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71The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God, by J. L. Schellenberg (review)Faith and Philosophy 33 (4): 500-506. 2016.I provide a book review of Schellenberg's book, The Hiddenness Argument.
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527Phenomenal conservatism and evidentialism in religious epistemologyIn Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief, Oxford University Press. pp. 52--73. 2011.Phenomenal conservatism holds, roughly, that if it seems to S that P, then S has evidence for P. I argue for two main conclusions. The first is that phenomenal conservatism is better suited than is proper functionalism to explain how a particular type of religious belief formation can lead to non-inferentially justified religious beliefs. The second is that phenomenal conservatism makes evidence so easy to obtain that the truth of evidentialism would not be a significant obstacle to justified…Read more
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187Divine hiddenness and the value of divine–creature relationshipsReligious Studies 44 (3): 269-287. 2008.Apparently, relationships between God (if He exists) and His creatures would be very valuable. Appreciating this value raises the question of whether it can motivate a certain premise in John Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness, a premise which claims, roughly, that if some capable, non-resistant subject fails to believe in God, then God does not exist. In this paper, I argue that the value of divine–creature relationships can justify this premise only if we have reason to believe tha…Read more
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1149Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1): 127-143. 2016.In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a significant liability. I argue, however, that the rele…Read more
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228Movin' on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justificationPhilosophical Studies 157 (3): 323-340. 2012.Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that he…Read more
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460Why Sceptical Theism isn’t Sceptical EnoughIn Justin McBrayer Trent Dougherty (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 45-62. 2014.The most common charge against sceptical theism is that it is too sceptical, i.e. it committed to some undesirable form of scepticism or another. I contend that Michael Bergmann’s sceptical theism isn’t sceptical enough. I argue that, if true, the sceptical theses secure a genuine victory: they prevent, for some people, a prominent argument from evil from providing any justification whatsoever to doubt the existence of God. On the other hand, even if true, the sceptical theses fail to preven…Read more
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527Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatismPhilosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 529-545. 2010.Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemol…Read more
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234Perceptual Justification and Warrant by DefaultAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3): 445-63. 2009.As I use the term, ‘entitlement’ is any warrant one has by default—i.e. without acquiring it. Some philosophers not only affirm the existence of entitlement, but also give it a crucial role in the justification of our perceptual beliefs. These philosophers affirm the Entitlement Thesis: An essential part of what makes our perceptual beliefs justified is our entitlement to the proposition that I am not a brain-in-a-vat. Crispin Wright, Stewart Cohen, and Roger White are among those who endorse…Read more
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210Evidential support, reliability, and Hume's problem of inductionPacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4): 503-519. 2009.Necessity holds that, if a proposition A supports another B, then it must support B. John Greco contends that one can resolve Hume's Problem of Induction only if she rejects Necessity in favor of reliabilism. If Greco's contention is correct, we would have good reason to reject Necessity and endorse reliabilism about inferential justification. Unfortunately, Greco's contention is mistaken. I argue that there is a plausible reply to Hume's Problem that both endorses Necessity and is at least as g…Read more
Williamsburg, Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Supererogation |
Normative Ethics |
Maximizing and Satisficing Consequentialism |
Moral Rationality |
Epistemology |
Divine Goodness |
The Argument from Evil |
Areas of Interest
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Normative Ethics |
Reasons and Rationality |
Moral Normativity |
Epistemology |
Divine Goodness |
The Argument from Evil |