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163Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments (Bootstrapping, Closure, Paradox and KK)Analysis 76 (2): 142-149. 2016.The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamson’s _reductio_ of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges.
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35The Impossibility of Inverted ReasonersActa Analytica 25 (4): 499-502. 2010.An âinvertedâ reasoner is someone who finds the inferences we find easy, inversely difficult, and those that we find difficult, inversely easy. The notion was initially introduced by Christopher Cherniak in his book, Minimal Rationality, and appealed to by Stephen Stich in The Fragmentation of Reason. While a number of difficulties have been noted about what reasoning would amount to for such a reasoner, what has not been brought out in the literature is that such a reasoner is in fact logic…Read more
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59Methodological Reflections on Two Kripkean StrategiesProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95. 1995.Aims. Saul Kripke’s (1977) argument defending Russell’s theory of (definite) descriptions (RTD) against the possible objection that Donnellan’s (1966) distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions marks a semantic ambiguity has been highly influential.1 Yet, as I hope you’ll be persuaded, Kripke’s line of reasoning— in particular, the ‘thought-experiment’ it involves—has not been duly explored. In section II, I argue that while Kripke’s argument does ward off a fairly ill-…Read more
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(1) The table is covered with books. (2) There is exactly one table and it is covered with books.
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62A Strawsonian Objection to Russell’s Theory of DescriptionsAnalysis 53 (4). 1993.One of Strawson's objections to Russell's theory of descriptions is that what are intuitively natural and correct utterances of sentences involving incomplete descriptions come out false by RTD. Russellians have responded, not by challenging Strawson's view that these uses are natural and correct, but by embellishing RTD to accommodate these uses. I pursue an alternative line of attack: I argue that there are circumstances in which "we" would find utterances of such sentences unnatural and impro…Read more
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289Anti-luminosity: Four unsuccessful strategiesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4): 659-673. 2009.In Knowledge and Its Limits Timothy Williamson argues against the luminosity of phenomenal states in general by way of arguing against the luminosity of feeling cold, that is, against the view that if one feels cold, one is at least in a position to know that one does. In this paper I consider four strategies that emerge from his discussion, and argue that none succeeds.
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62Knowing by way of tracking and epistemic closureAnalysis 75 (2): 217-223. 2015.Tracking accounts of knowledge were originally motivated by putative counter-examples to epistemic closure. But, as is now well known, these early accounts have many highly counterintuitive consequences. In this note, I motivate a tracking-based account which respects closure but which resolves many of the familiar problems for earlier tracking account along the way.
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153Contingent Identity in Counterpart TheoryAnalysis 50 (3): 163-166. 1990.A slight modification to the translation scheme for David Lewis's counterpart theory I put forward in 'An Alternative Translation Scheme for Counterpart Theory' (Analysis 49.3 (1989)) is proposed. The motivation for this change is that it makes for a more plausible account of contingent identity. In particular, contingent identity is accommodated without admitting the contingency of self-identity.
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259A counterfactual analysis of causationMind 106 (422): 263-277. 1997.On David Lewis's original analysis of causation, c causes e only if c is linked to e by a chain of distinct events such that each event in the chain (counter-factually) depends on the former one. But this requirement precludes the possibility of late pre-emptive causation, of causation by fragile events, and of indeterministic causation. Lewis proposes three different strategies for accommodating these three kinds of cases, but none of these turn out to be satisfactory. I offer a single analysis…Read more
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141The KK-Principle, Margins for Error, and SafetyErkenntnis 76 (1): 121-136. 2012.This paper considers, and rejects, three strategies aimed at showing that the KK-principle fails even in most favourable circumstances (all emerging from Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits ). The case against the final strategy provides positive grounds for thinking that the principle should hold good in such situations
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Bilkent UniversityRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |