David Benatar

In this article, it is argued that in the actual world, even if not in all possible worlds, sentience is both a necessary and sufficient condition for having moral standing. In arguing for this conclusion, the concepts of sentience and moral standing are explained. Five kinds of interest are then differentiated—functional, biotic, sentient, sapient, and self-conscious. It is argued that having sentient interests, rather than merely any interests, is what grounds moral standing. However, determining who has moral standing is only a beginning. Once we know whose interests we need to consider, we still need to know what interests need to be considered. We also need to know what considering those interests implies. Those questions are engaged in the remainder of this article.

Breeding companion animals as well as allowing them to reproduce is controversial. In this chapter three kinds of argument for an alternative course of action are presented, namely preventing companion animals from reproducing, usually by sterilization. These are anti-natalist arguments, abolitionist arguments, and harm prevention arguments. The anti-natalist and abolitionist arguments are categorically opposed to all breeding of companion animals. The harm prevention argument, on the other hand, is a conditional one, according to which people should desist from breeding companion animals until such time as the demand for such animals exceeds the number of these animals already in existence. However, given how many unwanted animals there currently are, people are nowhere near that point. Thus, all three arguments converge on the conclusion that reproducing companion animals is wrong. The case against breeding companion animals is significantly overdetermined.

This chapter argues that the quality of human life is so poor that the harm of coming into existence is serious—sufficiently serious that procreation is always wrong. The argument has two stages: first, evidence is provided to show why self-assessments of well-being are unstable and unreliable, changed by factors such as adaption and comparison to those who are worse off. Second, it is argued that when we correct for the optimism bias, or Pollyannaism, to which humans are prone we find how poor the quality of human life is, especially among the millions who are poor or suffering from natural disasters. Various secular optimistic “theodicies” such as transhumanism, are considered and rejected. It is then argued that even if every life is not of this poor quality, the risk of serious harm is so great that it is wrong to create new lives.

This chapter begins by presenting the non-identity problem, otherwise known as “the paradox of future individuals”, which involves issues of whether and under what circumstances life is worth living, specifically why it is wrong to create a suffering person when the alternative would have been not to create that person at all. In suggesting responses to that problem, the chapter then argues that there is an axiological asymmetry between benefits and harms, the upshot of which is that coming into existence is always in fact a net harm. Various scenarios are introduced under which the benefits of procreation are considered, but the axiological asymmetry is defended against such objections and the advantages of asymmetry are presented. The latter include the resolution of various problems in population ethics. The connection between this asymmetry and frustrationism vs. anti-frustrationism is explained.

This chapter introduces anti-natalism, the view that is wrong to bring new people into existence. Nuances within the anti-natalist view are described and this position is contrasted with the pro-natalism of David Wasserman; for example, anti-natalism does not include speciecide or suicide. The axiological asymmetry argument is introduced, which states that the harm caused by a child coming into existence outweighs the “not bad” results of a child not being brought into existence. A distinction is drawn between a negative moral evaluation of procreation and the view that procreation ought to be legally prohibited—the anti-natalist is not committed to the latter. The chapter ends with a brief overview of the remaining chapters in Part 1.

This chapter examines the second source of procreative constraints introduced in the previous chapter based on duties to future children that are roughly “birthright” or “role-based” duties (especially considering the future feasibility of genetic testing of potential children). It begins by considering an array of minimum standards for future children, from a life of at least average well-being (per Michael Tooley), or David DeGrazia’s “basic needs,” to a life truly worth living, or “flourishing of personhood.” It rejects the higher standards as implausibly restrictive and suggests that the intermediate standards offer rich, if debatable, accounts of what is required to have a life worth living. The chapter then offers a justification for treating the role morality of prospective parents as a source of duties and constraints, and then finds the expected well-being of the future child has only limited and indirect relevance for the permissibility of procreation.

This chapter advances a moral misanthropic argument for anti-natalism. This argument points to the dark side of human nature and to the vast amounts of harm that humans cause to other humans, to animals and, via environmental damage, to humans and animals. It suggests that while Homo sapiens may indeed be more of a thinking animal, factors such as the “framing effect” distort our rationality. We are impelled towards conformity and obedience to even cruel and unjust authority, as the “Stanford prison” experiments proved, and we as a species have committed numerous genocides; we also inflict constant animal abuse and destruction on the environment. It is argued that these ground a presumptive duty against creating new humans and that this presumption is almost always not defeated.

This chapter, the final one in Part 1, considers various pro-natalist arguments in favour of procreation. Most of these are not grounded in the interests of the people who would be brought into existence. Instead the arguments appeal to divine commands, parental interests, and group interests. So-called divine commands are shown to be flexible in, for example, the cases of celibacy among priests and nuns; parental interests can be met by adoption; group interests such as cultural demands are shown to be highly subjective, and demographic demands can be addressed by immigration. Given that continued procreation to save existing people from harm is shown to be a kind of procreative Ponzi scheme, it is argued that none of these arguments succeeds in defeating the anti-natalist case against procreation.

This first chapter introduces readers to the competing views on procreation that are defended in the book. The ethics of procreation, quality-of-life issues, and the so-called misanthropic position are presented as part of the arguments, especially as they are referenced in the work of Seana Shiffrin and Matti Hayry. The differences, but also the similarities, between the two positions are highlighted: one is an extreme anti-natalist position, the other is a pro-natalist position that is more permissive than most but not as extreme as some. This chapter emphasizes both that bearing a child is a morally significant activity, and that the decision to have a child demands serious reflection. The final goal of this introductory chapter is to present the plan for each subsequent chapter.

This chapter advances a misanthropic moral argument for anti-natalism. According to this argument, we have a presumptive duty to desist from bringing into existence new members of species that cause vast amounts of harm. Extensive evidence is provided to show that human nature has a dark side that leads humans to cause vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death to other humans and to non-human animals. Some of this harm is mediated by destruction of the environment. The resultant presumptive duty we have not to create new humans is very rarely if ever defeated. Not all misanthropy is about humans’ moral failings. The chapter is followed by an appendix, in which aesthetic considerations against procreating are advanced.

I begin by considering and rejecting a number of common arguments against suicide, concluding that it is sometimes morally permissible. I then broaden my defence of suicide, arguing that it is rational and morally permissible much more often than is usually thought to be the case. To this end, I argue that while some people do underestimate the quality of their lives, the much more common mistake is to overestimate one’s quality of life. I then argue that because none of us could have consented to being brought into existence, it is especially important that each one of us at least have the option of ceasing to exist if he or she would rather not endure the hardships that life presents. Finally, I consider the Epicurean argument against the badness of death.

Surgery inevitably inflicts some harm on the body. At the very least, it damages the tissue that is cut. These harms often are clearly outweighed by the overall benefits to the patient. However, where the benefits do not outweigh the harms or where they do not clearly do so, surgical interventions become morally contested. _Cutting to the Core_ examines a number of such surgeries, including infant male circumcision and cutting the genitals of female children, the separation of conjoined twins, surgical sex assignment of intersex children and the surgical re-assignment of transsexuals, limb and face transplantation, cosmetic surgery, and placebo surgery. When, if ever, do the benefits of these surgeries outweigh their costs? May a surgeon perform dangerous procedures that are not clearly to the patient's benefit, even if the patient consents to them? May a surgeon perform any surgery on a minor patient if there are no clear benefits to that child? These and other related questions are the core themes of this collection of essays.

In this paper it is argued that the overwhelming majority of gamete donors are amongst those who treat decisions about bringing children into existence too lightly. The argument proceeds through the following stages. 1) People have a presumptive responsibility for rearing children who result from their gametes. 2) The responsibility people have to rear their offspring is a responsibility not merely to provide a minimum of care, but also to attend to the details of nurturing children and fostering their flourishing. 3) Gamete donors transfer their responsibilities for raising their genetic offspring to those who will raise it. 4) Responsibilities for rearing children are weighty ones. 5) Treating weighty responsibilities too lightly is morally wrong. 6) Gamete donors' decisions to transfer their responsibilities for rearing their offspring to others, almost always involves treating parental responsibilities too lightly. 7) Therefore, gamete donation is almost always morally wrong.

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first appeared, David Benatar’s distinctive anthology designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level and even introductory courses. While many philosophers in the "continental tradition"—those known as "existentialists"—have engaged these issues at length and often with great popular appeal, English-speaking philosophers have had relatively little to say on these important questions. Yet, the methodology they bring to philosophical questions can, and occasionally has, been applied usefully to "existential" questions. This volume draws together a representative sample of primarily English-speaking philosophers' reflections on life's big questions, divided into six sections, covering (1) the meaning of life, (2) creating people, (3) death, (4) suicide, (5) immortality, and (6) optimism and pessimism. These key readings are supplemented with helpful introductions, study questions, and suggestions for further reading, making the material accessible and interesting for students. In short, the book provides a singular introduction to the way that philosophy has dealt with the big questions of life that we are all tempted to ask.

Rodger et al 1 argue that ‘ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it is demonstrated that’ the pain and suffering of donor pigs ‘cannot be eliminated by other means’. The phrase ‘genetic disenhancement’ refers to genetic manipulation that would produce an animal that is either less able or entirely unable to experience pain and suffering. (The phrase is euphemistic because, on one possible reading, it suggests the removal of an existing enhancement, rather than what it actually is, namely a diminishment relative to the species norm.) The authors acknowledge that genetic ‘disenhancement’ is not a ‘morally ideal ‘solution’, but argue that ‘it is morally better to prevent unavoidable pain until a viable non-animal alternative becomes available’ (p. 1). In advancing this argument, they explicitly state that they make no assumption that xenotransplantation is, in principle, morally permissible. They take no stand on that issue, which is beyond the scope of their paper. They assume only that ‘ (1) xenotransplantation research will inevitably continue and (2) causing pain and suffering requires sufficient justification’ (p. 1). However, in the absence of an assumption that xenotransplantation is, in principle, morally permissible, the authors have not established their …

The ethics of everyday life may sound mundane. However, while it is most certainly, and appropriately, mundane in the sense of being rooted in the material world, it is not mundane in a second sense - dull, or lacking interest. Ethical questions about our daily lives are, or at least should be, of great interest to us all. Moreover, many of the specific views I shall defend about everyday ethical issues are far from commonplace. That does not mean that they are either extreme or needlessly provocative. Instead, ordinary thinking about everyday ethics, much like ordinary thinking about other ethical questions, is often mired in convention and oversimplification. Any attempt to think freshly, with nuance, and without an ideological agenda, is likely to lead not only to unusual views about each particular question, but also to an unusual constellation of views about the different questions. Quotidian ethics Practical ethics is the area of philosophy devoted to asking and responding to practical moral questions. It is distinguished from other areas of moral philosophy, which focus on more theoretical questions, such as (i) those concerning the nature of morality (the domain of metaethics), and (ii) what makes some actions morally right and others morally wrong, or which character traits are virtues, and which are vices (the subject matter of normative ethical theory)

This article describes a paradoxical phenomenon arising from the fact that those who act rightly often pay a price for doing so. The paradox is that the very thing – acting rightly – that incurs the cost also makes the cost (especially) undeserved. In explicating the paradox, I distinguish between two kinds of cost (internal and external), two kinds of unfairness (intrinsic and comparative), and two manifestations of the paradox (prospective and retrospective). I suggest that the problem generated by the paradox of desert arises and becomes steadily more pronounced as we regress through three kinds of cases. I then consider and reject an attempt to dissolve the paradox, and I discuss the relevance of the paradox for questions about the extent of duty. Finally, I consider a concern about drawing attention to the paradox of desert.