Mohammad Bagher Ghomi

What this essay is to discuss is Plato''s theory of explanation in Phaedo. In this dialogue, we observe that Socrates criticizes both the natural scientists’ explanations and Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind since he thinks they could not explain all things, firstly, in a unitary and, secondary, in a real way. Thence, we are to call what Plato is seeking as his ideal explanation in Phaedo “One Real Explanation”. He talks at least about three kinds of explanation, two of which, the confused and foolish way of explanation by Forms and the explanation by Forms appealing to essence, are just "second best" and lower degrees of explanation. His ideal explanation is an explanation that can explain all things by one thing and in a real way. Though he cannot show, at least in Phaedo, how this One Real Explanation can work, we can see Plato completing his plan by the Form of the Good in Republic.

A. Knowledge and universal The points about the relationship between knowledge and universal in Aristotle’s philosophy can be inferred as such: 1. Knowledge of a universal includes knowledge of all its subordinates (τὰ ὑποκείμενα) in a sense. (Met., A, 982a21-23) The converse of this is not true because ‘highest universals (τὰ πρῶτα) and causes are not known by things subordinate to them (τῶν ὑποκειμένων). (Met., A, 982b2-4) 2. Knowledge is bound up severely with universality: ‘For all things that we know, we know in so far as they have some unity and identity, and in so far as some attribute belongs to them universally.’ (Met., B, 999a28-29) Aristotle believes that ‘the knowledge of anything is universal.’ (Met, B, 1003a13-15) It is for this reason that Aristotle argues that ‘if there is to be knowledge of principles there must be other principles prior to them, which are universally predicated of them.’ (Met, B, 1003a15-17) 3. About the relationship between the knowledge of a universal and the knowledge of its subordinate particulars we have the following: a) Knowledge of universal and particular are alongside each other: ‘It never happens that a man starts with a foreknowledge of the particular, but along with the process of being led to see the general principle he receives a knowledge of the particulars, by an act (as it were) of recognition.’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a22-26) b) ‘By a knowledge of the universal then we see the particulars.’ Thus, while we have the knowledge of the universal, we might ‘make a mistake in apprehending the particulars.’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a27-31) ‘It is when it meets with the particular object that it knows in a manner the particular through its knowledge of the universal.’ (Phy., Z, 3) c) ‘Knowing the universal without knowing the individual included in this, will often fail to cure.’ (Met., A, 981a21-23) 4. Most exact sciences are those dealing with highest genera. (τῶν πρώτων) (Met., A, 982a25-26) Also, those involving fewer universals are more exact than those involving additional ones. (Met., A, 982a26-28) 5. The role of universals totally differs based on the method by which we are to acquire knowledge. If we are to acquire the knowledge of a thing by examining its parts, its principles would not be its genera. (Met., B, 998a32-b4) ‘But in so far as we know each thing by its definition, and the genera are the principles of definition, the genera must also be the principles of definable things.’ (Met., B, 998b4-6) Those two ways are inconsistent and ‘it is not possible to describe the principles in both ways because the formula of the substance is one but definition by genera will be different from that which states the constituent parts of a thing.’ (Met., B, 998b11-14) 6. Aristotle projects an aporia about the role of universals in knowledge: ‘Even if the genera are in the highest degree principles, should one regard the first of the genera as principle, or those which are predicated directly of the individual?’ (Met., B, 998b14-16) On the other hand, ‘if the universal is always more of a principle, evidently the uppermost of the genera (τὰ ἀνωτάτων τῶν γενῶν) are the principles.’ (Met., B, 998b17-19) But the problem is that there will be as many principles of things as there are primary genera. (Met., B, 998b19-21) But if, on the other hand, principles are not universal, they cannot be knowable because the knowledge of anything is universal. (Met., B, 1003a13-15) 7. ‘We know no sensible thing, once it has passed beyond the range of our senses, … except by means of the universal and the possession of the knowledge which is proper to the particular, but without the actual exercise of that knowledge.’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a39-b3) Therefore, knowledge of a particular, even when we do not sense it at the moment, is possible only through universal and, as Aristotle notes, ‘this is the relation of knowledge of the universal to knowledge of the particular.’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a38-39) 8. Those that are more universal (τὰ μάλιςτα καθόλου) are hardest to know because they are furthest from the senses. (Met., Α, 982a23-25) 9. Since in every demonstration, ‘besides axioms and conclusion, there is a third element, namely ‘the subject-genus (τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμμενον) whose attributes, i.e. essential properties, are revealed by the demonstration,’ it is not possible to pass from one genus to another in demonstration. Thus, we cannot e.g. prove geometrical truths by arithmetic. (PsA., A, 7, 75a38-b3) 10. Aristotle regards ‘knowledge of the universal’ as only one sense among three senses of knowledge. The other two senses are i) to have knowledge proper to the matter in hand and ii) to exercise such knowledge. (PrA., B, 67b3-11) B. Knowledge and syllogism The following points are asserted by Aristotle about the relation of knowledge and syllogism: 1. Knowing premisses does not necessarily lead to the knowledge of conclusion. What makes the conclusion necessary is the consideration of the propositions together: ‘Nothing prevents a man who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B, and that B again belongs to C, thinking that A does not belong to C … for he does not know that A belongs to C, unless he considers the two propositions together,’ (PrA., B, 21, 67a31-38) 2. Aristotle asserts that when a syllogism is knowledge-giver (ἐπιστημονικόν), it is a demonstration and defines knowledge-giver as that ‘having it as being is the same as knowing it (ἐπιστημονικὸν δὲ λέγω καθ᾽ ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα).’ (PsA., A, 2, 71b17-19) 3. Albeit he accepts the fact that there may be another manner of knowing, Aristotle is inclined to base knowledge on demonstration. (PsA., A, 2, 71b16-17) 4. What generates the reasoned knowledge of the conclusion is the necessary connection of the middle with both of the extremes: ‘If, then, we suppose a syllogism in which, though A necessarily inheres in C, yet B, the middle term of the demonstration, is not necessarily connected with A and C, then the man who argues thus has no reasoned knowledge of the conclusion, since this conclusion does not owe its necessity to the middle term: for though the conclusion is necessary, the mediating link is a contingent fact.’ (PsA., A, 6, 74b) 5. Aristotle distinguishes between two different kinds of knowledge acquired out of syllogism: knowledge of the fact (τὸ δ᾽ ὃτι ἐπίστασθαι) versus knowledge of the reasoned fact (τὸ διότι ἐπίστασθαι). He makes the same distinction between opinion of the fact and opinion of the reasoned fact. Their main difference is that the latter can only be obtained through immediate premises. (PsA., A, 33, 89a20-23) Aristotle does not fully explain the difference. However, it seems there are two conditions in which we have only a knowledge of the fact and not that of the reasoned fact: a) Having the proximate or strict cause is a necessary condition of knowledge of reasoned fact. Thus, when the proximate cause is not contained, that is, when the premises of the syllogism are not immediate, we have only knowledge of the fact. (PsA., A, 13, 78a23-26) Also, when the middle falls outside the extremes, the strict cause is not given and the demonstration is only of the fact and not of the reasoned fact. ‘Such cases are like far-fetched explanations which precisely consist in making the cause too remote.’ (PsA, A, 13, 78b11-30) b) When instead of the cause, the better known of the two reciprocals is taken as the middle. (PsA., A, 13, 78a26-30) Aristotle asserts that ‘the syllogism of the reasoned fact is either exclusively or generally speaking and in most cases’ in the first figure (PsA., A, 14, 79a17-20) and that the ‘grasp of a reasoned conclusion is the primary condition of knowledge.’ (PsA., A, 14, 79a20-21) 6. The most scientific figure and ‘the primary condition of knowledge’ (κυριώτατον τοῦ ἐπιστασθαι) (PsA., Α, 14, 79a31-32) is the first figure. Aristotle provides us two reasons for this (PsA., A, 14, 79a17-28): a) ‘The syllogism of the reasoned fact is either exclusively or generally speaking and in most cases’ in the first figure (PsA., A, 14, 79a17-20) b) It is the only figure which enables us to pursue knowledge of the essence of a thing. The reason is that the knowledge of a thing’s essence must be both affirmative and universal. The second figure has no affirmative conclusion possible and the third figure no universal conclusion. 7. The middle of a syllogism is the object of every inquiry. (PsA., B, 3, 90a35) This is obvious in cases in which the middle is sensible because the middle is what we have not perceived it. (PsA., B, 2, 90a24-30) 8. Neither demonstration nor definition provides us the knowledge of essence. (PsA., B, 7, 92b38-) 9. A necessary conclusion and, thus, a demonstrative knowledge, can be reached in a demonstration in which the relations of the extremes with the middle be a necessary relation. (PsA., A, 6, 75a12-15) 10. Though a syllogism can be dependent on another, syllogisms must eventually be based on premises not concluded out of a syllogism. Thus, we must have some knowledge that we have not acquired through syllogism. The scientific knowledge then that is acquired in syllogism must be dependent on a knowledge not scientifically provided. However, this knowledge cannot be less accurate than scientific knowledge because otherwise our knowledge could not be scientific: ‘There will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premisses, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premisses- a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basis premiss, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact.’ (PsA., B, 19, 100b8-17) C. Knowledge and necessity It is an essential difference between knowledge and opinion for Aristotle that while the truth grasped by the latter can be other than it is, that of the former cannot. (PsA., A, 33, 89a16-20) ‘The proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.’ (PsA., A, 2, 71b15-16) A necessary conclusion and, thus, a demonstrative knowledge, can be reached in a demonstration in which the relations of the extremes with the middle be a necessary relation. (PsA., A, 6, 75a12-15) Even a necessary conclusion, if it does not owe its necessity to the middle term, would not provide reasoned knowledge. (PsA., A, 74b) D. Pre-existent knowledge ‘All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge.’ Aristotle proves this by enumerating all the kinds of such instructions: mathematical sciences, all other speculative sciences, the two forms of dialectical reasoning, i.e. syllogism (in its premisses) and induction (exhibiting the universal as implicit in the clearly known particular) and even rhetorical arguments including example (which is a kind of induction) and enthymeme (which is a kind of syllogism). (PsA., A, 1, 71a1-11) Moreover, besides previous knowledge, recognition of truth may contain also ‘knowledge acquired simultaneously’ with that recognition. Thus, while we already have virtually known a particular actually falling under the universal, we know it only in a manner but do not know it in another manner. (PsA., A, 1, 71a17-26) The possibility of knowing something in a manner and at the same time not knowing it in another manner is Aristotle’s alternative for Plato’s theory of recollection as a solution of Meno’s problem. (cf. PsA, A, 1, 71a26-29) E. Property of knowledge Since ‘we form a property for the sake of knowledge,’ the terms in which the property rendered must be more familiar. So we can conceive the subject of the property more adequately. (To., E, 2, ^129b7-) F. Knowledge: from whole to part ‘What is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for if it is a whole that is best known to sense perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, corresponding many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. ‘round,’ means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. Similarly, a child begins by calling all men ‘father,’ and all women ‘mother,’ but later on distinguishing each of them. (Phy., A, 1) G. Knowledge and element ‘When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained.’ (Phy., A, 1) It is through going from masses to elements, i.e. through analyzing each thing to its elements that we get knowledge: ‘What is plain to us and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. ‘round,’ means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. Similarly, a child begins by calling all men ‘father’ and all women ‘mother,’ but later on distinguishing each of them.’ (Phy., A, 1)

What are to be discussed in this article include two main points: i) some kind of a fixed structure can be found in all the chronologies that have been proposed from the last quarter of 19th century onward; a structure that is called here “standard” chronology, and ii) in spite of the fact that the appearance of this structure owes too much to the stylistic evidences, these evidences themselves do not confirm anything in the structure but the place of the so-called late dialogues. The standard chronology of Plato’s dialogues is inclined to consider Meno and Republic as dialogues that have been composed after so-called Socratic dialogues and before Parmenides and Theaetetus. This chronology also insists that the latter two dialogues must be dated after so-called middle dialogues and before dialogues like Sophist, Timaeus, Philebus and Laws. This papper is to illuminate the fact that except the similarities between the late dialogues and their probable lateness, the place of other dialogues, more importantly among them the so-called middle period dialogues, Theaetetus and Parmenides, cannot be approved by stylistic evidences.

In this article, it's tried to study Aristotle's narrative of pre-Socratics on the base of Aristotle's texts and mainly using metaphysics, physics, genesis and decadence books. It is also tried to show how Aristotle has interpreted all the pre-Socratics in one way and on the base of his own philosophy framework. He interprets pre-Socratic Arche as an element that means comprehensive matter which is nothing itself, but everything is combination of it and even considers that as substance and the other things as accident. He interprets the distinction of Arche and other things on the basis of this contrast in his philosophy. Aristotle, also analyzes pre-Socratics' viewpoint to change on the base of his distinction among change, genesis and corruption. All these cases show that Aristotle has interpreted the pre-Socratics on the basis of his thought, as Aristotelians. On this basis, since Aristotle's thoughts are the first and the most important sources of pre-Socratic philosophy, Aristotle's role should be considered in studies.

Plato Seeking for “One Real Explanation” in Phaedo Abstract: This essay intends to discuss what Plato was seeking as an explanation in Phaedo. In this dialogue, we observe Socrates criticizing both the natural scientists’ explanations and Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind because they could not explain all things, firstly, in a unitary and, secondary, in a real way. Thence, we are to call what Plato is seeking as his ideal explanation in Phaedo “One Real Explanation”. He talks at least about three kinds of explanation, two of which, the confused and foolish way of explanation by Forms and the explanation by Forms appealing to essence, are just "second best" and lower degrees of explanation. His ideal explanation is an explanation that can explain all things by one thing and in a real way. Though he cannot show, at least in Phaedo, how this One Real Explanation can work, we can see Plato completing the theory by the Form of the Good in Republic. Key words: Plato; explanation; cause; good; Form I Having discussed the immortality of human soul in Phaedo, Socrates says that their arguments do not prove the soul to be immortal but only being long-lasting (95c). He pauses 'for a long time, deep in thought' (95e7) to find a way for the soul’s immortality. He knows that it is a crucial problem that requires 'a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction' [ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι] (95e9-96a1). Socrates’ wonderful keen for the wisdom of natural science, he says, was because he thought it splendid to find out the causes of everything, 'why it comes to be, why it perishes, and why it exists' (96a9-10). Socrates is thus searching for i) the explanation of everything and ii) an explanation that tells him about being, generation, and destruction of things. One simply can expect these from those natural scientists based on what they were to present: explaining all things’ being, becoming, generation, and destruction by one or some elements. Their explanations not only were not satisfactory but made him even 'quite blind to those things which he and others thought that [he] clearly knew it before' (96c3-5). But why their explanations made him so? Let have a look at his three kinds of examples of what he had thought he knew before- but became blind to after their explanations: i) Men grow with eating and drinking. ii) A large man is taller than a small one by a head. iii) Ten is more than eight because two is added. All of these examples attempt to explain things through addition; in the first example, as he says, 'food adds flesh to flesh and bones to bones' (96d 1-2). We can see the same in other examples: the addition of a head in the second and of a number in the third. Actually he argues about addition after these examples: I will not even allow myself to say that where one is added to one either the one to which it is added or the one that is added becomes two, or that the one added and the one to which it is added becomes two because of the addition of the one to the other. (96e7-97a1) II Socrates speaks implicitly about two reasons of rejecting such explanations. Their first problem, in my view, is that they are not Real explanations. He wonders because it is obvious for him that coming close to each other cannot be the true cause of two ones’ becoming two: I wonder that when each of them is separated from the other, each of them is one, nor are they then two, but that, when they come near one another, this is the cause of their becoming two, the coming together and being placed closer to one another. (97a2-5) The second problem arises when we use the opposite things as the cause of the same thing: Nor can I any longer be persuaded that when one thing is divided, this division is the cause of its becoming two, for just now the cause of becoming two was the opposite. At that time it was their coming close together and one was added to the other, but now it is because one is taken and separated from the other. (97a5-b3) Corresponding the addition, or growing, to generation, division to destruction and twoness or oneness to being, it will be obvious how these examples are appropriate to Socrates’ expectation from natural scientists, namely the explanation of coming to be, destruction, and being. But they not only failed in giving one explanation for everything, but they did vice versa: they used the opposite explanations for the same thing. Two opposite things are at the extreme points of two-ness or, in other words, there are not two things that are more than two opposites two. If we sum up these two problems of explanation, namely, not being a real explanation and not being one, Socrates’ main problem with what is called 'physical explanation' will be obvious. Calling it a “requirement” of explanation, Politis (2010:70) formulates Socrates’ problem as such: “if same explanandum, then same explanans” or conversely: “if same explanans, then same explanandum”. Socrates’ reliance on traditional explanation, Politis thinks, was lost because he thought that “such explanations do not satisfy certain fundamental requirements of explanation” (ibid: 65). Bostoc’s formulation of the case is nearly the same: “Two opposite causes cannot have the same effect” and “the same causes cannot have opposite effects” (1986: 138). He calls them “two conditions which Socrates thinks any acceptable reasons or causes must satisfy”. (ibid) These are obviously some formulas that can be correctly said about Plato’s requirements or conditions of explanation but reducing the problem to this is misleading. His disappointment with them, I think, is due to the fact that they could not understand the necessity of One Real Explanation for all things. One Real Explanation is an explanation that can explain all the related matters in a unified and real way. Only in such a way we can understand the explanation and follow the argument. This is exactly what Plato has in mind when, in Sophist, gets the visitor to say that those philosophers 'have simply been talking their way through their explanations without paying any attention to whether we were following them or we were left behind' (243a7-b1). What is Socrates’ final decision about their explanation? Does he reject them completely? Does he think that they cannot be explanations at all or accept them as a low-level kind of explanation that, however, has some problems? Politis (2010:112) thinks that physical explanations 'cannot themselves be explanations' in Plato’s view but they can only be 'an element' in the explanation and 'can thus be accommodated within explanations' (ibid: 111). He thinks that Socrates’ disillusionment with them must be understood as resulting not in his throwing them out, but in his settling them to one side, for the sake of first examining what an explanation really is (ibid:112). David Hillel Ruben, on the other hand, thinks that Plato could not think about those explanations even as an element. '[He] did not find them less than fully adequate, and in need of supplementation', he says, 'but rather entirely unacceptable' and Socrates knows that he does not want to follow this alleged method of explanation at all (2004:47). For this last comment he refers to 97b3-7 where we have Socrates saying: I do not any longer persuade myself that I know why a unit or anything else comes to be, or perishes or exits by the old method of investigation, and I do not accept it, but I have a confused method of my own. We have already noted that Plato’s objection to natural scientists’ explanation was that they failed to suggest One Real Explanation. Having been disappointed with all those different incomprehensible explanations, the only thing that could make him hopeful again was One Real Explanation which he heard had been suggested by Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind (νοῦς). It was One explanation because it was saying that “it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything” (ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (97c1-2 cf. DK, Fr.15.8-9, 11-12, 12-14). That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all things can be proved even from what he has been expecting from natural philosophers. The case is, nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In addition to διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν (c4-5) all emphasizing the cause of all things (πάντα) which can clearly prove that one of the reasons which caused Socrates to embrace it delightfully was its claim to provide the cause of all things by One thing. But it was also a Real explanation because it was something specific: Mind. We pointed out that the cause of his dissatisfaction with the explanation of becoming two out of coming together was that it could not be a Real cause. Why Mind, in difference with those unreal causes, can be a Real cause? Because there is not, it seems at least at first, anything in the world more suitable than Mind to be the basis of explanation. The essential relation of knowledge and virtue or good and knowledge might help us understand the specific character of Mind. Trying to solve the problem of teachability of virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable only if it is a kind of knowledge because nothing can be taught to human beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). The dilemma will be, then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since virtue is good, we can change the question to: whether is there anything good separate from knowledge (εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is nothing good which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing but knowledge (d6-8). Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to explain everything by the concept of the Good. This connection between Mind and the Good belongs more to the essential relation they have in Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ own theory because there are almost nothing about such a relation in Anaxagoras. The reason for Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially compatible with Socrates’ idea of the relation between good and knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong willingly' and the theory of virtue as knowledge are evidences of this essential relation. Nobody who knows that something is bad can choose or do it as bad. The reason, when it is reason, that means when it is as it should be, when it is wise or when it knows, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, when Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it sounds to him like this: Good should be regarded as the basis of the explanation of all things. We see him, thus, passing from the former to the latter without any proof. This is done in the second sentence after introducing Mind: I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would arrange all things and put each thing in the way that was Best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ). If one then wished to find the cause of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is the most excellent (ἄριστον) and best (βέλτιστον). The same man must inevitably also know what is worse (χεῖρον), for that is part of the same knowledge. (97c4-d5) This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ Mind to his own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found Anaxagoras theory after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because of its capability for explanation on the basis of good to 'explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better (ἄμεινον), and that it was better (ἄμεινον) to be so' (97e1-3). On this basis, Anaxagoras could explain everything- that earth is flat or round, in the up or down or middle and if any of them, he would go on to show that it was better for it to be so. On the basis of his need for One Real Explanation, I think, we can elaborate why Anaxagoras’ Mind was so attractive for young Socrates. He emphasizes precisely on this point saying (98a1-b3): If he showed me those things I should be prepared never to desire any other kind of cause. I was ready to find out in the same way (οὕτω … ὡσαύτως) about the sun and the moon and …., how it is best (πῇ ποτε ταῦτ᾽ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν) that each should act or be acted upon. I never thought that Anaxagoras, who said that those things were directed by Mind, would bring any other cause for them than that it was best for them as they are (βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει). Once he had given the best for each (ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον) as the cause for each and the general cause of all, I thought he would go on to explain the common good for all (τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν). What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what he had been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not be satisfied with their explanations because they were unable to explain how it is the best for everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, that it was the lack of the unifying Good in their explanation that had disappointed him. Politis, conversely, thinks it is not true to say Socrates introduced this new method of explanation because of the fact that they were not good-based. 'Socrates’ complaint against traditional explanation', he says, 'is independent of and prior to his becoming hopeful about good–based ones.' (2010, 99) If we have to accept that what he means by ‘good-based’ explanation is the same with what Socrates had in mind about Anaxagoras’ theory, Politis is misleading here. Socrates’ hope for Anaxagoras’ theory was, I believe, owing to the fact that he had been disappointed with natural philosophers’ explanations which justifies the suggestion to take that which is included in this new theory as the same with what was absent before. It is also misleading, I think, to call Socrates' theory teleological if we mean by this some kind of explanation that must be considered besides other kinds of explanation as, for example, Taylor thinks (1998, 11). If we behold the essential relation between the Good and the knowledge and observe the fact that the good is here considered as the basis of explanation, we cannot be satisfied with putting it besides other kinds of explanations only as one kind. It must be insisted that we are discussing what Socrates thought Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should have been, not about Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not about what Socrates found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On the contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 98b, but Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. It was Anaxagoras’ fault not to find out how to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-99b). He 'made no use of Mind nor gave it any responsibility for the management of the things, but mentioned as causes air and either and water and many other strange things'. (98b8-c2) Socrates’ complaint against Anaxagoras, as it is obvious in the text above, is not against Anaxagoras as the creator of Mind, but is against Anaxagoras as a natural scientist who turned back to their method of explanation. Socrates’ example of the explanation of his staying at prison, 98e-99b, confirms it. He says when we make a mistake like what Anaxagoras had made and paid attention to many causes, it is the ignorance of 'true causes' (ἀληθῶς αἰτίας) (98e1). Socrates says that 'to call those things causes is too absurd' (99a4-5) and by those things he means all things that, though are necessary for its being as it is, they are not the causes of its being as it is. Though they are necessary, but are not the Real causes. We can clearly see his main concern about a cause in 99b2-4: Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause (αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι) (99b2) from that without which the cause cannot be able to act as a cause (ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ᾽ εἴη αἴτιον). (99b3-4) We cannot call them causes and this name does not belong to them. They cannot be causes and explanations since they cannot explain the Good in what they want to explain. Socrates gives an example to show how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words δέον συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good shows that he want it to have a unifying role: They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and holds them together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται). (99c5-6) At the end of discussing what he would like to be the explanation but became disappointed, he is still hopeful to find someone to teach him the workings of that kind of cause (99c6-8) which definitely shows he was not thoroughly disappointed of finding the way of using good in explanation. It is on this basis that we say One Real Explanation is the highest degree of explanation for him. What he suggests later on as the explanation by Forms is only a 'second voyage' (δεύτερον πλοῦν) (99c9-d1). Whatever this ‘second’ might mean, as Hackforth (1955, 137) notes, it must include some kind of ‘inferiority to πρῶτος πλοῦς’. His following use of the method of hypothesis after he finds that that wonderful One Real Explanation cannot be discovered easily -either by himself or by anyone else telling him its working- based on which he will make his new theory of explanation by Forms, can definitely show that the basis of explanation for him is still the Good even if he has to search for other theories of explanation. Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good at Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of seeing the truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo (99d-e) is more about the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation than its insufficiency, a difficulty precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-505a, 506d-e). What is said in Republic is totally compatible with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the sun. In spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, even if we know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it' (505a6-7). The problem of our not having sufficient knowledge of the Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the same method of Phaedo 99d-e, that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of looking at thing itself (506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of the Good with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as sun is not sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so regarding knowledge. It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the sun has for sight. Socrates draws our attention to the function of sun in our seeing. The eyes can see everything only in the light of the day being unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-6). Without the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear vision any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about knowledge based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a required condition of any kind of knowledge: The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it focuses on what is shined upon by truth and being, understands (ἐνόησέν), knows (ἔγνω) and apparently possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6) Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it with both aletheia and to on. He links them with the Idea of the Good when he is to assert the conclusion of the analogy: That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say, is the Idea of the Good: being the cause of knowledge and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας) so far as it is known (ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ). (508e1-4) Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἀγαθοειδῆ) since they are not the same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). What had been implicitly contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly being asserted in Republic. The Form of the Good in Republic, of which Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said. Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in the knowable realm, something so important that its seeing equals to understanding the fact that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful (517b). Producing both light and its source in visible realm, it controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible realm (517c). The same point is asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, where the Good is considered not only as a condition for the knowledge of X, but also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in its knowing them. At Republic VI, 508e1-3, when Socrates says that the Form of the Good 'gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower (τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν)' , he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his epistemological structure by which all the elements of this structure are bound. This point is emphasized at 509b6-7: 'the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good' (τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις … τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι … ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι). Good is the cause of knowledge (αἴτιαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης) (508e3), and the Form of the good, as is said in book VII, is the basis of knowing and its meaning since you cannot know anything without finding it: Unless someone can distinguish in an account the form of the good from everything else, cannot survive all refutation (ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν). (534b8-c1) This binding aspect of the Good is by no means a simple binding of all knowledge or all the objects of knowledge, but the most complicated kind of binding as it is expected from the author of the Republic. The kind of unity the Good gives to the different knowledge of different things is comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its participants in Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to the ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the Good. If we observe Aristotle's assertion that for Plato and the believers of Forms, the causative relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that of the Forms with particulars (e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is to say the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 988a10-11: τοῦ τί ἐστὶν, 988b4-6: τὸ τί ἢν εἶναί) of the Forms besides his statement that for them One is the Good (e.g. ibid, 988b11-13) the relation between the Good and unity may become more apparent. Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν) is more than discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this binding role is played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy by which this unifying role is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that the Good gives to the knowledge and its objects in the intelligible realm is comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the sight and its objects in the visible realm (508b-c). The allegory of Line (Republic VI, 509d-511), like that of the Sun, tries to bind all various kinds of knowledge. The hierarchical model of the Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from imagination to understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all kinds of knowledge by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of hypothesis starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a hypothesis that is not directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion (510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other subsection, to a 'principle which is not a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the 'unhypothetical principle of all things' (ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν) (511b6-7). This παντὸς must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm but to the sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, bound and, thus, unified by. III To pass over that theory of explanation by the Good to attach a new theory in Phaedo, Socrates needs a new method, the method of hypothesis. This method is used to represent an image of what the real explanation is, enabling us to look at the real one. He describes this method as such: However, I started in this manner: taking as my hypothesis in each case the theory that seemed to me the most compelling. I would consider as true, about cause and everything else, whatever agreed with this, and as untrue whatever did not so agree. (100a3-7) It is through this method that he comes to the kind of cause he has always been concerned about (100b2-3). Though his new kind of explanation is emphasized to be what he has never stopped talking about, I am not to agree with Bluck (2014, 14) that in this coming to the theory of explanation by Forms, there is a transition from ‘purely Socratic thought to Plato’s own development of it’ because the theory of good-based explanation in neither less Platonic than the theory of Forms nor is in a lower rank. However, Socrates knows that this theory can be used only when the existence of Forms has been accepted (100b7-9). If we accept the existence of forms, there will be no better way to explain a thing unless by its form: I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. (100c4-6) He calls this theory simple, naïve, and foolish and emphasizes that it is not the way of the relation between things and their Form that is important for this kind of explanation but this very theory of Form as explanation (100d). He also calls this answer to the question of explanation the safest answer and impossible to fall into error. It is not an answer which makes us surprised, but the most predictable one. He mentions the problem of the same explanations for the opposites again adding another problem which is the problem of explanation by the opposites: Bigger is bigger by a head which is small and this would be strange, namely, that someone is made bigger by something small. (101b1-2) Bostock (1986: 137) interprets this as the third condition of explanation and formulates it as such: “A cause cannot be the opposite of the effect it has”. We can also see this theory, for instance, in Timaeus 29b5-9. The theory of explanation by Forms is the most possible consistent theory with this kind of thinking. The Forms are the only things that can be the aitia of things: You would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Two-ness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this… (101c2-6) Let us return to the method of hypothesis on which he based his theory of explanation by Forms. He told us that in this method we should take the most compelling theory as our hypothesis and then analyze everything on its basis: Whatever agrees with it will be considered as true and whatever not, as false. The theory of Form as explanation is his first hypothesis here. It is obvious that the theory was the most compelling theory for him. Now he says that before examining the consequence of this theory, you should not examine the hypothesis itself; and continues: 'When you must give an account of your hypothesis itself, you will proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you the best of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable.' (101d5-e1) Now we know that we should examine the consequences of our theory and be careful not to jumble the consequences and the hypothesis at once. What is the consequence of the theory of Form as explanation? It might have happened that one thing has two opposite Forms. Let’s see his example: If you say these things are so, when you then say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, do not you mean that there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness? (102b3-6) Thus, it is obvious that it cannot be an explanation of something just by referring to its Form because it can share many Forms and it cannot be meaningful to say something is so and so because it shares a Form and it is such and such because it shares another Form, the opposite to the first one. It is noteworthy that this is not the same with what we have discussed as a problem in physical explanation (the opposite things as the cause of the same things) but something different: the opposite things as the cause of opposite characters of the same thing. In the former case, for example, addition and division were the causes of the same thing, two-ness, while here tallness and shortness are the causes of two opposite characters, being taller than Socrates and being shorter than Phaedo, in the same person, Simmias. While the first problem forced Socrates to look for one explanation for all things, this problem will make him distinguish between what is the thing itself and what it happened to have: It is not, surely, the nature of Simmias to be taller than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he happened to have (τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων). Nor is he taller than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness compared with the tallness of the other? (102c1-4) These are what happened for them to have and they do not have them because they are themselves as if these characters make their nature. This is only tallness that has tallness as its nature and only shortness that has shortness as its nature. Thus: Not only tallness itself is never willing to be tall and short at the same time, but also that the tallness in us will never admit the shortness or be overcome. (102d6-8) He concludes that the opposites themselves (not what have them by accidence) cannot accept each other while they are themselves. This leads us to a crucial point: only what that shares in a Form by its nature, refuses its opposite or cannot have it while it is itself. It means we can explain a thing by a Form it shares in only when it shares in it essentially. He says: It is true then about some of these things that not only the Form itself deserves its own name for all time, but there is something else- that is not the Form but has its character whenever it exists. (103e2-5) Every tall thing shares in the Form of tallness because it is tall, but only what has tallness in its nature can deserve the name of the Form essentially. What we have used as our example here, tallness, is his previous example and is not suitable to show what he wants to show us because there is not or at least we are not aware of a special thing which has tallness by its nature except the Form of tallness itself. Socrates’ own examples are ‘fire’ and ‘snow’ which have hotness and coldness by their nature and cannot accept the opposite. We have, thereupon, three classes of things: Forms (hot itself); what shares in or has the Form by its nature (fire); and what shares in Form by accidence (every hot thing). It is only the second or what shares in Form by nature that refuses its opposite. It is in this way that Socrates solves the problem of explanation by Form, the explanation of two opposite characters of a thing by two opposite Forms. Everything that shares in a Form by nature is always called with that Form and can never be called by the opposite: It cannot 'admit that Form which is opposite to that which it is' (104b9-10). He uses the examples of odd and even: Consider three: do you not think that it must always be called both by its own name and by that of the Odd, which is not the same as three? That is the nature of three, and of five, and of half of all the numbers; each of them is odd, but it is not the Odd. (104a5-b1) By this method, he reaches to a necessary opposition between things which are not the opposites: Five does not admit the Form of the Even, nor will ten, its double, admit the Form of the Odd. The double itself is an opposite of something else, yet it will not admit the Form of the Odd. (105a6-b1) Now he can extend his previous safe and foolish theory of explanation by Forms (by resolving that problem of the explanation of opposite Forms in the same thing) and pass to another not foolish but still safe theory of explanation. (105b6-c6) Let us review what we have discussed above and summarize them: 1. Plato cannot be satisfied with the natural scientists’ explanations since they have ignored to introduce One Real Explanation. 2. That One Real Explanation, for Plato, is a theory that i) can explain all things by a unitary way of explanation, and ii) can do this with showing how it is good or best for them to be as they are. Plato was disappointed with Anaxagoras’ Mind because he did not show how Mind could satisfy the conditions mentioned above (Anaxagoras used many other causes and did not use Mind to show how it was best for everything to be as it was). In spite of the fact that Anaxagoras made him disappointed, Plato did not leave the above conditions as the necessary conditions for an explanation. He had to come to other theories of explanation as 'second best' ones because neither he himself nor anyone else could show "the workings" of such an explanation. 3. He represents the theory of explanation by Form as his own confused theory of explanation as the safest, but foolish. Having encountered with the problem of the two opposite Forms as explanations of two opposites in one thing, he used the leading point of the method of hypothesis that when you reach to a problem and want to examine the hypothesis itself, you should assume another hypothesis; and he came to distinguish between what a thing is by its nature and what it is by accidence. The result was a new theory of explanation based on the previous theory through making limitations on it: the theory of explanation only by those Forms to which a thing shares by its nature. He still preserves this crucial point that explanation should refer to the Forms. What is added to this point here is that he restricts and limits that theory to the Forms which refer to the nature of what is going to be explained. IV Finally we should ask again what is Plato’s theory of explanation? Does he have one unitary theory of explanation? Taylor thinks that we cannot find a 'single principle' of explanation in Phaedo. Annas (1995, 25) thinks that Plato’s argument in Phaedo is a mixed one because he could not distinguish between different meanings of the explanation which Aristotle did. She says that Phaedo is ‘a classic case of what Aristotle regards as confusion arising from failure to note that a philosophically important term is being used as though it had a single sense, whereas in fact it is crucially ambiguous’. She thinks that Plato is 'confusedly treating together different kinds of explanation' and continues: A grasp of Aristotle’s point in physics II3 would have enabled Plato to transform his confused discussion into an unconfused discussion of three distinct kinds of explanation; but Plato shows no sign of any such grasp. (ibid) Vlastos recognizes three kinds of explanation in Plato to show how he anticipates Aristotle’s doctrine: Plato has not only distinguished here mechanical from teleological causes…. but has also come within sight of the still more radical distinction between both of these and the logical aitia of classification and entailment. (1971: 166) He thinks that Plato’s use of that ‘safe’ explanation was in order to 'explode pseudo–problems which arise when the categorical difference between logical and physical aitia is ignored' (ibid). Politis, on the other side, thinks that Plato defends a 'unitary account of explanation, i.e. an account that is supposed to be true of each and every explanation without distinction' (2010: 98). For him, this unitary account is nothing but essence. He says that Plato cannot distinguish between the teleological and formal explanations 'for he thinks that all explanations are formal and essence-based' (ibid: 99). What Plato distinguishes, he thinks, is between those essence–based explanations appealing to the essence of the good and those that do not appeal to it and believes that 'good-based explanations depend on essence–based ones' (ibid: 101) because it is necessary for good–based explanations if they are to satisfy what he calls the requirements of explanation, to depend on essence–based explanations (ibid: 101-102). He even says that 'good–based explanations are a kind of essence–based explanations' (ibid: 102). What I think is that we have a unitary theory of explanation we called One Real Explanation which is good-based. Based on this ground, even if explanation by Forms appealing to essence may be a second ranked explanation, it must be regarded on the same principle (good-based explanation) and under his unitary theory of One Real Explanation. As White (1989, 166) points out, ‘the second voyage will be directed toward’ the Good because otherwise Socrates appeal to what is “best” would be misleading. This becomes more apparent if we pay attention to the relation of Good and Forms as is construed in Republic or reported by Aristotle. Consequently, if we have Republic in mind, where the Good plays the causal role it were to play in Phaedo and is explicitly taken as aitia (cf. Herrmann 2007), the good-based unitary theory comes more apparent. If not, maybe we will not have such a single principle between One Real Explanation and explanation by Form and essence. In spite of the fact that we agree with Politis that Plato defends a unitary account of explanation, we have to disagree with his reduction of explanation to essence since we must consider the theory of explanation by essence either as a theory that is a second theory lower than One Real Explanation or as a theory that will finally come along with it based on the relation between Forms and the Form of the Good in Republic. In this way, we should accept that One Real Explanation is an explanation which seems inaccessible in Phaedo but achieved in Republic. If so, his overall theory of explanation is that there should be one explanation for all things and this explanation explains the presence of good in them. In this interpretation, we must consider the theories of 'explanation by Form' and 'explanation by Form appealing to essence' as the steps that cannot reach the One Real Explanation. Neither is the theory of explanation by Forms nor the theory of explanation by Forms appealing to essence are thus complete. They are some steps toward that One Real Explanation, but necessarily uncompleted steps that cannot reach it at least in Phaedo. If we add the Form of the Good as the highest Form which all other Forms share in, as it is said in Republic, and continue the method of hypothesis as it is drawn out in Phaedo, we will have, then, a complete theory of explanation by the Form of the Good and need only one more step: taking good as the essence of all the Forms or what all of them share in. Such being the case, our theories of explanation by Form and explanation by Form that appeals to the essence will be completed with the theory of good as the essence of all explanations and thus can be included in One Real Explanation. If this can be done, it, however, will show that we have a unitary theory of explanation in Plato’s philosophy. Notes