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44First-person authority and beliefs as representationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 67-69. 1993.
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18Causing ActionsOxford University Press. 2000.Paul Pietroski presents an original philosophical theory of actions and their mental causes. We often act for reasons: we deliberate and choose among options, based on our beliefs and desires. However, bodily motions always have biochemical causes, so it can seem that thinking and acting are biochemical processes. Pietroski argues that thoughts and deeds are in fact distinct from, though dependent on, underlying biochemical processes within persons.
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Does every sentence like this exhibit a scope ambiguityIn Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and Meaning: Essays at the Interface, Deutsche Bibliothek Der Wissenschaften. pp. 43--72. 2002.
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5Meaning before truthIn Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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458 Innate ideasIn James A. McGilvray (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky, Cambridge University Press. pp. 164. 2005.
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413When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from VacuityBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1): 81-110. 1995.A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws …Read more
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107Actions, adjuncts, and agencyMind 107 (425): 73-111. 1998.The event analysis of action sentences seems to be at odds with plausible (Davidsonian) views about how to count actions. If Booth pulled a certain trigger, and thereby shot Lincoln, there is good reason for identifying Booths' action of pulling the trigger with his action of shooting Lincoln; but given truth conditions of certain sentences involving adjuncts, the event analysis requires that the pulling and the shooting be distinct events. So I propose that event sortals like 'shooting' and 'pu…Read more
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Specifying senses innocently1In Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics, Maribor. pp. 318. 1997.
New Brunswick, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |
Cognitive Sciences |
Areas of Interest
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |