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65Skorupski’s Middle Way in MetaethicsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1): 192-200. 2012.
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26Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow‐RasmussenPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 412-422. 2003.In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen I defend trope‐value reductionism against three challenges. 1 focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenab…Read more
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99On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory : Reply to Evers, Streumer, and ToppinenJournal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4): 461-473. 2016.This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenienc…Read more
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80Error Theory in MetaethicsIn Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 58-71. 2017.Error theories have been proposed and defended in several different areas of philosophy. In addition to ethics, there are error theories about numbers, color, free will, and personal identity. Moral error theories differ in scope. Theories at one end of the spectrum take normative judgments in general—of which moral judgments are a subclass—to be uniformly false, whereas theories at the other end of the spectrum take only a subclass of moral judgments—example those concerning duty and obligation…Read more
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78Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, DefenceJournal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4): 397-402. 2016._ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 397 - 402 Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral…Read more
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549In defense of moral error theoryIn Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics, Palgrave-macmillan. 2010.My aim in this essay is largely defensive. I aim to discuss some problems for moral error theory and to offer plausible solutions. A full positive defense of moral error theory would require substantial investigations of rival metaethical views, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. I will, however, try to motivate moral error theory and to clarify its commitments. Moral error theorists typically accept two claims – one conceptual and one ontological – about moral facts. The conceptual cla…Read more
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1360Brentano's MetaethicsIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, Routledge. pp. 187-195. 2017.This chapter explains Franz Brentano's metaethical theory and how it purports to deal with such difficulties. Brentano explains correctness in emotions by analogy with correctness in judgements. For a judgement to be correct is for it to concord with a judgement made by someone who judges with self-evidence (Evidenz). Self-evident judgements are guaranteed to be correct, and they are based either on "inner perception" or on presentations of objects that are rejected apodictically. Brentano's met…Read more
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178The wrong kind of solution to the wrong kind of reason problemUtilitas 21 (2): 225-232. 2009.The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me
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89Regimenting ReasonsTheoria 61 (3): 203-214. 2005.The Belief‐Desire model (the B‐D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It is necessary to go beyond common philosophical pr…Read more
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168G. E. Moore on goodness and reasonsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4). 2006.Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section…Read more
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144A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not ConflictUtilitas 15 (2): 194-205. 2003.Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialismper se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequ…Read more
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11Review of Robert Audi, The Good in the right: A Theory of Inuition and Intrinsic Value (review)Philosophical Review 115 (4): 540-542. 2006.
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84The ethics of care and empathy • by M. SloteAnalysis 69 (1): 190-192. 2009.Most moral philosophers who have recently expressed sympathy with feminist or ‘care-based’ perspectives on ethical theory have thought that such perspectives can make valuable contributions to more comprehensive ethical theories. Few have thought that an ethics of care can offer a complete normative theory. However, Michael Slote is one of the ambitious few. In his recent book, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, he seeks to show that a care-based perspective can do a lot of service in first-order m…Read more
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3Reasons and the new non-naturalismIn Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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18Moral Error: History, Critique, DefenceOxford University Press UK. 2017.Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
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271Brentano and the Buck-PassersMind 116 (463). 2007.According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (the WKR problem): i…Read more
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30Essays in Moral Skepticism, written by Richard JoyceInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1): 66-71. 2018._ Source: _Page Count 6
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61Revisiting the tropic of value: Reply to Rabinowicz and rønnow-RasmussenPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenab…Read more
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183Projectivism and Error in Hume’s EthicsHume Studies 37 (1): 19-42. 2011.This essay argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but this paper argues that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive meta…Read more
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40Buck‐Passing AccountsIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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210Expressivism and moral certitudePhilosophical Quarterly 59 (235): 202-215. 2009.Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates bot…Read more
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153The freshman objection to expressivism and what to make of itRatio 23 (1): 87-101. 2010.Cognitivism is the view that the primary function of moral judgements is to express beliefs that purport to say how things are; expressivism is the contrasting view that their primary function is to express some desire-like state of mind. I shall consider what I call the freshman objection to expressivism. It is pretty uncontroversial that this objection rests on simple misunderstandings. There are nevertheless interesting metaethical lessons to learn from the fact that the freshman objection is…Read more
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18Review of Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8). 2006.
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454Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, DefenceOxford University Press. 2014.Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking
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9Error theory and reasons for beliefIn Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief, Cambridge University Press. 2011.