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241Altruism, group selection and correlated interactionBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4): 703-725. 2005.Group selection is one acknowledged mechanism for the evolution of altruism. It is well known that for altruism to spread by natural selection, interactions must be correlated; that is, altruists must tend to associate with one another. But does group selection itself require correlated interactions? Two possible arguments for answering this question affirmatively are explored. The first is a bad argument, for it rests on a product/process confusion. The second is a more subtle argument, whose v…Read more
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100On Arrow’s Theorem and Scientific Rationality: Reply to Morreau and StegengaMind 124 (493): 279-294. 2015.In a recent article I compared the problem of theory choice, in which scientists must choose between competing theories, with the problem of social choice, in which society must choose between competing social alternatives. I argued that the formal machinery of social choice theory can be used to shed light on the problem of theory choice in science, an argument that has been criticized by Michael Morreau and Jacob Stegenga. This article replies to Morreau’s and Stegenga’s criticisms
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265What did Hume really show about induction?Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204): 307-327. 2001.Many philosophers agree that Hume was not simply objecting to inductive inferences on the grounds of their logical invalidity and that his description of our inductive behaviour was inadequate, but none the less regard his argument against induction as irrefutable. I argue that this constellation of opinions contains a serious tension. In the light of the tension, I re-examine Hume’s actual sceptical argument and show that the argument as it stands is valid but unsound. I argue that it can only …Read more
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121Laudan and Leplin on empirical equivalenceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2): 251-256. 1997.In this paper, I explore Larry Laudan's and Jarrett Leplin's recent claim that empirically equivalent theories may be differentially confirmed. I show that their attempt to prise apart empirical equivalence and epistemic parity commits them to two principles of confirmation that Hempel demonstrated to be incompatible.
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69The levels of selection debate: Philosophical issuesPhilosophy Compass 1 (1). 2006.For a number of years, the debate in evolutionary biology over the ’levels of selection’ has attracted intense interest from philosophers of science. The main question concerns the level of the biological hierarchy at which natural selection occurs. Does selection act on organisms, genes, groups, colonies, demes, species, or some combination of these? According to traditional Darwinian theory the answer is the organism -- it is the differential survival and reproduction of individual organisms t…Read more
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109Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection--A Philosophical AnalysisBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3): 319-351. 2008.This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the ongoing controversy surrounding R.A. Fisher's famous fundamental theorem of natural selection. The difference between the traditional and modern interpretations of the theorem is explained. I argue that proponents of the modern interpretation have captured Fisher's intended meaning correctly and shown that the theorem is mathematically correct, pace the traditional consensus. However, whether the theorem has any real biological significan…Read more
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8Scepticism and its SourcesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3): 610-632. 2003.A number of recent philosophers, including Michael Williams, Barry Stroud and Donald Davidson, have argued that scepticism about the external world stems from the founda‐tionalist assumption that sensory experience supplies the data for our beliefs about the world. In order to assess this thesis, I offer a brief characterisation of the logical form of sceptical arguments. I suggest that sceptical arguments rely on the idea that many of our beliefs about the world are‘underdetermined’by the evide…Read more
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11Evolution and Rationality: Decisions, Co-Operation and Strategic Behaviour (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2012.This volume explores from multiple perspectives the subtle and interesting relationship between the theory of rational choice and Darwinian evolution. In rational choice theory, agents are assumed to make choices that maximize their utility; in evolution, natural selection 'chooses' between phenotypes according to the criterion of fitness maximization. So there is a parallel between utility in rational choice theory and fitness in Darwinian theory. This conceptual link between fitness and utilit…Read more
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22Re-reading: Frank Jackson, 'Grue', Journal of Philosophy 5 (1975)Philosophical Papers 36 (3). 2007.
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2Causation in BiologyIn Helen Beebee, Peter Menzies & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press. pp. 707--725. 2009.
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41“Which processes are selection processes?”Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3): 548-549. 2001.I argue that population-level selection does not necessarily have to be invoked to explain the polymorphism at the MHC locus. I argue that the authors' attempt to model operant conditioning in Darwinian terms faces a serious problem. Depending on how many operant responses we take to comprise a sequence, different conclusions about whether or not evolution is occurring in an operant lineage will be reached.
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87Multi-level selection, covariance and contextual analysisBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3): 481-504. 2004.Two alternative statistical approaches to modelling multi-level selection in nature, both found in the contemporary biological literature, are contrasted. The simple covariance approach partitions the total selection differential on a phenotypic character into within-group and between-group components, and identifies the change due to group selection with the latter. The contextual approach partitions the total selection differential into different components, using multivariate regression analy…Read more
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179Underdetermination, holism and the theory/data distinctionPhilosophical Quarterly 52 (208): 303-319. 2002.I examine the argument that scientific theories are typically 'underdetermined' by the data, an argument which has often been used to combat scientific realism. I deal with two objections to the underdetermination argument: (i) that the argument conflicts with the holistic nature of confirmation, and (ii) that the argument rests on an untenable theory/data dualism. I discuss possible responses to both objections, and argue that in both cases the proponent of underdetermination can respond in way…Read more
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36How to be a selective QuineanDialectica 56 (1). 2002.This paper examines whether one can accept Quine's critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction while rejecting his indeterminacy of translation thesis. I argue that this is possible, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Holding that linguistic synonymy is a well‐defined relation, and that translation is thus a determinate matter, does not commit one to the existence of an analytic‐synthetic distinction capable of playing the explanatory role that the traditional distinction was suppos…Read more
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64The concept of group heritabilityBiology and Philosophy 18 (3): 445-461. 2003.This paper investigates the role of the concept of group heritability in group selection theory, in relation to the well-known distinction between type 1 and type 2 group selection (GS1 and GS2). I argue that group heritability is required for the operation of GS1 but not GS2, despite what a number of authors have claimed. I offer a numerical example of the evolution of altruism in a multi-group population which demonstrates that a group heritability coefficient of zero is perfectly compatible w…Read more
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38Emergent group traits, reproduction, and levels of selectionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3): 268-269. 2014.
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89Replies to my criticsBiology and Philosophy 25 (3): 425-431. 2010.This paper contains replies to the reviews of my book by Steven Downes, Massimo Pigliucci and Deborah Shelton & Rick Michod.
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152Modeling in biology and economicsBiology and Philosophy 26 (5): 613-615. 2011.Much of biological and economic theorizing takes place by modeling, the indirect study of real-world phenomena by the construction and examination of models. Books and articles about biological and economic theory are often books and articles about models, many of which are highly idealized and chosen for their explanatory power and analytical convenience rather than for their fit with known data sets. Philosophers of science have recognized these facts and have developed literatures about the n…Read more
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64Does the concept of “clade selection” make sense?Philosophy of Science 70 (4): 739-751. 2003.The idea that clades might be units of selection, defended by a number of biologists and philosophers of biology, is critically examined. I argue that only entities which reproduce, i.e. leave offspring, can be units of selection, and that a necessary condition of reproduction is that the offspring entity be able, in principle, to outlive its parental entity. Given that clades are monophlyetic by definition, it follows that clades do not reproduce, so it makes no sense to talk about a clade's fi…Read more
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71Philosophical theories of probability (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1): 151-156. 2002.
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222Bayesianism and the Traditional Problem of InductionCroatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2): 181-194. 2005.Many philosophers argue that Bayesian epistemology cannot help us with the traditional Humean problem of induction. I argue that this view is partially but not wholly correct. It is true that Bayesianism does not solve Hume’s problem, in the way that the classical and logical theories of probability aimed to do. However I argue that in one important respect, Hume’s sceptical challenge cannot simply be transposed to a probabilistic context, where beliefs come in degrees, rather than being a yes/n…Read more
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90Optimal Choice in the Face of Risk: Decision Theory Meets EvolutionPhilosophy of Science 78 (1): 83-104. 2011.The problem of how to make optimal choices in the face of risk arises in both economics/decision theory and also evolutionary biology; in the former, ‘optimal’ means utility maximizing, while in the latter it means fitness maximizing. This article explores the links, thematic and formal, between the economic and evolutionary theories of optimal choice in risky situations, with particular reference to the relationship between utility and fitness. It is argued that the link is strongest between ev…Read more
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63The origins of human cooperation: Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis: A cooperative species. Princeton University Press, 2011, ISBN: 978-0-691-15125-0Biology and Philosophy 28 (5): 873-878. 2013.Bowles and Gintis argue that recent work in behavioural economics shows that humans have other-regarding preferences, i.e., are not purely self-interested. They seek to explain how these preferences may have evolved using a multi-level version of gene-culture coevolutionary theory. In this review essay I critically examine their main arguments
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149Fodor on cognition, modularity, and adaptationismPhilosophy of Science 70 (1): 68-88. 2003.This paper critically examines Jerry Fodor's latest attacks on evolutionary psychology. Contra Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Fodor argues (i) there is no reason to think that human cognition is a Darwinian adaptation in the first place, and (ii) there is no valid inference from adaptationism about the mind to massive modularity. However, Fodor maintains (iii) that there is a valid inference in the converse direction, from modularity to adaptationism, but (iv) that the language module is an excep…Read more
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161Evolution and the levels of selectionOxford University Press. 2006.Does natural selection act primarily on individual organisms, on groups, on genes, or on whole species? The question of levels of selection - on which biologists and philosophers have long disagreed - is central to evolutionary theory and to the philosophy of biology. Samir Okasha's comprehensive analysis gives a clear account of the philosophical issues at stake in the current debate.
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83Review. Genetics and reductionism. S SarkarBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1): 181-185. 2000.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Biology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Social Science |
Philosophy of Probability |