Rutger Claassen

Should media communication be left to the market, or rather (partly) removed from the market? This question is discussed by reconstructing an often-found ‘standard argument’ in the literature on the subject. This standard argument states that some form of market-independent media provision is required since markets will fail to deliver a specific kind of high-quality content conducive to the democratic process. This paper argues that the standard argument is defective in several respects. By doing so, it reevaluates the way we think about the contribution of the media towards democracy and the role that the market is to play in this respect. First, the paper argues that the standard argument's normative premise should not be couched in a welfarist theory but in terms of the capabilities that the media should strive to realise. Second, it sets the normative expectations of the media's contribution towards the public sphere and democracy at too high a level. Third, the standard argument's diagnosis of the market's failure incorrectly assumes that the market can never generate the demand for high-quality content. An alternative, more circumscribed claim about the market's failure is presented, resting on two more contingent types of demand failure.

This paper discusses philosophical arguments for presenting scarcity and/or abundance as characteristic of the human condition. It criticizes those positions which presenthuman action as characterized by either 'universal scarcity' or 'universal abundance'. Universal scarcity is associated with instrumental activity and argues that the possibility of abundance supposes a Utopia of intrinsic activity which is inconceivable. Universal abundance is defended by Georges Bataille, who conceives of human life as the necessary expenditure of an original abundance. Both positions are criticized: even on their own terms, abundance reappears in the worldview of universal scarcity and vice versa. Finally, a perspective is presented where scarcity and abundance are complementary, on three different levels. On the level of the general structure of action, scarcity is implied by the fundamental ideological structure of action while abundance is implied by the fact that our actions are not dictated by (strict) necessity. At the level of social practices in general and the more specific level of the modern economic practices of work and consumption, scarcity arises wherever action is best interpreted as the satisfaction of socially formulated needs. Abundance here arises in so far as we can free ourselves of these social needs, either by subjecting them to criticism and reformulation,or by revising our membership of social practices.

This paper discusses the question whether care work for dependent persons (children, the elderly, and disabled persons) may be entrusted to the market; that is, whether and to what extent there is a normative justification for the “commodification of care.” It first proposes a capability theory for care that raises two relevant demands: a basic capability for receiving care and a capability for giving care. Next it discusses and rejects two objections that aim to show that market-based care undermines the caring motives essential to care, one of them because of its reliance on contracts and the other because of the corrupting influence of payment on motivation. If market care is in principle legitimate, the commodification question transforms into one about the appropriate combinations of market and non-market care. This question can be answered only by adding an additional complication: care is to be balanced against other activities, most notably work for the labor market. This brings in the problem of gender inequality, since paid work has been traditionally distributed to men and caring activities to women. I show how the capability theory of caring presented in this paper can help resolve the dispute between competing models for balancing work and caring.

A capability approach prescribes paternalist government actions to the extent that it requires the promotion of specific functionings, instead of the corresponding capabilities. Capability theorists have argued that their theories do not have much of these paternalist implications, since promoting capabilities will be the rule, promoting functionings the exception. This paper critically surveys that claim. From a close investigation of Nussbaum's statements about these exceptions, it derives a framework of five categories of functionings promotion that are more or less unavoidable in a capability theory. It argues that some of these categories may have an expansionary dynamic; they may give rise to widespread functionings promotion, which would defeat the capabilitarian promise that paternalist interventions will be exceptions to the rule of a focus on capabilities. Finally, the paper discusses three further theoretical issues that will be decisive in holding this paternalist tendency in check: how high one sets threshold levels of capability protection, how lengthy one's list of basic capabilities is, and how one deals with individual responsibility for choices resulting in a loss of one's capabilities.