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Bruno Da Re

Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
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  •  1278
    Truth without standard models: some conceptual problems reloaded
    with Eduardo Barrio
    Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (1): 122-139. 2017.
    A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical the…Read more
    Logical Semantics and Logical Truth
  •  1403
    Contraction, Infinitary Quantifiers, and Omega Paradoxes
    with Lucas Rosenblatt
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4): 611-629. 2018.
    Our main goal is to investigate whether the infinitary rules for the quantifiers endorsed by Elia Zardini in a recent paper are plausible. First, we will argue that they are problematic in several ways, especially due to their infinitary features. Secondly, we will show that even if these worries are somehow dealt with, there is another serious issue with them. They produce a truth-theoretic paradox that does not involve the structural rules of contraction.
    ParadoxesQuantifiers