of process enables an integrated account of the emergence of normative phenomena. I show how substance assumptions block genuine ontological emergence, especially the emergence of normativity, and how a process framework permits a thermodynamic-based account of normative emergence. The focus is on two foundational forms of normativity, that of normative function and of representation as emergent in a particular kind of function. This proc…Read more
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210Some notes on internal and external relations and representationConsciousness and Emotion 4 (1): 101-110. 2003.Internal relations are those relations that are intrinsic to the nature of one or more of the relata. They are a kind of essential relation, rather than an essential property. For example, an arc of a circle is internally related to the center of that circle in the sense that
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