Maria Russo

Sartre and Kant are not often compared, especially because the former is frequently considered a theorist of a totally arbitrary free will. Nevertheless, this is not a fair interpretation of Sartre. Starting already from Being and Nothingness, he conceived an ethical difference between bad faith and authenticity. More unequivocally, in Notebooks for an Ethics he developed an existentialist ethics, which is more Kantian than expected. In that text, the ethical ideal of authenticity is not so different from the ethical ideal of autonomy in Kant. The aim of this article is to characterize Sartrean authenticity as a radicalization of Kantian autonomy. In both cases, there is a normative criterion, which implies a correct exercise of freedom towards oneself and others. This correct exercise of freedom implies for Kant the exclusion of the will determined by material conditions. For Sartre, this correct exercise means the rejection of bad faith. There is also a similar connection between autonomy and respect in Kant, and between authenticity and generosity in Sartre. Highlighting this little‐known affinity between the two most radical philosophers of freedom could also reveal a non‐ideological Sartre, ready to dialogue with contemporary ethical debate.

In the Critique of Dialectical Reason and in many interviews, Sartre upheld the proletariat’s attempts at emancipation in Western societies and their revolts in the developing world. In these texts, counter-violence is considered the only way to exercise concrete engagement, and a classless society is presented as the only possibility of reducing social inequalities. However, this radical point of view was not the only perspective he tried to develop. He also sought to elaborate an existentialist ethics, which does not correspond to the Marxist theory. This article aims to show that Sartre evoked Notebooks’ ideas in his last interview, Hope Now, in which he envisaged a different typology of democracy and society. This article will examine this new and last direction of Sartre’s political thought.

A filosofia da técnica de Ortega y Gasset, desenvolvida sobretudo em Meditación de la técnica (1933), e, depots, em El mito del hombre allende la técnica (texto alemão de 1951; trad, castelhana de 1952), representa um contributo original para um debate que na primeira metade do século xx se tornou particularmente vivo na Europa. Segundo a autora do artigo, Ortega y Gasset, dialogando virtualmente com Henri Bergson e realmente com Martin Heidegger, está particularmente interessado na dimensão antropológica do problema da técnica. Porém, ao não conceber a possibilidade de se estudar a técnica independentemente de uma consideração do que seja a natureza do ser humano, Ortega y Gasset acaba por se distanciar da inquietude heideggeriana acerca da essência da técnica e revelar ser a sua uma sensibilidade intelectual bem mais próxima de Bergson do que, à primeira vista, se poderia pensar. Veja-se, como exemplo, a importância dada ao papel que uma sociedade aberta tem no desenvolvimento da inteligência humana. De facto, para o pensador espanhol, é a técnica que permite ao ser humano adaptar o meio e, dessa forma, construir para si uma nova natureza, ou seja, uma sobrenatureza humana, o seu verdadeiro mundo. A originalidade de Ortega, de resto, pode também ver-se no modo como evidencia estreita relação que existe entre a técnica e a estrutura do ser humano, especificamente no que se refere à dialéctica entre intimidade e projecto ou, ainda, em relação a importantes questões como as relativas ao sentido do trabalho e/ou dos tempos livres. Para além de tudo isso, porém, o artigo visa explorar o impacto de Ortega y Gasset no âmbito do pensamento italiano dos finais do século xx (1970-1996), pelo que nele se distinguem referências a pensadores como Luciano Pellicani, Gualtiero Cangiotti, Antimo Negri, Lorenzo Infantino, e se faz particular menção de categorias orteguianas como ensimismamiento, imaginação criadora, capacidade de autotranscendência, capacidade simbólica, capacidade de projecto. Ou seja, ao mesmo tempo que se evidencia a visão de Onega y Gasset acerca da especificidade ontológica do ser humano, o artigo aprofunda também o modo como os seus leitores italianos o recepcionam em consonância com o impacto que nele tem o pensamento de autores como Ernst Cassirer, Max Scheler ou Arnold Gehlen, por um lado, e, por outro, demarcam em relação ao estruturalismo de Claude Lévi-Strauss ou ao antihumanismo de Michel Foucault. Ortega y Gasset's philosophy of technology, developed mainly in his work Meditación de la técnica (1933), and, later, in El mito del hombre allende la técnica (German text from 1951; Spanish translation from 1952) represents an original contribution for a debate which, in the first half of the twentieth century, became particularly lively in Europe. According to the article's author, Ortega y Gasset, in virtual dialogue with Henri Bergson and in real dialogue with Martin Heidegger, is particularly interested in the anthropological dimension of the question pertaining to the meaning of technology. But by not conceiving the possibility of studying technology independently of considering what the nature of the human being is, Ortega y Gasset keeps himself away from the Heideggerian inquietude about the essence of technology and reveals that his intellectual sensibility is much nearer Bergson than one could think at first sight. See, for instance, the importance given by Ortega to the role which an open society plays in the development of human intelligence. In fact, to the Spanish thinker, it is technology which enables the human being to adapt the environment and, thus, to construct for himself a new nature, that is, a human supernature, her true world. Moreover, the originality of Ortega can abo be seen in the way in which he points out the close relation existing between technology and the structure of the human being as such, specifically when it comes to the consideration of interaction between intimacy and project or to questions like the ones related to the meaning of labor and free time. The main goal of the article, however, is to explore the impact of Ortega y Gasset in the Italian thought at the end of the twentieth century (1970-1996). Hence the references to authors like Luciano Pellicani, Gualtiero Cangiotti, Antimo Negri, Lorenzo Infantino, as well as the study of categories like ensimismamiento, creativity, self-transcendence, project and symbolic capacity, etc. In other words, the article not only pays special heed to Ortega's vision about the ontological specificity of man, but also studies how the reception of his thinking in Italy was done in consonance both with the impact (positive) of authors like Ernst Cassirer, Max Scheler or Arnold Gehlen, as well as with positions in relation to which a demarcation was asked for, as it was the case with Claude Lévi-Strauss' structuralism or Michel Foucault's anti-humanism

El médico gallego Juan Rof Carballo es un exponente significativode la así llamada medicina humanista que se desarrolla en la España de la primeramitad del siglo XX. Con sus ensayos de antropología y epistemología, él proporciona unaporte considerable y hasta anticipador de muchas cuestiones relativas a aquella comprensiónfilosófica del hombre, tan necesaria al ejercicio auténtico de la medicina. Siendo anatomopatólogoy bioquímico de formación, llega sucesivamente a la medicina psicosomática.Juan Rof Carballo tiene también el mérito de haber introducido el psicoanálisis en España,individuando sus tesis más equilibradas, pero también reconociendo sus límites, en favor deuna visión más completa del ser humano. El eje de su concepción del hombre es la originalnoción de urdimbre —literalmente cañamazo y troquelado— trama originaria de relacionesque preside a la estructuración del yo, en la que juega una importancia fundamental lanoción de ternura, que se manifiesta primariamente en la atención genitorial, especialmentematernal y sucesivamente en todos los gestos de cuidado.