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768Imagine the possibilities: information without overloadLogique Et Analyse 49 (196). 2006.Information is often modelled as a set of relevant possibilities, treated as logically possible worlds. However, this has the unintuitive consequence that the logical consequences of an agent's information cannot be informative for that agent. There are many scenarios in which such consequences are clearly informative for the agent in question. Attempts to weaken the logic underlying each possible world are misguided. Instead, I provide a genuinely psychological notion of epistemic possibility a…Read more
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44Verifying Space and Time Requirements for Resource-Bounded AgentsIn A. Lomuscio & S. Edelkamp (eds.), Model Checking and Artificial Intelligence, Springer. 2007.The effective reasoning capability of an agent can be defined as its capability to infer, within a given space and time bound, facts that are logical consequences of its knowledge base. In this paper we show how to determine the effective reasoning capability of an agent with limited memory by encoding the agent as a transition system and automatically verifying whether a state where the agent believes a certain conclusion is reachable from the start state. We present experimental results using …Read more
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640Modal Realism, Still At Your ConvenienceAnalysis. 2016.Divers (2014) presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.
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1072The Conjunction and Disjunction ThesesMind 118 (470): 411-415. 2009.Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) argues for the disjunction thesis but against the conjunction thesis. I argue that accepting the disjunction thesis undermines his argument against the conjunction thesis.
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625Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical OmniscienceLogic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3): 325-354. 2006.I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a…Read more
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1223Against Yagisawa's modal realismAnalysis 73 (1): 10-17. 2013.In his book Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise (2010), Takashi Yagisawa presents and argues for a novel and imaginative version of modal realism. It differs both from Lewis’s modal realism (Lewis 1986) and from actualists’ ersatz accounts (Adams 1974; Sider 2002). In this paper, I’ll present two arguments, each of which shows that Yagisawa’s metaphysics is incoherent. The first argument shows that the combination of Yagisawa’s metaphysics with impossibilia leads to triviality: every …Read more
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1247The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap EpistemicismThought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4): 320-329. 2012.Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: …Read more
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155The Accidental Properties of Numbers and PropertiesThought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2): 134-140. 2012.According to genuine modal realism, some things (including numbers and properties) lack distinct counterparts in different worlds. So how can they possess any of their properties contingently? Egan (2004) argues that to explain such accidental property possession, the genuine modal realist must depart from Lewis and identify properties with functions, rather than with sets of possibilia. We disagree. The genuine modal realist already has the resources to handle Egan's proposed counterexamples. A…Read more
Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Language |
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |