Joseph C. Pitt

The general topic I am addressing concerns the epistemological role of the use of metaphor in the philosophy of science. More specifically, I am concerned with the role metaphor plays in scientific and technological change. In the case in point, nanotechnology, I will explore the role of metaphor in changing our conception of the confirmation of the plausibility of theoretical notions. The basic idea is that metaphors either offer or suggest images that are meant to persuade one to change one’s belief. Thus the confirmatory role is variable..

A volume of essays concerned with mapping out future domains in philosophy of technology, it will serve as an excellent text in a variety of courses. Since the future belongs to the young, in addition to established scholars there are many fresh voices featured. The scope of the essays range from data discrimination to space junk and beyond. This volume offers a glimpse into the future of philosophy of technology, laying out the land in contemporary philosophy technology. The organization maps out the spaces of activity in the field and anticipates the big issues that we will soon face. Exciting new work on social networking, virtual environments, privacy, intellectual property, and discrimination with data constitute crucial avenues of thought for understanding and framing our experiences with and through technology today. Of enduring interest, articles on outer space, engineering design, and technology assessment help anchor this volume in more traditional topics, while work on the relationship between art and technology suggest that some themes that have been less emphasized in recent work will receive new life.

It is argued that Galileo's theory of justification was a version of explanationism. Galileo's Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems is to be read as primarily a defense of his theory of the tides. He shows how, by assuming Copernican motions, he can explain the tides, thereby justifying the endorsement of Copernicus. The crux of the argument rests on Galileo's account of explanation, which is novel in its reliance on the use of geometry. Finally, the consequences of his use of geometry, and his views on the limits of knowledge, force us to conclude that if Galileo was a realist, his realism was so highly constrained as to be irrelevant

Wilfrid Sellars attempts to deflect traditional objections to the straight rule of inductive acceptance by embedding it in a complicated system of levels. This system rests on a theory of probability in which the meaning of "probable" is reconstructed in the context of Sellars' general theory of practical reason. To say a statement is probable means, according to Sellars, that there is good reason for accepting the statement as true. In this paper I examine Sellars' attempt to resuscitate the straight rule and conclude that not only does he fail, but his account of "probable" is circular.