-
516Reducing mind to molecular pathways: Explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience (review)Synthese 151 (3): 411-434. 2006.As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain wor…Read more
-
2Criteria for consciousness in the brain: Methodological implications of recent developments in cognitive neuroscienceConsciousness and Cognition 9 (2). 2000.
-
34Precis of psychoneural reduction: The new waveGrazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1): 249-255. 2001.
-
73Multiple realizability and psychophysical reductionBehavior and Philosophy 20 (1): 47-58. 1992.The argument from multiple realizability is that, because quite diverse physical systems are capable of giving rise to identical psychological phenomena, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states. This influential argument depends upon a theory of reduction that has been defunct in the philosophy of science for at least fifteen years. Better theories are now available
-
130What's Old Is New Again: Kemeny-Oppenheim Reduction at Work in Current Molecular NeurosciencePhilosophia Scientiae 17 (2): 89-113. 2013.We introduce a new model of reduction inspired by Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model [Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956] and argue that this model is operative in a “ruthlessly reductive” part of current neuroscience. Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model was quickly rejected in mid-20th-century philosophy of science and replaced by models developed by Ernest Nagel and Kenneth Schaffner [Nagel 1961], [Schaffner 1967]. We think that Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model was correctly rejected, given what a “theory of reduction” w…Read more
-
191The Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2009.The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ethics) and current neuroscience. Containing chapters written by some of the most prominent philosophers working in this area, and in some cases co-authored with neuroscientists, this volume reflects both the breadth and depth of current work in this exciting field. Topics include the nature of explanation in neuroscience; whether and how cu…Read more
-
58A Brief History of Neuroscience's Actual Influences on Mind-Brain ReductionismIn Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press. pp. 88. 2012.
-
45Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive AccountKluwer Academic Publishers. 2003.Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account is the first book-length treatment of philosophical issues and implications in current cellular and molecular neuroscience. John Bickle articulates a philosophical justification for investigating "lower level" neuroscientific research and describes a set of experimental details that have recently yielded the reduction of memory consolidation to the molecular mechanisms of long-term potentiation (LTP). These empirical details suggest ans…Read more
-
83Marr and ReductionismTopics in Cognitive Science 7 (2): 299-311. 2015.David Marr's three-level method for completely understanding a cognitive system and the importance he attaches to the computational level are so familiar as to scarcely need repeating. Fewer seem to recognize that Marr defends his famous method by criticizing the “reductionistic approach.” This sets up a more interesting relationship between Marr and reductionism than is usually acknowledged. I argue that Marr was correct in his criticism of the reductionists of his time—they were only describin…Read more
-
43Review: W. Teed Rockwell: Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory (review)Mind 117 (466): 508-511. 2008.
-
66Connectionism, reduction, and multiple realizabilityBehavior and Philosophy 23 (2): 29-39. 1995.I sketch a theory of cognitive representation from recent "connectionist" cognitive science. I then argue that (i) this theory is reducible to neuroscientific theories, yet (ii) its kinds are multiply realized at a neurobiological level. This argument demonstrates that multiple realizability alone is no barrier to the reducibility of psychological theories. I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, the most influential argument against psychophysical reductionism, should be abandoned
-
183Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account (review)Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3): 231-238. 2005.This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience …Read more
-
7New wave metascience: Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and StephanGrazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1): 285-293. 2001.
-
64From sensory neuroscience to neurophilosophy: Reflections on llinas and Churchland's mind-brain continuumPhilosophical Psychology 10 (4): 523-530. 1997.Philosophers and psychologists seeking an accessible introduction to current neuroscience will find much value in this volume. Befitting the neuroscientific focus on sensory processes, many essays address explicitly the binding problem. Theoretical and experimental work pertaining to the “temporal synchronicity” solution is prominent. But there are also some surprising implications for current philosophical concerns, such as the intemalism/extemalism debate about representational content, episte…Read more
-
211The philosophy of neuroscienceStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2006.Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly “local.” Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of …Read more
-
96A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 262-264. 2007.
-
109Psychoneural Reduction: The New WaveBradford. 1998.One of the central problems in the philosophy of psychology is an updated version of the old mind-body problem: how levels of theories in the behavioral and brain sciences relate to one another. Many contemporary philosophers of mind believe that cognitive-psychological theories are not reducible to neurological theories. However, this antireductionism has not spawned a revival of dualism. Instead, most nonreductive physicalists prefer the idea of a one-way dependence of the mental on the physic…Read more
-
Mississippi State UniversityDepartment of Philosophy & Religion
Neurobiology and Anatomical Sciences, University of Mississippi Medical CenterProfessor
University of California, Irvine
PhD, 1989
Starkville, Mississippi, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |