Alan Richardson

É uma questão de algum interesse histórico e filosófico pensar por que razão o empirismo lógico veio a perder o seu estatuto de projeto filosófico a adotar, e como tal aconteceu. Afinal, como este volume amplamente demonstrou, o empirismo lógico foi um projeto de ponta na filosofia analítica num passado não tão distante, e, de fato, o projeto preeminente em certos ramos da filosofia, como a filosofia da ciência. Algo de substancial tem de ter acontecido para tal projeto ter declinado tão consideravelmente em influência que mesmo o trabalho mais técnico em áreas como a teoria da confirmação ou a filosofia da física não possa hoje ser considerado um exemplo da filosofia da ciência do empirismo lógico.

This symposia-papers volume is the second volume of essays from the PSA 2008 program. The vast majority of the work in putting together this volume fell to the program committee. The members of this committee began the adjudication process with over 200 submitted papers and went through two rounds of selection, first for the program and then for this volume. Throughout, they all worked diligently and in good humor. So, I would like to thank Ken Aizawa, Rachel Ankeny, Davis Baird, Paul Bartha, Anjan Chakravartty, Hasok Chang, Sharyn Clough, Carla Fehr, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Brad Monton, Mark Risjord, Laura Ruetsche, Kyle Stanford, Friedrich Steinle, and Peter Vranas. In addition to papers from symposia presented at PSA 2008, we hope the selection of symposia reveals the widening range of philosophical expertise within the PSA.

History of analytic philosophy has been an active, going concern within analytic philosophy for decades — one can scarcely imagine analytic philosophy being continued with some serious attention paid to the work of founders such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. History of philosophy of science has become an explicit part of the philosophical agenda in the past quarter century or so. These areas of research importantly overlap — logical empiricism, in particular, was an episode in both histories. One might be forgiven for thinking, given all this, that the question of the relations of analytic philosophy to philosophy of science in the twentieth century would have been importantly thematized in both sorts of history and that the historical relations between analytic philosophy and philosophy of science would be, by now, a well-tilled field.

This contributed-papers volume is the first volume of essays from the PSA 2008 program. The vast majority of the work in putting together this volume fell to the program committee. The members of this committee began the adjudication process with over 200 submitted papers and went through two rounds of selection, first for the program and then for this volume. Throughout, they all worked diligently and in good humor. So, I would like to thank Ken Aizawa, Rachel Ankeny, Davis Baird, Paul Bartha, Anjan Chakravartty, Hasok Chang, Sharyn Clough, Carla Fehr, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Brad Monton, Mark Risjord, Laura Ruetsche, Kyle Stanford, Friedrich Steinle, and Peter Vranas.

This essay examines the perspective from which Bas van Fraassen, in his book, The Empirical Stance, explains the project of empiricism. I argue that this perspective is a robustly transcendental perspective, which suggests that the tradition of empiricism lacks the resources to explain itself. I offer an alternative history of epistemic voluntarism in twentieth-century philosophy to the history van Fraassen himself provides, one that finds the novelty in van Fraassen's own views to be precisely his reintroduction of the knowing mind into the tradition of analytic philosophy of science

If there is a movement or school that epitomizes analytic philosophy in the middle of the twentieth century, it is logical empiricism. Logical empiricists created a scientifically and technically informed philosophy of science, established mathematical logic as a topic in and tool for philosophy, and initiated the project of formal semantics. Accounts of analytic philosophy written in the middle of the twentieth century gave logical empiricism a central place in the project. The second wave of interpretative accounts was constructed to show how philosophy should progress, or had progressed, beyond logical empiricism. The essays survey the formative stages of logical empiricism in central Europe and its acculturation in North America, discussing its main topics, and achievements and failures, in different areas of philosophy of science, and assessing its influence on philosophy, past, present, and future.