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22On Hamilton’s Rule and Inclusive Fitness Theory with Nonadditive PayoffsPhilosophy of Science 83 (5): 873-883. 2016.Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness is a widely used framework for studying the evolution of social behavior, but controversy surrounds its status. Hamilton originally derived his famous rb > c rule for the spread of a social gene by assuming additivity of costs and benefits. However, it has recently been argued that the additivity assumption can be dispensed with, so long as the −c and b terms are suitably defined, as partial regression coefficients. I argue that this way of generalizing Ham…Read more
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1Proceedings of the Second Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association. (edited book)Springer. 2012.
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19X *—Does Hume’s Argument Against Induction Rest on a Quantifier-Shift Fallacy?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1): 237-255. 2005.It is widely agreed that Hume’s description of human inductive reasoning is inadequate. But many philosophers think that this inadequacy in no way affects the force of Hume’s argument for the unjustifiability of inductive reasoning. I argue that this constellation of opinions contains a serious tension, given that Hume was not merely pointing out that induction is fallible. I then explore a recent diagnosis of where Hume’s sceptical argument goes wrong, due to Elliott Sober. Sober argues that Hu…Read more
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15How to be a Selective QuineanDialectica 56 (1): 37-47. 2002.This paper examines whether one can accept Quine's critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction while rejecting his indeterminacy of translation thesis. I argue that this is possible, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Holding that linguistic synonymy is a well‐defined relation, and that translation is thus a determinate matter, does not commit one to the existence of an analytic‐synthetic distinction capable of playing the explanatory role that the traditional distinction was suppos…Read more
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327Van Fraassen's Critique Of Inference To The Best ExplanationStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (4): 691-710. 2000.
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2Biological AltruismStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Plato. Stanford. Edu/Entries/Altruism-Biological. forthcoming.
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115Individuals, groups, fitness and utility: Multi-level selection meets social choice theoryBiology and Philosophy 24 (5): 561-584. 2009.In models of multi-level selection, the property of Darwinian fitness is attributed to entities at more than one level of the biological hierarchy, e.g. individuals and groups. However, the relation between individual and group fitness is a controversial matter. Theorists disagree about whether group fitness should always, or ever, be defined as total (or average) individual fitness. This paper tries to shed light on the issue by drawing on work in social choice theory, and pursuing an analogy b…Read more
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111The Evolution of Bayesian UpdatingPhilosophy of Science 80 (5): 745-757. 2013.An evolutionary basis for Bayesian rationality is suggested, by considering how natural selection would operate on an organism’s ‘policy’ for choosing an action depending on an environmental signal. It is shown that the evolutionarily optimal policy, as judged by the criterion of maximal expected reproductive output, is the policy that, for each signal, picks an action that maximizes conditional expected output given that signal. This suggests a possible route by which Bayes-rational creatures m…Read more
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67Scepticism and its sourcesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3). 2003.A number of recent philosophers, including Michael Williams, Barry Stroud and Donald Davidson, have argued that scepticism about the external world stems from the foundationalist assumption that sensory experience supplies the data for our beliefs about the world. In order to assess this thesis, I offer abrief characterisation of the logical form of sceptical arguments. I suggest that sceptical arguments rely on the idea that many of our beliefs about the world are ‘underdetermined’ by the evide…Read more
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339Experiment, observation and the confirmation of lawsAnalysis 71 (2): 222-232. 2011.It is customary to distinguish experimental from purely observational sciences. The former include physics and molecular biology, the latter astronomy and palaeontology. Experiments involve actively intervening in the course of nature, as opposed to observing events that would have happened anyway. When a molecular biologist inserts viral DNA into a bacterium in his laboratory, this is an experiment; but when an astronomer points his telescope at the heavens, this is an observation. Without the …Read more
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17Evolution and Directionality: Lessons from Fisher's Fundamental TheoremIn Mauricio Suárez, Mauro Dorato & Miklós Rédei (eds.), EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences · Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, Springer. pp. 187--196. 2009.
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163On the interpretation of decision theoryEconomics and Philosophy 32 (3): 409-433. 2016.:This paper explores the contrast between mentalistic and behaviouristic interpretations of decision theory. The former regards credences and utilities as psychologically real, while the latter regards them as mere representations of an agent's preferences. Philosophers typically adopt the former interpretation, economists the latter. It is argued that the mentalistic interpretation is preferable if our aim is to use decision theory for descriptive purposes, but if our aim is normative then the …Read more
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78Biological ontology and hierarchical organization: a defence of rank freedomIn Brett Calcott & Kim Sterelny (eds.), The Major Transitions in Evolution Revisited, Mit Press. pp. 53--64. 2011.This chapter presents a displacement of the organism as a privileged level of analysis in evolutionary biology. It is concerned with the ontology of biology systems, with particular reference to hierarchical organization. It argues that the concept of a rank-free hierarchy can be transposed to the major transitions hierarchy, with interesting consequences. This chapter shows that the idea of rank freedom makes good sense of a number of facets of the recent discussion of evolutionary transitions …Read more
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126Multilevel Selection and the Major Transitions in EvolutionPhilosophy of Science 72 (5): 1013-1025. 2005.A number of recent biologists have used multi-level selection theory to help explain the major transitions in evolution. I argue that in doing so, they have shifted from a ‘synchronic’ to a ‘diachronic’ formulation of the levels of selection question. The implications of this shift in perspective are explored, in relation to an ambiguity in the meaning of multi-level selection. Though the ambiguity is well-known, it has never before been discussed in the context of the major transitions.
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243The underdetermination of theory by data and the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledgeInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3). 2000.Advocates of the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge have argued that, because scientific theories are "underdetermined" by data, sociological factors must be invoked to explain why scientists believe the theories they do. I examine this argument, and the responses to it by J.R. Brown (1989) and L. Laudan (1996). I distinguish between a number of different versions of the underdetermination thesis, some trivial, some substantive. I show that Brown's and Laudan's attempts to refute t…Read more
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134Holism about meaning and about evidence: In defence of W. V. Quine (review)Erkenntnis 52 (1): 39-61. 2000.Holistic claims about evidence are a commonplace inthe philosophy of science; holistic claims aboutmeaning are a commonplace in the philosophy oflanguage. W. V. Quine has advocated both types ofholism, and argued for an intimate link between thetwo. Semantic holism may be inferred from theconjunction of confirmation holism andverificationism, he maintains. But in their recentbook Holism: a Shopper's Guide, Jerry Fodor andErnest Lepore (1992) claim that this inference isfallacious. In what follow…Read more
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84The “averaging fallacy” and the levels of selectionBiology and Philosophy 19 (2): 167-184. 2004.This paper compares two well-known arguments in the units of selection literature, one due to , the other due to . Both arguments concern the legitimacy of averaging fitness values across contexts and making inferences about the level of selection on that basis. The first three sections of the paper shows that the two arguments are incompatible if taken at face value, their apparent similarity notwithstanding. If we accept Sober and Lewontin's criterion for when averaging genic fitnesses across …Read more
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24Review of William F. Harms, Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (12). 2005.
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416Philosophy of science: a very short introductionOxford University Press. 2002.What is science? Is there a real difference between science and myth? Is science objective? Can science explain everything? This Very Short Introduction provides a concise overview of the main themes of contemporary philosophy of science. Beginning with a short history of science to set the scene, Samir Okasha goes on to investigate the nature of scientific reasoning, scientific explanation, revolutions in science, and theories such as realism and anti-realism. He also looks at philosophical iss…Read more
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143What Does Goodman's 'Grue' Problem Really Show?Philosophical Papers 36 (3): 483-502. 2007.No abstract
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387Darwinian metaphysics: Species and the question of essentialismSynthese 131 (2): 191-213. 2002.Biologists and philosophers of biology typically regard essentialism about speciesas incompatible with modern Darwinian theory. Analytic metaphysicians such asKripke, Putnam and Wiggins, on the other hand, believe that their essentialist thesesare applicable to biological kinds. I explore this tension. I show that standard anti-essentialist considerations only show that species do not have intrinsic essential properties. I argue that while Putnam and Kripke do make assumptions that contradict re…Read more
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100On Arrow’s Theorem and Scientific Rationality: Reply to Morreau and StegengaMind 124 (493): 279-294. 2015.In a recent article I compared the problem of theory choice, in which scientists must choose between competing theories, with the problem of social choice, in which society must choose between competing social alternatives. I argued that the formal machinery of social choice theory can be used to shed light on the problem of theory choice in science, an argument that has been criticized by Michael Morreau and Jacob Stegenga. This article replies to Morreau’s and Stegenga’s criticisms
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265What did Hume really show about induction?Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204): 307-327. 2001.Many philosophers agree that Hume was not simply objecting to inductive inferences on the grounds of their logical invalidity and that his description of our inductive behaviour was inadequate, but none the less regard his argument against induction as irrefutable. I argue that this constellation of opinions contains a serious tension. In the light of the tension, I re-examine Hume’s actual sceptical argument and show that the argument as it stands is valid but unsound. I argue that it can only …Read more
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241Altruism, group selection and correlated interactionBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4): 703-725. 2005.Group selection is one acknowledged mechanism for the evolution of altruism. It is well known that for altruism to spread by natural selection, interactions must be correlated; that is, altruists must tend to associate with one another. But does group selection itself require correlated interactions? Two possible arguments for answering this question affirmatively are explored. The first is a bad argument, for it rests on a product/process confusion. The second is a more subtle argument, whose v…Read more
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121Laudan and Leplin on empirical equivalenceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2): 251-256. 1997.In this paper, I explore Larry Laudan's and Jarrett Leplin's recent claim that empirically equivalent theories may be differentially confirmed. I show that their attempt to prise apart empirical equivalence and epistemic parity commits them to two principles of confirmation that Hempel demonstrated to be incompatible.
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69The levels of selection debate: Philosophical issuesPhilosophy Compass 1 (1). 2006.For a number of years, the debate in evolutionary biology over the ’levels of selection’ has attracted intense interest from philosophers of science. The main question concerns the level of the biological hierarchy at which natural selection occurs. Does selection act on organisms, genes, groups, colonies, demes, species, or some combination of these? According to traditional Darwinian theory the answer is the organism -- it is the differential survival and reproduction of individual organisms t…Read more
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8Scepticism and its SourcesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3): 610-632. 2003.A number of recent philosophers, including Michael Williams, Barry Stroud and Donald Davidson, have argued that scepticism about the external world stems from the founda‐tionalist assumption that sensory experience supplies the data for our beliefs about the world. In order to assess this thesis, I offer a brief characterisation of the logical form of sceptical arguments. I suggest that sceptical arguments rely on the idea that many of our beliefs about the world are‘underdetermined’by the evide…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Biology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Social Science |
Philosophy of Probability |